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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: SCIENCE AND VALUE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
It may be mainly on account of a conceptual bias 
that we consider psychology an offshoot of science and not 
an evolvement of ethics. The widespread acceptance that 
psychotherapy enjoys in contemporary circles seems to 
follow from its pretensions to science, irrespective of 
their actual legitimacy (Koch, 1974). Psychologists prob-
ably would not have gained even a foothold in the 20th 
century had they suggested that their principles and pre-
scriptions comprised a mo~al doctrine--that is, a system 
of directives designating right conduct. Yet persuasive 
arguments can be mounted in support of this position as 
well, thereby giving rise to an exceedingly difficult 
dilemma. 
To the modern intellect, these contrasting claims 
seem virtually irreconcilable. The conceptual scheme with-
in which we operate admits only of mutually exclusive cate-
gories: science versus ethics, fact versus value, objec-
tivity versus subjectivity, tentativeness versus dogmatism. 
This dichotomous perspective compels psychologists to 
align themselves with one as against the other; the scien-
tific tenor of the times renders their preference nearly 
inevitable. Not surprisingly, psychology has been identi-
1 
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fied as a science. As such, it is supposed to deal exclu-
sively in the domain of facts, to be objective in its 
approach and tentative in its pronouncements. Psycholo-
gists can have nothing to do with moral values, for these 
belong to ethics and not to any science. 
Although this arrangement works well enough in theo-
ry, it breaks down irreparably when applied in the arena 
of human affairs. In the following chapters we will observe 
that psychologists cannot attain any substantial separation 
of fact and value without either severely curtailing their 
current activities or ignoring certain critical aspects of 
their subject matter; eve~ then, their success is rather 
dubious. Attempts to salvage psychology for traditional 
science typically give rise to implications less attractive 
than those they were designed to overcome. 
It is my impression that the problem lies not with 
psychology, but with the procrustean notion of science and 
ethics to which we have been taught it must conform. We 
cannot grasp the character and significance of that under-
taking so long as it remains fixed to an inadequate concep-
tual framework. I propose to put aside our dichotomous 
preconceptions for a while, and to reconsider whether there 
may be another option besides representing psychology as 
either exclusively scientific or exclusively moralistic. 
Psychology has invaded nearly every facet of modern 
life since its formal inception scarcely a century ago. 
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Because the psychological perspective has been absorbed in-
to the popular wisdom governing our attitudes toward the 
home and family, the workplace, social life and even the 
legal system, its impact upon the very way we think and act 
is inestimable. For this reason, it is a matter of practi-
cal importance and not merely one of intellectual curiosity 
that we should seek a clearer understanding of the charac-
ter and significance of psychology. No other discipline 
purporting to be a science has ever so altered our under-
standing of what it means to be a human being. It may be 
too soon to assess fully its impact upon human affairs. 
However, Rieff (1979) considers this movement momentous 
enough to merit distinction as the epochal rise of "psycho-
logical man." 
Our age is not set apart from former ones simply be-
cause a few intellectuals have devised incisive and con-
vincing explanations of human dynamics. Throughout record-
ed history--and almost certainly before--poets and scholars 
have studied the human condition; the observations they 
have left us are by no means devoid of the sort of insight 
that nowadays we term "psychological." Rather, it is be-
cause psychological principles have been deliberately ap-
propriated as a framework for guiding us in the conduct of 
our lives that this is the epoch of psychological man. 
Traditionally, of course, principles of right con-
duct have been the province of moral philosophy, religious 
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or secular. The doctrines of modern psychology are not 
about to supplant traditional systems of moral governance, 
but their respective concerns and social functions already 
overlap to a considerable extent. Until recently, however, 
this overlap had been virtually ignored; this was partly 
because the differences between their respective languages 
were more striking and partly because our preconceptions 
about science and ethics led us to explain away those simi-
larities that were evident. So although it should have 
come as no surprise to the exponents of this newer movement 
that sooner or later they would be challenged to confront 
the moral implications of their principles and practices, 
they have been caught largely unprepared. In confronting 
the moral implications of their work, psychologists must 
inevitably confront the problem of their own agency--namely, 
whether or to what extent they play scientist or moralist. 
These issues seem so intractable that, in Jahoda's words, 
"one is almost tempted to claim the privilege of ignorance" 
(1958, p. 77). Unfortunately, some psychologists still do. 
When academic psychology--which is primarily re-
search oriented--was first admitted to the ranks of legiti-
mate science, it simultaneously acquired the epithet "value-
free." Research psychologists have been able to remain 
aloof of the value controversy since then only because the 
problems inherent in the notion of scientific value-freedom 
are still unfamiliar outside a small circle of philosophers 
of science. This has fostered the false assumption that 
research constitutes a neutral enclave to which psycholo-
gists can retreat. 
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Psychologists pass the threshold of value-involvement 
unequivocally once they go beyond investigating human af-
fairs and actually attempt to influence them. Applied in-
terests signal a critical shift in emphasis--namely, from 
observation to prescription. This is readily apparent as 
regards psychotherapy, the dimension of psychology with 
which we will be primarily concerned. It is the psychother-
apist who must confront the problem of value-involvement in 
its most obvious and urgent form. 
Psychotherapy as a Technology 
The transition from theoretical to applied interests 
is a familiar one in science. With few exceptions, each 
of the established sciences has developed some correspond-
ing technology. Indeed, it is considered a fundamental 
tenet of positive science that knowledge must be technical-
ly utilizable (Habermas, 1971, p. 76). 
In recent years it has become increasingly popular 
to refer to certain forms of psychotherapy as the techno-
logy of behavior change. Whatever its descriptive merit, 
this relabeling is representative of a more widespread ten-
dency to legitimize the transition from research to practice 
in psychology by analogy to the well-established natural 
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sciences. It has been argued before that such analogies 
may confer upon psychology an unearned or undeserved credi-
bility (Koch, 1974). Here we are interested in pointing 
out that, contrary to common belief, no analogy to science 
can extricate psychology and psychotherapy from their in-
volvement in matters of moral value. 
The aim of any technology--whether derived from 
natural science or from psychology--is to obtain some pre-
determined result by exploiting the particular causal rela-
tionships known through scientific inquiry. To the extent 
that the outcome bears some relation to human interests, 
every manipulation mediated by science will have signifi-
cance morally as well as technically. Its moral signifi-
cance is actually twofold: there is the moral value of the 
result itself and the moral responsibility of the technolo-
gist who mediates that result. Both are overshadowed by 
the current emphasis upon technique. 
Of course, not all judgments made in the course of 
technological activity involve moral values directly. Some 
judgments pertain to the instrumental value of a technical 
manipulation--i.e., its usefulness in bringing about a 
particular end, without reference to the moral value of the 
end itself. These have been described as technical or 
scientific judgments. 
Houts and Krasner (1980) argue that most of the be-
havior therapist's decisions regarding strategies for inter-
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vention are of this sort, grounded in science and strictly 
technical in nature. On the other hand, London (1964) ques-
tions whether the therapist's decisions are ever exclusive-
ly technical. For example, alternative strategies for 
eliminating some circumscribed symptom may be equally effec-
tive, yet they may have vastly different moral implications. 
In essence, the relative preponderance of technical judg-
ments is irrelevant to the issue of value-involvement in 
psychotherapy--or, for that matter, in any other applied 
science--for at no point do technical judgments replace 
moral judgments. The value of the result must be assessed 
ultimately according to whether it supports or hinders the 
realization of our moral ends, whatever they may be. 
Stripped of its complexity and glamour, technology 
is simply knowledge put to use. No program of technologi-
cal activity can proceed without some prior specification 
of the use to which scientific knowledge should be put. At 
times, this decision-making process is explicit; often, 
however, such preliminary judgments remain largely tacit. 
In either case, these specifications follow from presuppo-
sitions regarding what constitutes a worthwhile end. That, 
of course, is ultimately a moral issue. 
Applied science is therefore never confined exclu-
sively to matters of factual relationship. Some conception 
of what ought to be is integral to the direction and design 
of all technological activity. Such value judgments dictate 
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not only the uses to which scientific discoveries are put, 
but even the matters that are selected for investigation 
and subsequent exploitation (Grunfeld, 1973). In light of 
these conclusions, the concept of value-freedom in science 
and technology appears to have been an idealistic but naive 
attempt to preserve scientists' own cherished illusions 
about the objectivity and impartiality of their work 
(Veatch, 1976). 
From our present perspective, technology is essenti-
ally a sophisticated prosthesis, i.e., an extension or tool 
that in effect augments man's capacity for implementing his 
intentions effectively. Up to a certain point, it may be 
legitimate to think of our technological extensions as 
value-free, in the sense that a tool is indifferent to the 
hand that guides it. A number of man's inventions can be 
pUt to use for good or for ill. But if the instrument is 
value-free in this sense, the agent who employs the instru-
ment is not. Moral responsibility for the result must rest 
squarely upon those persons whose intentions it reflects. 
The question then becomes whether the technologist himself 
should select the values that guide technological change 
efforts, or whether he must abide by someone else's judg-
ments. 
Natural scientists have already addressed this issue, 
in an attempt to clarify their moral responsibilities in 
the age of atomic science. On the one side, Bronowski 
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argues: 
The individual scientist is not the keeper of the pub-
lic conscience, because that is not what he was chosen 
for. The population at large ..• has chosen scientists 
to execute certain public orders which are thought to 
represent the public will. And you cannot ask the sci-
entist to be executioner of this will, and judge as 
well. (Bronowski, 1967, p. 584) 
On the other side, Haybittle replies: 
Where the public uses of the end-product of any scien-
tific work are known, then those scientists doing the 
work share a part of the responsibility for those uses. 
The scientist, therefore, cannot with an easy conscience 
escape from the burden of making what may be essential-
ly moral and political decisions about the work he will 
do and the results he will publish. (Haybittle, 1967, 
p. 592) 
The moral dilemma that confronts behavioral scien-
tists in this regard is considerably more complex. The as-
sumption that a technological extension is indifferent to 
its user's intentions breaks down when applied to an instru-
ment such as psychotherapy. Every invention is constructed 
to serve some human purpose and, as such, its design re-
flects the intentions of the inventor (Harris, 1965, p. 
224). Every approach to psychotherapy entails some con-
ception of human nature, and that in turn is bound inex-
tricably to some notion of the ends that human beings must 
or should pursue. Matson (1976) argues, for example, that 
one's idea of man determines for the most part what one 
will become eventually. Several authors whom we will cite 
later have analyzed in detail the relationship between par-
ticular approaches to therapy and particular valued ends. 
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In short, we cannot consider a program of psychotherapy 
value-free in the same sense that other technological ex-
tensions might be. The design of the psychotherapeutic 
program is the concrete expression of the psychologists' 
intentions. 
Max Weber, the early champion of value-freedom in 
the social sciences, argued that social scientists should 
eschew applied interests altogether. In his opinion, it 
was virtually certain that some degree of bias and distor-
tion would come into play during the transition from pure 
to applied science (Veatch, 1976, pp. 24-27). 
On the one hand, Weber feared that scientists who 
chose to subserve the interests of a particular social 
group might only confer upon those interests the cloak of 
scientific legitimacy, without regard for their actual 
worth. On the other hand, he believed that the status en-
joyed by scientists as experts in technical matters was 
often generalized improperly to include expertise in matters 
of value, either because the public desired guidance or be-
cause the scientist desired influence in such matters. 
These two extremes correspond more or less to the positions 
espoused by Bronowski and Haybittle, respectively. Within 
psychology, the first characterizes those representatives 
of the mental health establishment whom Szasz (1970) in-
dicts as covert enforcers of social conformity, while the 
second probably describes the majority of psychotherapists. 
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Despite Weber's reservations, behavioral scientists 
have continued to pursue matters of practical interest, 
applying their understanding of human nature to the prob-
lems of living. However, neither the sincerity of their 
efforts to improve the quality of human life nor their de-
monstrable successes in relieving human suffering can obvi-
ate the need for a scrupulous examination of the value pre-
suppositions that underlie those efforts. 
Of course, it is possible to assess the effective-
ness of a program of psychotherapeutic intervention without 
any reference to its moral implications. Indeed, if we 
could trust that the criterion defining its goals were mor-
ally adequate, we would have to concern ourselves only with 
matters of technical judgment. However, as long as we are 
unaware of the values embodied in the design of our pro-
grams, such an approach remains highly presumptuous. With-
out that awareness, we lack the perspective needed to as-
sess the adequacy of our therapeutic goals or even to con-
sider alternative formulations. 
If there is any truth to Matson's warning that our 
idea of man ultimately determines our own fate, it may be 
morally incumbent upon us to pursue a self-critical inquiry 
into psychological and psychotherapeutic values. Specifi-
cally, it may be a moral responsibility that we owe our-
selves, collectively and individually, inasmuch as our own 
fundamental interests hang in the balance. 
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Even the most doctrinaire scientist or technologist 
should recognize that the foregoing consideration must take 
precedence over all others. Yet, contrary to common be-
lief, a self-critical inquiry into the values embodied in 
scientific and technological programs would not constitute 
an external constraint upon their activity. On the con-
trary, the implicit purpose of scientific investigation 
and its technical application might be undermined if scien-
tists failed to pursue such an inquiry. We strive to know 
and to act only in order to augment our own well-being. 
Science and technology should serve no other end. 
Hall (1976) offers an incisive analysis of the cur-
rent tendency to treat science and technology as inviolable 
institutions rather than as provisional and tentative at-
tempts to give concrete form to our efforts to adapt. Be-
ing in actuality only extensions of this striving, their 
value is strictly instrumental and subordinate to the ful-
fillment of fundamental human interests. But when this 
means-to-end relationship is forgotten, a provisional pro-
gram of scientific-technical activity may begin to define 
the scope of "legitimate" interests instead. 
According to Hall, human evolution accelerated dra-
matically once man developed the capacity to create and to 
elaborate functional extensions of himself. Extensional 
systems are thus fundamentally constructive in nature; 
taken together, they constitute what we call culture. How-
1.3 
ever, we tend unfortunately to lose control over our exten-
sions, because we habitually conceive of them as having. an 
identity largely independent of our own. As a result, they 
become crystallized, sometimes to the extent that they con-
strain our ability to direct our own development. Hall ap-
plies the term "extension transference" to this tendency 
for extensional systems to be confused with, or even to re-
place, the human processes that are extended. He writes 
that 
once man began evolving his extensions, particularly 
language, tools, and institutions, he got caught in 
the web of ... extension transference and was both ali-
enated from himself and incapable of controlling the 
monsters he had created. In this sense, he has ad-
vanced at the expense of that part of himself that he 
had extended, and as a consequence has ended up by re-
pressing his nature in its many forms. (p. 4) 
The only way for us to undo the consequences of this self-
alienation, he suggests, is to make a deliberate effort to 
rediscover the basic living processes that lie behind our 
extensions. 
Hall points out that social scientists have been 
particularly prone to becoming trapped in extension trans-
ference. Their tendency to allow a methodology--the one 
borrowed more or less intact from the natural sciences--to 
dictate subject matter, rather than the other way around, 
is only the most obvious instance. A more subtle and diffi-
cult problem is that often social scientists are apt to 
confuse the models that they construct with the reality 
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that the models are meant to represent. This confusion 
thwarts the legitimate function of a model, which is to aid 
in the organization and interpretation of experience. It 
also transforms the model into a filter that allows only 
data congruent with the model to pass through. "The danger 
is that real-life problems are dismissed while philosophi-
cal and theoretical systems are treated as real" (p. 34). 
we might add that there is a correlative danger: that only 
technical problems involved in implementing the model are 
treated as real, while the particular values it embodies 
are not even construed as such. Hence, the values implicit 
in our models go unexamine~. 
In a subsequent chapter, we will analyze the psycho-
therapeutic enterprise as an extensional system--i.e., as 
the outcome of our attempts to externalize, formalize and 
elaborate some natural human process. From that perspec-
tive, value-involvement in psychotherapy follows directly 
from the intrinsic goal-directedness of the process that it 
extends. However, inasmuch as our awareness of this rela-
tionship has been imperfect at best, the values embodied in 
our current programs may not reflect adequately the values 
implicit in that underlying process. A critical inquiry 
into psychotherapeutic values becomes necessary. Its aim 
would be twofold: first, to elucidate those underlying 
values, and second, to modify the extended system of psy-
chotherapeutic values accordingly. 
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The call for a sharper awareness of values in psy-
chotherapy has been received with little enthusiasm, how-
ever. The reasons for this will be examined in some detail 
in the following chapters. For now, we may consider one 
source of resistance to value-critique that psychologists 
share with other social scientists. 
By the very nature of their vocation, applied social 
scientists could not follow Weber in rejecting practical 
interests. Yet, by and large, they have retained his in-
sistence upon a strict separation of their roles as scien-
tists and as private citizens. According to Veatch, this 
finds expression in "the n~ed to separate so-called scien-
tific facts from 'mere' values and preferences" (Veatch, 
1976, p. 23). 
This requirement is essentially a vestige of early 
positivism in the modern doctrine of empirical science. 
According to Habermas (1971), positivism removed the prob-
lematic issues of ethics and metaphysics from scientific 
discussions altogether simply by ruling them "undiscussable." 
These issues were excluded specifically "by restricting 
the realm of. decidable questions to the explanation of 
facts" (p. 79). Facts were defined as the possible objects 
of rigorous scientific analysis and then identified exclu-
sively with the immediate deliverances of the senses. 
Thenceforth, scientific conduct entailed strict adherence 
to methodological rules governing the manipulation of such 
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"facts." Values had no place in this scheme, so any men-
tion of them was considered unscientific. 
Nowadays it is rarely denied that values play a nec-
essary role in steering scientific investigation and its 
applications. Even Weber had acknowledged that values in-
fluenced the selection of research topics, calling this 
"value-relevance" (Veatch, 1976, p. 21). However, even 
though the prejudices of modern empiricism no longer enjoy 
unquestioned acceptance in all circles, scientists have 
yet to establish new guidelines for deciding when their in-
quiries would cease being scientific. 
This uncertainty is evident in confused attempts on 
the part of social scientists to reconcile their adherence 
to the canons of science with some justification of their 
values. Kitchener (1980) argues, for example, that a num-
ber of behavior therapists have tried to maintain two fun-
damentally irreconcilable positions simultaneously. On the 
one hand, they assert that ethical claims must be treated 
as personal biases or preferences that cannot be defended 
rationally--meaning that they are incapable of scientific 
justification. Yet, having affirmed this, they proceed to 
advance (and to defend by purportedly rational argument) 
one or another moral principle as the basis for their in-
terventions. 
An equally common approach to the values involved in 
behavioral science has been to assume that these warrant no 
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special consideration. Of this approach, Grunfeld notes: 
The position that ends are to be excluded from inquiry, 
so that our ends need not be examined, is often ration-
alized by the argument that they are unproblematic be-
cause they are universally shared--that is, shared by 
all "decent, right-thinking people." (197.3, p. 5.3) 
This approach sidesteps the inconsistencies that follow 
from any attempt to affirm the canons of empirical science 
and of morals simultaneously. However, as Grunfeld goes on 
to indicate, it is a rather dubious assumption that the 
values in question enjoy universal support. 
In all likelihood, the notion of a strict separation 
of scientist and citizen roles should join the concept of 
value-freedom in science and technology as another naive 
and outdated ideal. 
The Crisis in Science and Psychology 
Overall, the foregoing considerations suggest that 
applied psychology cannot be freed from its involvement in 
moral values merely by aligning it with other scientific 
technologies. However, some psychologists (e.g., those 
trained in research or in behavior therapy) have had re-
course to a second line of defense in attempting to vindi-
cate their principles and programs: They claim that psycho-
therapeutic principles and programs are valid--or at least 
relatively free of subjective bias and distortion--because 
they are generated in accordance with established scienti-
fic procedures. 
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Ironically, .rather than rescuing it from the problem 
of value-involvement, this attempt to align psychology with 
empirical science has unintentionally ensnared it in a more 
intractable difficulty. We have already noted that values 
underlie even the investigation stage of scientific activi-
ty, and that scientists may fall prey to extension trans-
ference when handling their models. Although these are 
serious concerns, they pale somewhat before the more radi-
cal chorus of criticism raised by philosophers of science 
over the last 25 years. Their criticisms challenge the ob-
jectivity of any scientific investigation or the truth-
value of its results. 
Practitioners of science have been taught that the 
surest route to certainty in the pursuit of knowledge lay 
in rigorous adherence to the rules of scientific methodol-
ogy. Psychologists have assumed, quite naturally, that 
this guarantee would generalize to their discipline as well, 
as long as they were equally scrupulous about adhering to 
the scientific method. There is admittedly some debate as 
to whether the natural-scientific method is appropriate to 
psychological subject matter, or whether it generates only 
trivial knowledge when employed by psychologists (Koch, 
1974). Nonetheless it is generally taken for granted that, 
trivial or not, the knowledge so obtained is somehow more 
certain than that obtained by other means. 
This position has been cast in doubt by recent cri-
19 
tics of science, who suggest that our scientific programs 
actually rest upon unverifiable assumptions. These assump-
tions are believed to be largely sociocultural in nature 
and specific to particular historical periods (Kuhn, 1970). 
These assumptions are made prior to the execution of any 
science; more importantly, they define the character of 
scientific activity itself. As a result, they cannot be 
verified by scientific procedures--which, according to the 
doctrine of empirical science, is the only way that know-
ledge can be validated (Popper, 1959). Consequently, there 
is no assurance that scientific standards are either abso-
lute or unchanging. Feyerabend (1971, p. 228) has gone so 
far as to suggest that one's preferences in regard to com-
peting theories may be merely a matter of "taste." The 
character of observational data is believed to be condi-
tioned by the theoretical structure and procedures of the 
prevailing scientific community--that is to say, observation 
is "theory-laden" (Hanson, 1972) • 
Obviously, these conclusions undermine the doctrinal 
foundations of empirical science. The empirical method, 
once thought to be the cornerstone of science, has been dis-
credited as the sole route to genuine knowledge. If scien-
tific investigations are to constitute a valid source of 
knowledge at all, some other way of verifying their under-
lying assumptions must be available. So far, however, the 
parties involved have failed to agree upon the nature (or 
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even the existence) of that principle or procedure. A few 
critics have abandoned the search altogether, claiming that 
science is actually a social process; in their view, all 
judgments as to whether scientific knowledge is valid fol-
low from paradigms that are socially generated and accepted 
by consensus. 
It is not yet settled whether the conclusions out-
lined above are true of science itself, or whether they are 
merely the logical consequence of an inadequate conception 
of the scientific process. I am persuaded by Harris' (1970a) 
argument that it is the prevailing conception of science 
that is flawed, and not the process itself. In either case, 
however, our beliefs about science are clearly in need of 
fundamental revision. (We will explore this matter further 
in Chapter Seven.) 
It should be apparent that these challenges under-
mine the empiricist's insistence upon a thoroughgoing sepa-
ration of fact and value in science. Grunfeld (1973, p. 53) 
argues that social scientists cannot erase their biases 
simply by "keeping to the facts": Their judgments as to 
what constitutes a fact, which facts are to be admitted as 
relevant, and how these are to be interpreted are already 
conditioned by the theories they entertain. (Harris, 1970b, 
makes essentially the same point.) The scientists' judg-
ments are conditioned by other factors as well--e.g., by 
the values implicit in their initial approach to the phenom-
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ena theorized, and (more subtly, perhaps) by their attitude 
toward the activity of science itself. 
We are apt to overlook such preconditioning influ-
ences because they are embedded so firmly in the structure 
of our thinking. When we are aware of them at all, our 
biases and values seem self-evident or a matter of common 
sense. More often than not, these are externalized along 
with the rest of our theoretical framework. Extension 
transference then comes into play: We begin to treat our 
biases and values as part of the reality we are observing. 
This dissociation is actually enforced by empiricist doc-
trine, first, because it denies that values could be in-
volved in a rigorously "scientific" treatment of facts and, 
second, because it prohibits the value-critique that could 
challenge this denial. Grunfeld cautions that "by isolating 
a theory of behavior from the values on which it is based, 
we do not make it 'scientific,' we merely take its values 
for granted" (1973, p. 46). 
Psychology is an especially vulnerable target for 
the argument that scientific formulations are susceptible 
to the influence of socially-conditioned presuppositions 
regarding their respective objects. Of course, man's under-
standing of the natural world in its various aspects may be 
influenced by his prevailing ideology; the long reign of 
the Ptolemaic model attests to that. Yet one might only ex-
pect that when the object of scientific study is man him-
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self, this influence is likely to be magnified considera-
bly. Grunfeld even suggests that 
most of the problems of observation in behavioral sci-
ence stem from the shared humanity of the scientist 
and his subject matter. Because the behavioral scien-
tist speaks the same language of those whose behavior 
he is studying, it seems to him as though action is 
directly observed without mediation of hypotheses. Yet 
that meanings are shared is only a presumption and dif-
ferent interpretations of the empirical findings are 
always possible. (1973, p. 48) 
No area of scientific investigation can compare to psychol-
ogy in terms of the depth to which its object is a matter 
of human interest. The most rigorous possible adherence 
to the traditional methodology of science may still oe in-
sufficient to safeguard ag~inst introducing our biases and 
values into our psychological models of man. 
Since the Enlightenment, scientists and moralists 
have acceded (tacitly, for the most part) to partitioning 
experience into two discrete realms, that of natural phe-
nomena and that of human affairs, each group claiming its 
own jurisdiction. This partition corresponds to the pur-
ported separation of fact and value. The once precise di-
vision between these realms has become increasingly indef-
inite, however, owing largely to the rise of psychology as 
a formal science. The subject matter of psychology cannot 
be fitted neatly into one category or the other, in con-
trast to those of either the natural sciences or moral and 
political philosophy. For this reason, the identity crisis 
to which science has succumbed recently is focused most 
sharply in psychology. 
When psychologists approach their subject matter 
unself-consciously, they are more or less indifferent to 
the traditional lines drawn between science and ethics. 
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They move rather freely between statements of fact and as-
sertions of value, although this movement is disguised 
partly because both are framed in the language of psychol-
ogy. Trouble arises when psychologists are pressed to de-
clare their allegience in terms of that two-category system. 
They have opted overwhelmingly to align themselves with the 
factual rather than with the moral, but this is ultimately 
an untenable solution. One might conclude from this that 
psychological investigations are destined to remain subjec-
tive and therefore undeserving of scientific status. There 
is an alternative, however. The acute polarization of the 
scientific and moral attitudes in psychology may provide 
the opportunity for a synthesis that might spearhead the 
impending redefinition and renewal of science. We will ex-
plore this possibility later. 
Psychotherapy and Moral Responsibility 
For the most part, natural scientists engaged in 
routine research and its application have been indifferent 
to the recent crisis in our understanding of science. To 
the scientifically inclined, it seems almost ludicrous to 
deny that the deliverances of modern science constitute 
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real knowledge, so philosophers of science have been left 
to debate their epistemological concerns among themselves. 
The widespread indifference to these concerns about science 
can hardly be countenanced, however, given their profound 
moral and practical implications. For one, we can no long-
er trust that the changes wrought by modern science neces-
sarily represent progress. It is up to us to determine 
whether the values embodied in the technological extensions 
shaping our material world--and our collective lifestyle--
are adequate. So far only a few scientists have abandoned 
the spurious mantle of value-freedom to join the ranks of 
concerned laymen who have begun to ask such questions. 
The moral implications of the current crisis in 
science are even more compelling with respect to the theory 
and practice of psychology, so the need for a critical ex-
amination of the values embodied in those activities is 
correspondingly greater. As was noted earlier, much of 
what we believe to be objectively true of human nature may 
be actually a projection of our own unexamined and possi-
bly inadequate values and preconceptions. Consequently, 
it is hazardous to assume that developments in psychologi-
cal science will lead ineluctably to the proper understand-
ing of human nature. Koch (1974) alludes to the moral re-
percussions that accompany the adoption of any of our pur-
portedly factual models of mans 
Such "knowledge," when assimilated by a person, is no 
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neutral addition to his furniture of confusions: it 
has an awesome capacity to bias the deepest attitudes 
of man towards Man, to polarize sensibility. After 
all, the formulations of the positive study of man pre-
tend to define human reality, to delimit the ends and 
mechanisms of conduct. (Koch, 1974, p. 7) 
The message here is clearly that we should be circumspect 
about the psychological mold into which we would cast our-
selves, suggesting that a critical examination of the values 
entailed in psychological theory and practice is in order. 
As I see it, the activity in which psychotherapists 
are engaged is essentially that of establishing how, accord-
ing to the principles of psychology, a person ought to con-
duct himself or herself. Psychotherapists articulate their 
psychological insights in practical terms, and then assist 
or instruct individuals in applying these to the mundane 
affairs of living. Although undoubtedly susceptible to some 
qualification--the details of which would depend upon one's 
theoretical orientation--this characterization does lay 
bare several basic issues: Are there indeed any objective 
principles of psychology? If so, what are they and how 
are they derived? Is the implied (or even explicit) "ought" 
of psychotherapeutic prescriptions of a moral or a nonmoral 
nature? Are psychotherapists merely technicians who ren-
der their services on a contractual basis, or are they de 
facto arbiters of moral conduct? Unfortunately, our under-
standing of these issues has advanced little in the 25 years 
since the problem of values in psychotherapy was addressed 
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in its own right. 
In simple terms, the psychologist must reconcile the 
demands of two masters, science and ethics, for his activi-
ties straddle their traditional domains. On the one side, 
he owes much of his current authority to his alignment 
with science. Having been taught to believe that scienti-
fic pursuits automatically enjoy both conceptual validity 
and technical efficacy, we tend immediately to grant psy-
chology a certain credibility. On the other side, the 
psychotherapist appears to be the modern counterpart of 
the shamans, ministers and teachers of earlier moral tra-
ditions, at least in terms of his social function. This 
resemblance prompted London (1964) to describe the psycho-
therapeutic discipline as a secular priesthood--in his 
words, the "saving guild." 
Even if Koch (1974) is correct that psychotherapists 
are something less than exemplary scientists--a judgment 
that presumes the current definition of science is sound--
it still seems plausible that they are something more than 
priests or dogmatists. What they are exactly, and what 
they do with respect to the categories of science and ethics 
will be the subject of our discussion. 
The one conclusion we cannot avoid is that, by the 
very nature of their activity, psychotherapists advance 
and promote moral values of some sort. 
When psychotherapists practice their discipline, 
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their principal intent is to influence in some predeter-
mined way the thoughts, feelings and behavior of their cli-
ents. In this regard, it is irrelevant whether they employ 
explicit directives and behavioral interventions or more 
subtle techniques such as reflection and interpretation, as 
long as the intended outcome is obtained. Psychotherapists 
cannot disavow the influence they wield over others without 
undermining the claim that psychotherapy is effective (Lon-
don, 1964). They have no choice but to assume responsi-
bility for the nature of their influence. 
What is the nature of the psychotherapists' influ-
ence? It is virtually axiomatic that all deliberate and 
reasoned change efforts are meant to achieve ends consid-
ered worthwhile by their initiators. The implicit (or ex-
plicit) basis for deciding whether some end is worthwhile 
is one's understanding of fundamental human interests--
i.e., moral interests. Hence, such selections entail moral 
judgments, and the change efforts designed to realize those 
ends involve the advance and promotion of particular values. 
There are no unassailable arguments for exempting psycho-
therapeutic change efforts from this general characteriza-
tion. Therefore, to the extent that psychotherapists advo-
cate, approve, direct or support certain changes, they are 
affirming concurrently the differential value--moral value--
of the corresponding ends. 
As I indicated at the outset, principles and pre-
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scriptions for human conduct have been traditionally the 
domain of ethics. Yet the principles and prescriptions of 
applied psychology apparently serve the same function--
namely, that of guiding persons in the proper conduct of 
their lives. Admittedly, the therapists' interpretations 
and interventions are framed in a language unlike that of 
any traditional system of moral governance, and in promot-
ing their model of psychological man they seem to display 
little of the dogmatism typically associated with those 
traditional systems. But the novel language may only ob-
scure the values implicit in the therapists' scheme, and 
the apparent absence of dogmatism may actually suggest that 
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we have already been indoctrinated successfully into that 
system of values. 
I am not suggesting that there is no significant 
difference between the psychotherapeutic program and tradi-
tional ethical systems. We will find later that there is 
indeed one of great significance. My point is that we 
should not allow any superficial lack of resemblance be-
tween them to obscure their common function: to provide 
moral guidance. As change agents, psychotherapists are 
perforce moral agents. Because their object is to change 
persons along certain lines, they cannot help but to ad-
vance and promote particular values. 
Once psychotherapists acknowledge this, they may 
recognize that it is their moral responsibility to ensure 
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that theirs are the most adequate values available. From 
the moral point of view, the value of psychotherapy itself 
rests in the adequacy of the values that therapists advance 
and promote. If these values are inadequate in some re-
spect, they are liable to lead persons into the sort of 
error and conflict that moral reasoning is meant to avert. 
It is obviously inconsistent with the therapists' 
fundamental commitment that they might risk engendering 
error or conflict, even if only unwittingly. After all, 
they find themselves in a position of moral agency precise-
ly because they intend to bring about worthwhile changes. 
The assurance that psychotherapeutic values are adequate 
can come only from a vigorous and open critique of the moral 
implications of the psychotherapeutic program. 
The call for an ongoing value-critique should not 
be read as a moral indictment of the psychotherapeutic en-
terprise. It would not constitute even an external con-
straint, either upon the practice of psychotherapy or upon 
the intellectual freedom of its proponents. To the con-
trary, a critical awareness of values is fundamental to the 
entire undertaking. Bergin (1980) anticipates this in part, 
warning his colleagues: "If we are unable to face our val-
ues openly, it means we are unable to face ourselves, which 
violates a primary principle of professional conduct in 
our field" (p. 102). 
This principle of critical self-awareness is more 
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than a matter of professional conduct, however. It is en-
tailed in every program of psychotherapy--the circumscribed 
and highly focused behavior therapies as well as the broad-
er psychodynamic and existential approaches. I will try 
to show in the following chapters that the psychotherapeu-
tic enterprise is founded on the self-critical analysis 
and modification of human values. Indeed, the natural hu-
man activity extended as psychotherapy is the value-
formative process itself. 
Our investigation is planned as follows: 
In Chapter Two, we will explore in more detail why 
psychotherapists are reluctant to pursue the problem of 
value-involvement in psychotherapy. We will also note 
some of the ways in which therapists as well as their cli-
ents introduce moral values into psychotherapy. 
Chapter Three begins with another look at why values 
are intrinsic to the psychotherapeutic program. We will 
discover that, on the one hand, current approaches to ther-
apy promote somewhat incongruous value-systems, while on 
the other hand, most therapists are agreed on one position 
with respect to values. The unsatisfactory implications of 
each will be indicated. 
Chapters Four and Five examine various considera-
tions that point to the need for an explicit self-critical 
inquiry into values as an ongoing part of the psychothera-
peutic enterprise. Chapter Four argues that in order to 
31 
ensure that the psychotherapeutic design for living is an 
adequate one, the value presuppositions that condition its 
theoretical formulations and strategies for intervention 
must be elucidated and scrutinized. Social and normative 
values should be subjected to similar scrutiny. Chapter 
Five discusses various objections and subtle forms of re-
sistance to psychologists' adoption of an ongoing value-
critique, demonstrating that these lack a defensible foun-
dation. 
Chapter Six begins with an examination of the ambi-
guity that currently pervades psychologists' understanding 
of the relation between the psychotherapeutic ideal and 
social and normative values. We will find that inasmuch 
as no existing value-system (including the current psycho-
therapeutic ideal) can be employed justifiably to evaluate 
its rivals, some other standard of moral valuation is re-
quired. An alternative approach to value-critique will be 
discussed, and it will be argued that the psychotherapeu-
tic enterprise itself is implicitly an embodiment of the 
process of value-inquiry. 
Chapter Seven explores the meaning of objectivity 
and the nature of scientific inquiry, for one of the major 
obstacles to incorporating an ongoing value-critique into 
psychology is the belief that science and ethics must be 
entirely discrete realms of discourse. We will consider 
the possibility that the activity of formulating and jus-
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tifying a system of moral governance is actually a contin-
uation of the scientific process, and not a departure from 
it. I will argue that psychology is both the apex of sci-
entific inquiry and the nascent manifestation of an objec-
tive value-formative process. 
The final chapter, Chapter Eight, is a brief over-
view of the foregoing issues, and a restatement of the ba-
sic position of this thesis--that the psychotherapeutic 
enterprise implicitly constitutes a concrete synthesis of 
science and ethics. 
CHAPTER II 
ASPECTS OF VALUE-INVOLVEMENT IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
It would be misleading to suggest that there has 
been no interest in the issue of values in psychotherapy. 
over the last 25 years a number of prominent psychologists 
have acknowledged that values play a significant role in 
psychotherapy. Articles on values now appear with some 
frequency in several professional journals, an indication 
that it has become a legitimate topic for discussion. 
Although this attention to values may be considered 
a sign of progress, the issue remains one that is peripher-
al at best. Most psychotherapists have not yet grasped 
the immediate implications of their involvement with val-
ues, so their approach to the activity of psychotherapy 
has gone largely unaltered. The scientific attitude toward 
change is understandably conservative, even inertial, and 
it is indeed a tremendous challenge to reconcile science 
and ethics. Yet most therapists devote little attention 
to values except those introduced by the client. Their 
awareness that other values may be involved in therapy goes 
hardly beyond the recognition that they must monitor them-
s·elves for any intrusion of personal values into their 
work. The latter is sound advice, of course, but it is 
little more than an elaboration of traditional admonitions 
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regarding countertransference and therapist subjectivity. 
The psychologist who hears the term "ethics" in 
connection with his work is likely to think first of "pro-
fessional ethics." A code of professional ethics is a set 
of standards established by a professional organization in 
order to regulate the activities of its members, and espe-
cially to promote propriety in certain aspects of their re-
lationship to the public. The principles devised by the 
American Psychological Association (APA, 1981) constitute 
one of the most comprehensive ethical codes of its kind. 
Professional codes of ethics address only a narrow 
range of moral issues, however. Such standards are more 
analogous to civil law than to ethics proper, and their 
relation to ethics is similar to that of civil law. Yet it 
is typically the only formal instruction in ethics offered 
to students in clinical training programs in psychology. 
Too often, according to Zemlick (1980), even this is pro-
vided only to comply with minimal standards mandated recent-
ly by the APA. One might wonder whether this indicates a 
lack of resolve on the part of the psychotherapeutic disci-
pline to take seriously its moral agency. 
Psychotherapists have responded so sluggishly to 
tpe issue of their own value-involvement for a variety of 
reasons. We have already considered those concerns common 
to all scientists. In this chapter we will examine sever-
al others that pertain specifically to psychotherapists. 
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Afterwards, we will begin to explore the reasons that their 
attempts to circumvent moral problems are untenable. 
confronting the Problem of Values 
Psychotherapy was devised originally as a system of 
practical techniques for resolving problems considered psy-
chological in nature. To this day, despite its broad im-
pact upon life outside the confines of the traditional 
therapy s~tting, the program remains geared primarily to-
ward structured, individual-oriented intervention. Given 
this emphasis upon technique, therapists have been brought 
up with the notion that the.y are applied scientists or 
technicians, whether or not their techniques parallel close-
ly those of the applied natural sciences. Their preference 
for a pragmatic approach to problem-solving is understand-
able, inasmuch as they have been entrusted to provide ser-
vice to persons searching, sometimes desperately, for re-
lief from their troubles. The pragmatic approach affirms 
the primacy of activities intended to identify, perfect 
and implement whatever "works." 
Having adopted such priorities, psychotherapists may 
Perceive the demand for moral critique either as an imprac-
tical distraction or as a disconcerting complication. Yet 
in order to ensure that their achievements constitute real 
progress toward bettering the human condition, a critical 
inquiry into values may be indispensable. This inquiry 
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would have to encompass not only those values embodied in 
existing psychotherapeutic programs, but also any objective 
moral imperatives that ought to guide our conduct and our 
development. Otherwise, we could not be certain that our 
short-term interventions were congruent with our essential, 
long-term interests. 
Psychotherapists are trained to implement models of 
diagnosis and intervention in applied treatment settings. 
Their curriculum provides little, if any, exposure to moral 
discourse, and they are neither advised nor encouraged to 
inquire into the value presuppositions of their field of 
study. Considering their lack of preparedness, it is not 
surprising that therapists are reluctant to discuss values. 
Yet we should not mistake this reluctance for an uneasiness 
with abstraction. Modern psychology is deeply rooted in 
philosophical tradition, and it is only the current intel-
lectual bias that obscures this relation. Koch (1974) even 
suggests that, for the most part, our psychological texts 
and treatises are comprised of philosophical speculations, 
embellished with references to research results of ques-
tionable significance. Psychologists' reluctance to dis-
cuss values betrays more an antipathy toward anything re-
miniscent of the "unscientific" roots of their discipline 
than some vague uneasiness with abstract speculation. 
Other factors may contribute to the profession's 
relative neglect of value-related issues. Weisskopf-
Joelson (1980) suggests that psychotherapists may be un-
willing to give up the pretense of value-freedom because 
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it might disrupt the profession's current status before the 
public. She cites several possible consequences: loss of 
the prestige borrowed against the public's trust in sci-
ence; a drop in public support and in professional fees; 
pressure to modify criteria for the selection and training 
of therapists; and the obligation to substitute a tentative 
and humble manner for their authoritarian (if benign) one. 
Weisskopf-Joelson hardly flatters the profession, 
but Albee (1980) asserts unequivocally that a "trend toward 
status and self-interest" is becoming more prevalent among 
practitioners, at the expense of their sensitivity to mat-
ters of social responsibility. There is apparently little 
sentiment among therapists that such motives violate the 
letter of their professional standards of conduct. It is 
the implicit spirit of those standards that is in question 
here. One might argue, of course, that this trend merely 
reflects that of our present society. Yet if therapists 
are indeed moral agents, they ought to examine their values 
explicitly. This seems unlikely to occur as long as they 
accept the model of professionalism encouraged nowadays. 
Although such factors as these have undoubtedly 
contributed to the current impasse, they may not consti-
tute the most serious impediment. The reluctance to admit 
that value-involvement exists is not universal among psy-
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chotherapists; indeed, there are some who acknowledge rath-
er matter-of-factly that psychotherapy is laden with values, 
including moral values. The problem of value-involvement 
becomes particularly controversial once that acknowledge-
ment has been made, for there is little, if any, consensus 
as to how values should be approached. 
Not surprisingly, the issues here differ little from 
those that have occupied moral philosophers for ages. This 
is merely testimony to the perennial difficulties that ac-
company any attempt to orchestrate human behavior. Yet, 
upon entering the arena of behavior change, applied psy-
chologists must inevitably confront these difficulties head-
on. In a few words, the dilemma therapists face is that 
they must formulate moral judgments in the apparent absence 
of an explicit and well-defended standard of valuation. 
London (1964) suggests that psychologists are reluc-
tant to tackle this dilemma largely from trepidation at its 
breadth. Problems of a moral nature demand a far more com-
prehensive approach to human conduct than most contemporary 
A psychologists have been taught to accept as legitimate. 
Recall, for example, that according to the prevailing doc-
trine of science, we minimize the risk of corrigibility by 
following conventional methodological procedures. Ques-
tions pertaining to values have been left in a virtual lim-
bo because, unless truncated severely, they fit poorly in-
to that framework. If psychologists were to address such 
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questions, they would have to venture onto uncharted waters 
where their conventional instruments were relatively use-
less. Instead, they have steered a cautious course, ad-
hering to circumscribed rules and procedures in their con-
ceptual approach to technique as well as in the research 
laboratory. Ostensibly, the lesser risk of corrigibility 
should compensate for the restriction of scope. 
The plausibility of this rationale rests largely on 
the assumption that the movement of science is inherently 
positive or progressive·. We have already found that this 
assumption is far from certain. Bereft of such support, 
the risks attendant upon any narrowly scientific approach 
begin to overshadow its supposed advantages. As long as 
we dismiss the awkward issue of value-involvement in psy-
chotherapy, we are apt to ignore not only the moral dimen-
sion of the therapist's activity, but the moral dimension 
of psychological problems as well. 
Szasz (1970) argues along these lines in his critique 
of modern psychiatry. For the most part, scientific theo-
ries of human behavior have devoted scant attention to the 
moral dimension of human relations, particularly the moral 
aspects of human conflicts. According to Szasz, the medi-
c.al-scientific approach to psychopathology assigns overtly 
amoral and impersonal explanations to problems that, in 
truth, cannot be understood properly without reference to 
issues of a moral nature. Thus, he asserts, the psychiat-
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ric perspective virtually obscures the conflicting human 
needs, aspirations and values that are at the heart of 
manY behavioral problems. Yet theorists and practitioners 
continue to employ that approach, ignoring that its cate-
gories are actually laden with covert value judgments. 
szasz concludes that this perpetuates what is essentially 
a massive fiction, the "myth of mental illness." 
This argument is commonly read with an emphasis upon 
the negative function of the "myth," i.e., the purported 
misidentification of certain behavioral phenomena as psy-
chiatric disease entities. Consequently, its impact seems 
to have been blunted by cur!ent advances in the study of 
the biological bases of severe symptomatology, as well as 
by recent (at least token) acknowledgments that many of the 
less disruptive behavioral phenomena can be treated as prob-
lems of living. 
Szasz does not proffer a simplistic equation of myth 
and falsehood, however. Myths generally have a positive 
function as well, in the sense that they service some human 
need. According to Szasz, the positive function of the 
myth of mental illness is to "render more palatable the 
bitter pill of moral conflicts in human relations" (1970, 
p. 24) • 
In short, we may be reluctant to admit that human 
life is inherently fraught with moral difficulties. So, 
rather than face the disturbing prospect that the problems 
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of living have no straightforward and certain solution, we 
promote an oblique perspective that offers at least an il-
lusion of moral security. 
In their search for a suitable palliative, the co-
vert moralists of "psychological man" appropriated the one 
problem-solving strategy that seemed unassailable, namely, 
that of modern science. Their rationale was this: If only 
our difficulties could be rendered in terms amenable to 
scientific treatment, then, by its slow yet certain prog-
ress, science might eventually provide valid solutions. To 
all appearances, these requirements were met in the psycho-
therapeutic enterprise. Its aspirations were avowedly sci-
entific, and at least some attempt was made to carry them 
over into the actual design of its programs. Indeed, until 
quite recently, it had seemed entirely plausible that the 
psychotherapeutic technology could promote the mental 
health and well-being of persons without having to promote--
or at least to defend--particular values. 
The scientific-technical approach was not advanced 
merely as a subterfuge of moral values, of course. First 
and foremost, its intent was to apply the most trusted in-
strument of knowledge-seeking available to real human prob-
lems, in the hope of attaining valid solutions. Yet this 
is hardly separable from its other apparent advantage, 
namely, that it circumvents the dilemma of having to make 
value-judgments without incorrigible standards to base them 
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upon. It is easy enough to appreciate why such an approach 
would be attractive. The natural sciences have displayed 
both a remarkable consensus regarding procedural principles 
and an impressive track record as regards the convergent 
validity of their results. In marked contrast, ethical 
studies have been plagued by a decided lack of consensus 
in their approach to moral issues, resulting in the prolif-
eration of conflicting values and apparently incongruous 
belief systems. 
So far we have indeed failed to develop a coherent 
and universally accepted program of human conduct along ex-
plicitly moral lines, and it is uncertain whether we will 
ever be able to do so. But the maneuver of substituting 
the scientific-technical world-view for former ones has 
proved to be little more than a temporary panacea. Its ini-
tial promise was an illusion, fostered by its continual 
failure to consider the dimension of values and value-con-
flict. This dimension was avoided by consistently redefin-
ing value-conflicts as problems of a nonmoral nature (Lon-
don, 1964; Szasz, 1970; Weisskopf-Joelson, 1980). 
In essence, the illusion is that moral problems, if 
not resolved, have at least been rendered irrelevant in the 
effective governance of human conduct. It encourages peo-
ple to believe, as Szasz puts it, that "mental health, con-
ceived as the absence of mental illness, automatically en-
sures the making of right and safe choices in the conduct 
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of life" (1970, p. 23). This notion is patently false, how-
ever. It also subverts the basic intent of ethics, which 
is to submit all human aims and actions to moral critique. 
The "good life" is fundamentally a moral concept, 
and only derivatively a scientific-technical one. The es-
sential link between an ideal standard of conduct and eth-
ics may be lost when the former is reduced to the psycho-
analysts' notion of adjustment or the humanists' notion of 
self-fulfillment. If we restrict our discussions of human 
conduct to those technical languages, we may fall unwitting-
ly into moral complacency. As Hall (1976) observed, one 
might overlook critical issues because the only problems 
considered relevant were those defined by one's theoretical 
system. The risk is that we might pursue some course of 
action with unreflective enthusiasm, only to succumb later 
to inadequacies that had gone undetected, unexamined or ig-
nored. Yankelovich (1981) argues convincingly that we are 
headed for such disillusionment as the humanistic design 
for living continues to break down and its inadequacies be-
come apparent. 
These considerations suggest that we cannot rely per-
manently upon any approach to regulating human conduct that 
neglects its basis in the process of value judgment. To do 
so only obscures the practical advantage of submitting val-
ues to moral critique. If we fail to recognize that the 
order we try to impose upon human behavior follows from our 
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values, it is unlikely that we will examine those presuppo-
sitions carefully. The purpose of moral critique is to as-
certain the degree to which particular values are justifi-
able, in terms of fundamental human interests. This com-
mitment implies that values that cannot be justified or 
that prove to be inadequate in some respect do not merit 
unqualified adherence. 
Here we reach the crux of the problem of values for 
psychotherapists: How are we to go about the task of sub-
mitting values for justification? Specifically, what stan-
dard are we to employ in order to determine the relative 
adequacy of particular values? 
These questions are perplexing to the modern mind, 
particularly to one with a scientific bent, biased by epi-
stemological concepts rooted in the empiricist tradition. 
That tradition, it will be recalled, defines objectivity in 
terms of adherence to certain methodological procedures ap-
plicable to the category of facts but inapplicable to that 
of values. It is widely believed that although statements 
of fact can be demonstrated to be true or false, there is 
no way to decide objectively whether one value is better 
than another. In other words, value judgments cannot be 
entertained with the same kind of certainty with which sci-
entific judgments are held. 
Of course, this leaves open the possibility that 
there could be some other kind of certainty, i.e., a sepa-
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rate procedure for validating propositions, applicable to 
the category of values but inapplicable to that of facts. 
such a solution was favored in the 17th century. Bacon, 
for example, supported the doctrine of "double truth," 
which asserted that the deliverances of both reason and rev-
elation were valid (Russell, 1945). Originally, this doc-
trine lent support to scientific claims rather than to mor-
al ones, for the scientific attitude was just beginning to 
challenge the exclusive authority of the theological and 
moral establishment of the time. 
By the 20th century, however, reason had become iden-
tified almost exclusively with the procedural rules of mod-
ern science. For most intellectuals, revelation had lost 
all but its emotional appeal. Once ethics was deprived of 
either support, the belief became more widespread that val-
ues were a subjective matter. The social sciences contri-
buted, if only unwittingly, to undermining the plausibility 
of any rational validation of values. Proponents of emo-
tivism and ethical relativism--popular theories that ad-
vance a nonrational approach to values, rooted in positiv-
ist and empiricist assumptions--have sought support in so-
cial science data (Blanshard, 1966; Kitchener, 1980). Over-
all, the intellectual mood at present is one that makes any 
nonscientific (i.e., nonempirical) approach to validation 
seem somehow inferior and less trustworthy, however vague 
that feeling might be. The recent challenge to the proce-
46 
dures of science only confuses matters more, since it casts 
doubt upon any attempt at validation whatsoever. 
The fact remains that psychologists must make judg-
ments of relative value whenever they attempt to manipulate 
human behavior. They must discriminate and choose from 
among possibilities that are often mutually exclusive. 
Therapists' selections make sense only insofar as they fol-
low from some rank-ordering of the relative worth of the 
imagined alternatives. It is not necessary that these judg-
ments be explicit; frequently, they are left implicit or 
taken as self-evident. But, whether implicit or explicit, 
this ordering of alternatives must occur. Otherwise, all 
alternatives are of equal status, and the distinctions among 
them provide no systematic basis for discriminating among 
various behaviors. 
In short, we are at an ideological crossroads. Ei-
ther we must conclude that our judgments are arbitrary, and 
abandon the task of directing behavior, or we must affirm 
that our choices are subject to justification, at least in 
principle, and attempt to develop the means of doing so. 
Yet, as Kitchener (1980) suggests, there should be no ques-
tion among psychotherapists as to which course they are com-
mitted. 
The Client's Moral Concerns 
Moral values are introduced into psychotherapy in a 
variety of ways. A few of these are obvious, but most are 
subtle and unintended. For the purposes of our analysis, 
we may isolate three sources of value-involvement in psycho-
therapy: the therapy client, the psychotherapist, and the 
psychotherapeutic program itself. In this section we will 
look at how the client introduces values into psychotherapy. 
we will examine the other sources of value-involvement in 
the next section and again in the following chapters. 
Of the three, the client is the most readily identi-
fied source of value-involvement in psychotherapy. This is 
obviously so when in the course of treatment the client 
brings up a particular moral problem or moral conflict that 
he or she is experiencing at the time. Here the therapist 
is confronted immediately and openly with the question of 
how such issues should be handled in therapy. As we have 
already seen, this is a difficult question for therapists, 
inasmuch as their studies provide them little, if any, di-
rection in dealing with moral values. Several approaches 
have been suggested and tried which avoid the therapist's 
direct involvement in promoting particular solutions to 
moral problems, but we will find that ultimately none of 
these is satisfactory. 
The question of how to handle the client's moral con-
cerns in therapy is not an uncommon one for the therapist. 
As the editors of an early symposium on values in counsel-
ing pointed out, 
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many of the problems which he is called on to help 
solve relate to moral values and their violation in the 
most direct possible manner: to sexual irregularities, 
vocational irresponsibility, guilt, religious defection, 
hatred, deceit and all the varieties of misconduct to 
which troubled people seem prone. (Bier & McCall, 
1959, p. 143) 
Before that, Rosenthal (1955) had garnered empirical sup-
port for his assumption that moral values centering around 
sex, aggression and authority were commonly involved in 
neurotic conflicts and that the client's improvement in 
therapy was related to changes in his or her values. Ac-
cording to London (1964), clients bring up moral issues in 
therapy because such concerns are genuinely troubling to 
them, and they seek the therapist's guidance in resolving 
their moral conflicts because they feel that some resolu-
tion is necessary if they are to live more harmonious and 
more satisfying lives. 
In the last section we discussed Szasz's contention 
that many of the problems encountered in living are moral 
problems, or at least involve moral issues. Both Buhler 
(1962) and Lowe (1969) suggest that this may be particular-
ly true now, as compared to former generations, inasmuch as 
there seems to be considerable confusion over basic values. 
Without the benefit of a stable, shared tradition, we are 
left in an environment of perpetual moral ambiguity. Com-
peting values vie for our allegience, and our attempts to 
adhere simultaneously to mutually incongruous values predis-
Pose us to tension, confusion and conflict. Moreover, we 
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must continually interact with others who do not share our 
values, thereby magnifying even further the possibility of 
occasioning such undesirable consequences. 
All in all, it is clear that value-related problems 
are likely to be a common feature of modern life--emotion-
ally as well as intellectually, and interpersonally as well 
as intrapsychically. It is no wonder that people bring up 
these problems in therapy, especially since they have been 
taught that psychotherapy is the most effective vehicle for 
working out the problems encountered in living. Therapists 
must take responsibility as well as credit for the layman's 
trust in the efficacy of psychotherapy, for it is this they 
have worked hard to promote. 
Initially, of course, psychotherapy was not intended 
as a setting in which moral issues could be dealt with. It 
began as a relatively circumscribed treatment for the re-
lief of specific physical symptoms. But, as London (1964) 
points out, its scope was expanded almost immediately. As 
clients were given permission to talk about their general 
concerns, it was discovered that they were sometimes re-
lieved of the troubling symptoms that had brought them into 
treatment; even more frequently, they were relieved of oth-
e_r less focalized but no less troubling dissatisfactions 
with themselves. In light of this, therapists followed 
what seemed to be a natural sequence of inferences: 
Once a connection had been made between disorders of 
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bodily function and psychological conflict and discon-
tent, permitting the argument that the basic problem 
which gave rise to ailments was a psychological one, it 
became reasonable to think that psychological problems 
should be treated even if they had not yet produced 
physical ailments in a person. Finally, and equally 
plausibly, it was argued that psychological problems 
should be treated even if they would never give rise to 
physical illness, for physical ailments are peripheral 
events and psychological problems central ones in the 
lives of modern men. (London, 1964, p. 18) 
In short, moral values are introduced into psycho-
therapy as soon as it admits consideration of the clients' 
concerns regarding the ways in which they behave, the ends 
that they seek, or the manner in which they interpret the 
meaning of their experiences. As we have already noted, 
these are fundamentally moral concerns, whether or not they 
are addressed explicitly in traditional systems of moral 
governance or even discussed in terms of right and wrong. 
Once this transition is effected, psychotherapy ceases to 
be merely a medical treatment: It is transformed from a 
procedure for curing psychosomatic disease into a vehicle 
for discovering how to conduct oneself so as to minimize 
the tensions, confusions and conflicts encountered in liv-
ing. Hence, even the psychotherapists' prescriptions are 
no longer medicinal--they are moral. 
Psychotherapists are generally able to remain indif-
ferent to the moral significance of their clients' concerns 
as long as conduct, aims and meanings can be discussed in 
the amoral language of psychology. However, this becomes 
far more difficult when the client violates the overtly 
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value-free environment of the psychotherapeutic interaction 
by framing his or her concerns in explicitly moral language 
or by raising an issue that is inescapably moral in its· 
ramifications. Then the therapist is faced squarely with 
the problem of how to handle moral values in therapy. 
Ironically, the introduction of moral concerns into 
psychotherapy is considered a problem for therapists for 
the same reason that values have become such a problem for 
their clients--namely, because there is no universal con-
sensus as to which values should be considered proper. If 
there were some thoroughgoing agreement as to which consti-
tuted the proper values, there would be no question as to 
the ways in which the clients should behave, the ends that 
they should seek, and the manner in which they should inter-
pret their experiences. Indeed, if the answers to these 
questions were self-evident, we might not even recognize 
that they were value-determined at all. 
That is not the case, however. Most therapists are 
aware that values are partisan issues in this pluralistic 
society, and that venturing particular solutions to value-
conflicts is tantamount to taking sides. As we have seen, 
the therapist's role is defined as that of an applied sci-
entist, and traditional science provides no criterion with 
which therapists could evaluate the moral adequacy of al-
ternative solutions to value conflicts. The only judgments 
they believe themselves competent to make are technical 
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judgments. Even psychotherapists who are acutely aware of 
value-involvement in psychotherapy reject the possibility 
that they might render or promote particular moral judg-
ments. Patterson argues, for example, that the therapist 
should "leave to the family, the church and the school, as 
institutions representing the moral and ethical standards 
of society, the teaching of such standards" (Patterson, 
1959, p. 74). 
Later we will discuss in some detail whether, in 
contrast to this position, the psychotherapeutic enterprise 
itself is one such moral institution in modern society. 
For now, we should note that even the therapist who disa-
vows rendering his own moral judgments must still respond 
somehow to the client who raises explicitly moral concerns. 
Therapists have considered several options in this regard. 
The most radical solution is to prevent the client 
from introducing moral issues into therapy at all. Because 
values necessarily accompany the client's expression of 
general concerns about his or her problems in living, this 
could be accomplished effectively only by restricting the 
scope of concerns with which psychotherapy dealt--reversing, 
in effect, the trend that London noted. Some behavior 
therapists have indeed attempted this, by restricting their 
practice to the most morally innocuous problems (e.g., pho-
bias, enuresis, unwanted addictions to alchohol or tobacco, 
and the like) . However, these are not the kinds of prob-
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1ems for which the majority of people turn to therapy for 
help, and the trend among other behavior therapists is to 
broaden rather than to restrict the scope of problems to 
which they would apply their techniques. 
If the therapist does not adopt that restrictive ap-
proach, he must respond somehow within the context of the 
therapeutic interaction when the client raises a moral con-
cern. Buhler (1962) describes the variety of rather diver-
gent approaches that therapists have adopted in such situ-
ations. For example, a therapist may react to his client's 
concern with silence. He may give any number of verbal re-
sponses: reflecting the client's remark, or interpreting it 
in psychological terms, or even attempting to change the 
subject. His reaction may be supportive or disapproving or 
overtly neutral. Some therapists may actually offer their 
personal opinions, with or without labeling these as their 
own. 
However, according to London (1964), no approach can 
extricate the therapist from involvement in the moral di-
mension of the client's problems. The therapist has al-
ready committed himself to a position of moral agency the 
moment he allows the client to raise a moral concern--re-
gardless of the attitude he assumes once the issue has been 
broached. London's point is that the client who has raised 
an issue in moral terms is bound to interpret the thera-
Pist's response within a moral framework, whether or not 
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the therapist intended that his response be read as a moral 
position on the client's issue. Even a therapist's silence 
or his psychologistic restatement of the issue will influ-
ence the client's attitude toward his or her value problem. 
we should bear in mind here that the client typical-
ly invests a great deal of faith in the authority of the 
therapist, as well as in the efficacy of the psychothera-
peutic process itself (Frank, 1961). He looks to the ther-
apist for solutions to his questions and conflicts over 
his behavior, his aims and the significance of his experi-
ences--all of which have a distinctly moral dimension. 
Even if the client understands the therapist's reservations 
about introducing moral subject matter into psychotherapy--
and it is by no means clear that most clients do--he may be 
unable to observe those conditions in his own mind. Of 
course, depending upon the therapist's way of responding, 
the client may learn either to remain silent about his mor-
al concerns or to reframe them in the therapist's oblique 
language. But for him the issue is a moral one, and one 
that is both relevant to his psychological distress and un-
likely to go away merely by avoiding it or translating it 
into nonmoral terms. If the therapist ignores this, or at-
tempts to impose his notion of value-free therapy upon the 
client, the meaning and purpose of therapy may end up be-
ing something quite different for each of them. 
So therapists cannot avoid communicating to their 
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clients some stand on the moral issues they bring with them, 
by their mere presence in the therapeutic interaction when 
those issues are raised. (We will discuss another sort of 
communication shortly.) The most important point here is 
that because the message read into this communication is 
largely a matter of the client's inference, the moral posi-
tion ascribed to the therapist in any instance may not cor-
respond to his actual position, if indeed he has formulated 
one. Naturally, if the therapist refrains from making his 
own position explicit, such discrepancies are more likely 
to occur. In this event, the client could only project on-
to the therapist his own imaginings as to the latter's posi-
tion on his moral concerns. I believe that this situation 
is potentially more serious than others in which projec-
tions onto the therapist occur, for here the client is left 
particularly vulnerable to his own neurotic distortions. 
The client has no opportunity to test the veridicality of 
his imaginings unless the therapist reveals his own posi-
tion. Yet this is precisely what therapists are reluctant 
to do, for the reasons noted earlier. 
In short, however reluctant therapists may be to in-
volve themselves in the moral problems of their clients, 
the point is that they are already involved. Therapists 
influence their clients by their response to the moral con-
cerns raised in the context of therapy, whether or not they 
intend or even desire to have such influence. There is no 
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way to extricate themselves from that involvement short of 
removing themselves altogether from the therapeutic inter-
action. 
The question, then, is whether therapists should al-
low the impact that they have on their clients in moral 
matters to go unchecked, or whether they should assume re-
sponsibility for their influence and attempt to exercise 
some deliberate control over it. To my mind, when the is-
sue is laid out in these terms, therapists have little 
choice but to assume that responsibility and to address the 
problem of values explicity. In the following section we 
will see that there are other reasons for doing so as well. 
The Therapist's Value Input 
Every individual has moral concerns--i.e., concerns 
regarding his behavior, his aims and the meaning of his ex-
periences. Although he may be uncertain about these in 
some respects, he must possess a relatively stable core of 
assumptions about the way he ought to live. Life is essen-
tially activity, and (at any level we consider) living ac-
tivity must be organized and directed along some lines. 
Hence, some more or less orderly framework of guiding prin-
ciples is absolutely prerequisite in order for an individu-
al to function at all. This framework is not merely an in-
tellectual construct, however. Indeed, it may remain 
largely unconscious in most persons. But, whether articu-
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lated or not, it is integral to the individual's identity, 
expressed in his personality and in the design of his ongo-
ing activity. we may designate this core of explicit and 
implicit assumptions as the individual's personal system of 
values. 
All of this must apply to the psychotherapist, of 
course. He too must hold some assumptions about right con-
duct and about the proper ends to pursue, embodied in his 
personality as much as in his conscious convictions. Con-
sequently, we cannot expect that he be able to activate or 
to suspend his personal value-system as he moves back and 
forth between his roles as private citizen and as profes-
sional. It remains at least implicit in the character of 
his unconscious reactions as well as in his deliberate re-
sponses. Moreover, the psychotherapist cannot help but to 
interpret his experiences--including his experience of his 
clients--in terms of the framework of moral meanings that 
structures his awareness. 
In discussing the client's moral concerns, I indi-
cated that the therapist cannot avoid communicating some 
moral stand on the client's issues simply because he is 
present when these are brought up in therapy. Inasmuch as 
the content of that sort of communication is comprised 
largely of the client's own inferences, it may or may not 
represent the therapist's actual position. But when we con-
sider that the therapist's values are necessarily implicit 
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in his attitude and in his behavior, we should expect that 
he does in fact communicate some of these to the client as 
well--and that, again, he cannot avoid doing so. 
There are at least two respects in which the thera-
pist's personal system of values might be implicated in the 
psychotherapeutic interaction. First, his values may influ-
ence his interpretation of the client's behavior, his formu-
lation of therapy goals for that client, and his unconscious 
as well as his deliberate responses in the therapy setting. 
secondly, and as a result, the therapist's values may be 
communicated to his client in ways both direct and indirect; 
whether intentionally or unintentionally, the therapist may 
actually impose or impress these values upon the client to 
some extent. Clearly, if there is any substance to these 
considerations, the therapist's value input plays a signifi-
cant role in determining the course of the psychotherapeu-
tic interaction. 
As a matter of fact, most authors who discuss the 
problem of values in psychotherapy acknowledge that the 
therapist's personal values are manifested in his activity 
and communicated to his clients. In an early review of re-
lated research, for example, Patterson (1959) marshalled 
considerable evidence to suggest that the therapist's val-
ues influenced those of the client, as well as affecting 
the character of the therapeutic interaction, in ways that 
were usually unintended and so subtle that neither the ther-
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apist nor his client was even aware of them. Since then, 
others have developed further the implications of these ini-
tial indications of the therapist's personal value-involve-
ment (e.g., Buhler, 1962; London, 1964; Lowe, 1969; Szasz, 
1970; Weisskopf-Joelson, 1980; Wilder, 1971). 
One particularly seminal piece of research was Rosen-
thal's (1955) study of changes in clients' values following 
psychotherapy. He found, first, that clients tended to re-
vise certain of their moral values (specifically, those 
centering around sex, aggression and authority) over the 
course of therapy. Second, those clients who had revised 
their values in the direction of their therapists' values 
were rated (on several independent measures) as having im-
proved, while those who had revised their values away from 
their therapists' values were unimproved or worsened. 
According to Rosenthal, these findings support the 
notion that a client may not only perceive his therapist's 
values, but may also be influenced by them--regardless of 
the therapist's efforts to avoid promoting or even reveal-
ing his own moral position. A later study by Welkowitz, 
Cohen and Ortmeyer (1967) provides clearer evidence of this. 
They demonstrated that clients who had been assigned random-
ly to therapists were more likely to share their own thera-
pists' values following therapy than to share the values of 
the therapists to whom they had not been assigned. 
Rosenthal suggests that, inasmuch as most therapists 
believe it is improper to exert any influence over their 
clients' (or patients') values, 
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it may be that the therapist communicates his values to 
the patient in many unintended, subtle ways, even when 
trying to avoid doing so. The patient, who is often 
sensitized to the therapist's every word and inflection, 
may be able to receive these communications, and be-
cause of his trust, admiration, and respect for the 
therapist, may permit himself to be influenced by them. 
(Rosenthal, 1955, p. 4J6) 
This theme is echoed by Frank (1961) and by Lowe (1969), 
who argue that the client's characterological dependency 
upon other persons for guidance in structuring his life, 
combined with his ascription of competence and authority to 
the therapist, are likely to make him highly suggestible 
and prone to adopt his therapist's personal value-system. 
While not rejecting this interpretation, Pepinsky 
and Karst (1964) suggest a broader context for understand-
ing the finding that clients tend to assume their thera-
pists' values. Drawing upon considerable and diverse evi-
dence, they conclude that "every therapeutic interaction is 
characterized by an amount of convergence, which involves a 
measurable shift in client behavior toward that of the ther-
apist" (p. JJ5). These authors conceive of this shift in 
the client's behavior and beliefs as an analogue of the pro-
cess of convergence or conformity in judgment-making and 
other behavior elicited in the laboratory by experimental 
psychologists. They consider particularly illuminating the 
laboratory finding that the uncommitted member of a dyad 
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will tend automatically to shift his beliefs toward those 
of the member whose beliefs are firmly anchored--a rather 
obvious parallel to the therapeutic relationship. Accord-
ing to Pepinsky and Karst, the convergence evident in psy-
chotherapy signals the client's acquisition of the "psychol-
ogical grammar" provided by the therapist. By this they 
apparently mean that the client learns to structure his in-
terpretations and his conduct according to the conceptual 
framework that the therapist represents in various ways. 
Weisskopf-Joelson (1980) has advanced a similar argument. 
Altogether, the arguments and supporting evidence 
put forward suggest that the psychotherapist does indeed 
communicate his values somehow to the client and that, in 
doing so, he may influence the development of the client's 
values along lines corresponding to his own. The general 
consensus seems to be that although to some extent the 
therapist's influence may be unavoidable, it should at 
least be acknowledged and an effort should be made to keep 
the therapist's values from insinuating themselves into the 
therapeutic interaction in ways over which the therapist 
has neither awareness nor control. Almost all agree that, 
as the first step, therapists should strive to become more 
vividly aware of their own personal value-systems. Typical 
of this is Wilder's (1971) opinion that such an awareness 
would constitute an analogue of the astronomers' "personal 
formula," by which a therapist could make adjustments in 
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his interpretations and responses so as to minimize any 
distortion introduced by his personal values. Patterson 
(1959) and Buhler (1962) advise therapists to label their 
own values and opinions clearly as such whenever these are 
expressed to the client. Weisskopf-Joelson (1980) argues 
that inasmuch as the therapists' prescriptions are liable 
to be colored by their own subjective values, they should 
present these to the client in a tentative rather than in 
an authoritarian manner. 
The overwhelming sentiment among therapists is that 
they should not teach moral values nor promote a particular 
philosophy of life in psychotherapy. Instead, the client 
should be permitted and encouraged to develop his or her 
own system of values, without any interference on the part 
of the therapist. (We will examine this position further 
in the next chapter.) Only a few therapists (e.g., London, 
1964; Murphy, 1955; Samler, 1959) have argued in favor of 
the opposing view. 
What we see in these solutions to the problem of the 
therapist's value input is the attempt to enforce some sep-
aration of the therapist's two roles, that of scientist-
practitioner and of private citizen. While acknowledging 
that their personal values do intrude upon the therapeutic 
interaction in subtle and to some extent unavoidable ways, 
most therapists are intent upon minimizing this involvement, 
or at least upon making adjustments so as to counteract its 
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unintended effects. 
In my opinion, we are obliged to insist (if only as 
an ideal) that a distinction be drawn and maintained between 
the therapist as a professional and as a private individual. 
Inasmuch as the therapist represents himself to his clients 
and to the public at large as an agent of the psychothera-
peutic process, it is hardly legitimate that in practice he 
function as an agent of his own idiosyncratic moral view of 
the world. By confounding the two, he risks compromising 
the psychotherapeutic process. However, for reasons that I 
will explain shortly, it is inappropriate and misleading to 
characterize the distinction between these agencies as a 
separation of roles. 
It is a serious mistake to assume that the thera-
pist's value input could be eliminated merely by preventing 
him from introducing his personal values into the therapeu-
tic interaction. This assumption itself rests upon another 
misconception--namely, that the therapist's professional 
role is as free of values as the role of the scientist is 
purported to be. Rather, as I have already argued, the 
principles and prescriptions of applied psychology consti-
tute a system of moral values, inasmuch as these are in-
tended to guide persons in the conduct of their lives. The 
moral underpinnings of the psychotherapeutic enterprise 
Will be examined in more detail in the following chapter. 
Here it must suffice to note that even if all input from 
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the therapist's idiosyncratic value-system could be elimi-
nated, those values that were intrinsic to the psychothera-
peutic program itself would remain. 
Once we acknowledge that the psychotherapeutic pro-
gram constitutes a system of values, it becomes apparent 
that the attempt to eliminate value-involvement entirely is 
pointless--for the attempt would necessitate the annihila-
tion of the psychotherapeutic program. But behind that 
sentiment there is, I think, the legitimate conviction that 
values extraneous to the psychotherapeutic process (or actu-
ally antagonistic to it) should be excluded from its pro-
gram. In other words, we should distinguish between the 
personal values entertained by particular therapists (which 
may include social and religious values as well as idiosyn-
cratic ones) and those notions of right conduct, of proper 
aims and of valid meanings that are implicit in the ideal 
psychotherapeutic program. It is the latter system of val-
ues that properly should be communicated and promoted in 
the psychotherapeutic interaction. 
In this light, the insistence upon a "separation" of 
the therapist's professional and personal roles should be 
interpreted as requiring that the therapist become more 
consistently an agent of the values intrinsic to the psycho-
therapeutic process. To my mind, this necessitates action 
on two fronts: First, the values intrinsic to the psycho-
therapeutic process must be explicated. Second, therapists 
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must modify their own personal value-systems in accordance 
with those values, in order to reflect more adequately the 
psychotherapeutic ideal. 
Most of our inquiry will be devoted to exploring the 
problems involved in explicating the psychotherapeutic 
ideal. But something should be said about the second task 
as well. I suggested a moment ago that it was inappropriate 
and misleading to characterize as a "separation of roles" 
the distinction between the therapist as a professional and 
as a private individual. This is so, in my opinion, be-
cause the purported separation would have to be between two 
systems of values--one a reflection of the psychotherapeu-
tic ideal and the other personal--and not between value-
freedom and value-involvement. As a purely practical mat-
ter, I do not believe that it is possible for the therapist 
to maintain successfully the compartmentalization of two 
distinct systems of values, nonetheless to be able genuine-
ly to adhere to the two of them simultaneously. Yet this 
is essentially what is implied in the notion of a separa-
tion of roles. 
we noted earlier that because the therapist's per-
sonal values are embodied in the structure of his personal-
ity as much as in his conscious convictions, they permeate 
his attitude and his behavior whether or not he intends it. 
So it is doubtful whether he could suspend the influence of 
his personal values in the therapy situation--i.e., "sepa-
66 
rate" his personal role from his therapeutic one--merely 
by an act of will. To the contrary, several critics have 
concluded that it is the therapist's personal values that 
find expression in his working notion of the psychotherapeu-
tic ideal. For example, Lowe suggests that "the concept of 
mental health is little more than a therapist's or a per-
sonality theorist's description of the ideal person ... and 
in large measure is therefore a projection of the thera-
pist's own highly personal values" (1969, p. 50). Lowe 
quotes several authors (Burton, 1960; Ginsberg & Herma, 
1953; Halmos, 1966) who voice the same conclusion; this is 
shared as well by others whom I have cited (e.g., London, 
1964; Weisskopf-Joelson, 1980). 
On its face, this involvement of the therapist's 
personal values in the formulation and promotion of the 
concept of mental health might seem an insuperable obstacle 
to the objectivity of the psychotherapeutic enterprise. 
Weisskopf-Joelson (1980), for one, was led to conclude that 
we should acknowledge openly the relative and subjective 
character of the values disseminated by psychotherapists. 
However, even though the values promoted by particular ther-
apists may be derived in part from their subjective systems 
of personal values, this does not imply that the psycho-
therapeutic enterprise itself is inevitably bound to remain 
subjective. 
It is necessary to abandon the simplistic notion of 
67 
a separation of the therapist's professional ("value-free") 
and personal ("value-involved") roles. But in its place, 
I suggest that we affirm what might be termed a "transfor-
mation of roles." That is, instead of insisting upon the 
impossible requirement that he suspend his personal values 
while in his professional capacity, the therapist should be 
encouraged to examine his personal values self-critically 
in light of the objective psychotherapeutic ideal. The 
only way the therapist can ensure that he will function as 
an agent of the psychotherapeutic process is to emend his 
own system of values so that it is congruent with the value-
system implicit in that process. Then the therapist's per-
sonal value-system--which, as we have seen, conditions to a 
large extent the therapeutic interaction--would become a 
vehicle through which the psychotherapeutic message was 
communicated, rather than remaining a source of subjective 
bias and limitation. 
The notion that therapists should engage in a self-
critical inquiry into values--their own personal values, 
consensually supported values, and the values implicit in 
the psychotherapeutic enterprise--will be the major theme 
of the chapters that follow. We will explore reasons for 
c?nsidering that an ongoing commitment to value-critique 
is both a moral obligation and a professional responsibili-
ty, if therapists are to fulfill their implicit mission, 
Which is to formulate an adequate design for living and to 
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facilitate its concrete realization. In the course of our 
discussion we will also have an opportunity to examine the 
various forms of resistance to the incorporation of an ex-
plicit value-critique as part of the psychotherapeutic pro-
gram. 
CHAPTER III 
THERAPEUTIC VALUES: DIVERSITY AND CONSENSUS 
So far we have seen that value-judgments are an in-
tegral part of the psychotherapist's activity. For a num-
ber of reasons, however, therapists are reluctant to con-
front their involvement in matters of moral value. Fore-
most among these are, first, that moral values are not ame-
nable to conventional scientific treatment, and second, 
that no other standard has been identified by which the 
relative adequacy of particular values might be determined. 
We have also found that the therapist puts himself 
in a position of moral agency as soon as he allows his 
clients to express moral concerns, or even to consider 
questions about aims, goals or intentions, and the means of 
attaining them. The issue this raises is whether the thera-
pist should assume responsibility for the impact he has upon 
his clients in moral matters--an influence that he wields 
in any case, whether or not he intends or even desires to 
do so. In the last chapter we examined several aspects of 
the therapist's value input: first, his clients' natural 
tendency to interpret within a moral framework any response 
he makes to their moral concerns; second, the inevitable 
influence of his own personal values upon his interpreta-
tions and responses within the therapeutic interaction; and 
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third, his implicit function as an agent of the values in-
trinsic to the psychotherapeutic process. 
Once we acknowledge that the psychotherapeutic enter-
prise entails a system of values, we must confront the task 
of elucidating in concrete detail the psychotherapeutic 
ideal. However, when we turn to the current psychotherapeu-
tic programs for some clue, we find that there appears to 
be a diversity of value-systems that purportedly represent 
the psychotherapeutic ideal. In this chapter we will also 
examine the untoward implications of the one position re-
garding values in psychotherapy that is held in common by a 
broad spectrum of therapists. 
Divergent Value-Systems in Psychotherapy 
I have already suggested that the principles and pre-
scriptions of applied psychology constitute a system of mor-
al values, inasmuch as they are intended to guide persons 
in the conduct of their lives. At first glance, the psycho-
therapeutic program may not resemble traditional systems of 
moral governance. It seems not to display those features 
commonly associated with tractional moral systems, which are 
often considered dogmatic, authoritarian or obligatory in 
character. Of course, these features should not be taken 
as the defining characteristics of an ethical system. But 
even in re~ard to these characteristics, the lack of any 
resemblance between the psychotherapeutic program and tradi-
tional systems of moral governance may be more apparent 
than real. 
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As regards dogmatism, a number of psychotherapists 
(e.g., Bugelski, 1971; Houts & Krasner, 1980; Singer, 1980) 
claim that their program is unique in that it is scientific 
rather than speculative, and (by implication) open rather 
than close-minded. However, our observations about science 
in Chapter One (which will be amplified in Chapter Seven) 
leave some doubt as to whether the current psychotherapeu-
tic program is entirely free of dogmatic underpinnings. 
In general, the principles guiding the psychothera-
peutic program are not imposed upon persons in an authori-
tarian manner. But there are exceptions to this, sometimes 
obvious (as in the management of psychiatric patients) and 
sometimes subtle (as when, for example, therapists set 
ground rules and conditions for the continuation of therapy). 
The matter of obligation is perhaps the most subtle 
of the three. Except for legal psychiatric commitments--
which actually have very little to do with psychotherapy--
persons are free to adopt or to reject the psychotherapeutic 
principles of guidance. However, there is a tacit assump-
tion that they must adhere to these principles in order to 
Participate in the psychotherapeutic design for living. In 
this regard, the psychotherapeutic program bears more than 
a passing resemblance to such traditional moral systems as 
the various programs of religious observance. In each case, 
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there are the believers and the nonbelievers, those who 
will be benefited (saved, liberated, adjusted, actualized) 
and those who will not. Therapists may not make explicit 
their conviction that adherence to their system is obliga-
tory, but this is implicit in their evaluations nonetheless. 
Although such resemblances are worth noting, there 
are more fundamental reasons for asserting that the psycho-
therapeutic program comprises a system of moral values. 
When we analyze that program in terms of its essential ele-
ments, it becomes evident that value judgments are an in-
trinsic and indispensable feature of psychotherapy. 
To my mind, the purpose of psychotherapy is essenti-
ally to facilitate some change which, for one reason or 
another, is believed to be favorable. Following this char-
acterization, there are two elements essential to the psy-
chotherapeutic process: first, the presence of the person 
who is to undergo change, and second, some notion of the 
sort of change that should occur. 
All deliberately initiated activity is intended to 
bring about some kind of change. In psychotherapeutic ac-
tivity, the change intended is some modification of an in-
dividual's behavior. Before the psychotherapeutic process 
can proceed, that individual--the so-called client or pa-
tient--must first be identified. 
We generally conceive of the psychotherapeutic pro-
cess as an interaction between two persons, the therapist 
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and hiS client. We emphasize either the "treatment" aspect 
of this interaction or its "relationship" aspect, depending 
upon our theoretical orientation. However, in my opinion, 
it is not an indispensable requirement that there be pres-
ent a person who acts as therapist. Of course, the thera-
pist's presence is necessary in order to execute most of 
the technical programs that currently represent the psycho-
therapeutic process. Yet this person might also be consi-
dered only one agent or facilitator of that process, albeit 
the most prominent one. There are, for example, certain 
self-modification and self-help programs that do not re-
quire the presence of a therapist. Under those conditions, 
the procedural principles themselves constitute the agency 
facilitating the process. 
I am not suggesting that we should consider the in-
teractive (therapist-client) model of psychotherapy any 
more or less appropriate than another. My point is simply 
that when we view the psychotherapeutic process as not en-
tirely dependent upon the physical presence of a therapist, 
it is much easier to appreciate the power that the princi-
ples and prescriptions of applied psychology may have out-
side the traditional therapy setting. In either case, how-
ever, the psychotherapeutic process obviously requires the 
presence of someone (the client) who is to undergo change. 
Before the potential client can be identified, it is 
necessary to ascertain the kind of change that should result 
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from psychotherapy. Generally speaking, change in psycho-
therapy entails a transition from one psychological or be-
havioral state or condition to another. Consequently, the 
potential therapy client is a person for whom that transi-
tion is possible, or at least conceivable. This carries 
several implications. First, this individual's psychologi-
cal or behavioral condition must differ initially from the 
one that is intended to result from therapy, for otherwise 
there could be no transition or change. Second, this ini-
tial condition must be somehow inferior by comparison, for 
otherwise there would be little point in changing it. 
In short, the potential therapy client is an indivi-
dual whose psychological or behavioral condition deviates 
in some respect from one that is considered more acceptable. 
Psychotherapy is aimed at transforming that individual's 
actual condition into at least an approximation of the 
other. 
Clearly, our definition of therapeutic change will 
depend upon the criterion employed to differentiate accep-
table and nonacceptable conditions. This criterion is in 
fact the pivotal element of psychotherapy, for without it 
we could establish neither the identity of the potential 
client nor the direction in which change should occur. 
From this perspective, psychotherapy is aimed essentially 
at actualizing the psychological or behavioral order en-
visioned in that criterion, by modifying the actual condi-
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tion of individual persons accordingly. Individuals become 
the concrete embodiment of that envisioned order. 
In practice, the particular criterion that one ac-
cepts determines both the population of potential clients 
and the character of the change efforts constituting the 
program of therapy. We will see shortly that there are nu-
merous ways of characterizing the current approaches to 
psychotherapy. By my account, practitioners have employed 
at least four distinct sorts of criteria: 
(a) The medical-organic approach to psychotherapy 
focuses upon physiological parameters ascertained by refer-
ence to the organic conditions of individuals identified 
as normal and as deviant; 
(b) The psychosocial approach utilizes behavioral 
parameters established, directly or indirectly, by refer-
ence to real or abstracted social norms; 
(c) The social-libertarian approach favors a stan-
dard of behavior whose form is to be specified by each in-
dividual for himself or herself; 
(d) The self-actualizing approach promotes ideal 
and universally applicable standards that purportedly char-
acterize the condition toward which human nature may or 
must tend. 
These otherwise diverse criteria display one common 
feature that situates them in the sphere of ethics. With-
out exception, each delineates some systematic array of 
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psychological or behavioral conditions, organized in a way 
that clearly entails judgments as to their relative value. 
Every condition acquires a particular valence, correspond-
ing to its position in that array. This valence represents 
the degree or extent to which that condition should either 
be abandoned or be emulated, relative to the others differ-
entiated within the system. The result is a more or less 
explicit scale that enables one to evaluate the psychologi-
cal condition of any individual and to establish the direc-
tion of therapeutic change. 
These criteriological systems shape the fundamental 
character of the various approaches to psychotherapy be-
cause they shape our conceptions of conformity and deviance. 
Yet their general outlines are commonly taken as self-
evident, whether it be in the day-to-day practice of psy-
chotherapy or in attempts to further its theoretical devel-
opment. For the most part, therapists direct their atten-
tion and their efforts toward elaborating the system that 
they have chosen, extending or refining its categorization 
scheme and devising practical steps whereby the designated 
changes can be effected. 
Although the moral dimension of these criteriological 
systems is apt to be neglected under such circumstances, it 
remains fundamental to the .entire enterprise. The valence 
that any psychological or behavioral condition acquires 
within one of these systems is essentially a value judgment. 
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por all practical purposes, those having the most positive 
(or most favorable) valence in the scale are established as 
ideals after which we should model ourselves (or others). 
Moreover, inasmuch as the means that therapists devise for 
achieving those ideals are primarily modes of conduct--i.e., 
ways of being and acting--their approaches to therapy are 
comprised of principles or guidelines by which persons might 
govern their lives properly. As we have already seen, any 
such set of principles or guidelines constitutes a system 
of moral values. 
Traditional models of moral conduct identify behavi-
ors as good and bad, or right and wrong, by reference to 
some more or less explicit standard. Psychotherapists gen-
erally avoid using such morally evaluative terms, consider-
ing them improper in a scientific lexicon. When employed 
in a therapeutic context, their use is restricted to de-
scribing instrumental relationships, e.g., that a certain 
behavior might be a right or a wrong way to achieve a par-
ticular therapeutic end (Houts & Krasner, 1980) . In such 
contexts, these terms are more or less synonymous with the 
terms effective and ineffective. 
However, as I indicated in the introduction, the di-
mension of moral judgment cannot be abandoned by retreating 
to the level of technical judgment. Any question regarding 
the effectiveness of some behavior in bringing about a par-
ticular result has relevance to therapists only insofar as 
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the result itself is considered worth achieving. After all, 
the entire psychotherapeutic change effort rests upon the 
belief that not all psychological and behavioral conditions 
are equally desirable. (Without this assumption, therapists 
could justify no activity meant to modify an individual's 
given condition.) Any evaluation of their relative desira-
bility--or of the direction of desirable change--is essenti-
ally a form of moral judgment. The scale or criterion at 
the basis of those judgments is essentially the value-system 
implicit in the psychotherapeutic program. 
According to Buhler (1962), there are several valued 
ends upon which most (if not all) therapists would agree. 
As the result of psychotherapy, persons should be capable 
"of functioning better, of mastering their lives, and of 
conceiving of life as worthwhile" (p. 28). She also men-
tions one methodological value--that clients should "think 
things through" on their own--which may no longer be uni-
versal, given the recent upsurge of highly directive be-
havior therapies. 
It should not be surprising that most therapists 
could hold these values--good functioning, self-mastery and 
a sense of meaningfulness--in common. Hardly anyone would 
find them objectionable, inasmuch as they are formulated so 
vaguely. They are not rendered any less valid for their 
vagueness. However, they are rendered practically useless 
as the sole standard for determining in any detail the na-
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ture of the psychotherapeutic ideal. The problem is that 
these formulations are susceptible of so many different and 
conceivably incongruous interpretations that each interpre-
tation can be considered a distinct system of values. 
The current approaches to psychotherapy are so di-
verse that any statement of common values may have to be 
deliberately vague in order to make good on its claim. This 
becomes apparent when we consider that this diversity is 
fundamentally a matter of differences among their underly-
ing value-systems, and not merely one of differences in 
technical detail or technique. I suggested a moment ago 
that at least four distinct kinds of criteria have been em-
ployed by psychotherapists:~ the medical-organic, the psycho-
social, the social-libertarian and the self-actualizing mod-
els of the human condition. Although nearly every critic 
of value-involvement has offered his or her own analysis of 
the same spectrum, they all converge upon one conclusion: 
that the current diversity of approaches to psychotherapy 
reflects the coexistence of several relatively incompatible 
value-systems. 
London (1964) offers a relatively simple, two-cate-
gory scheme, according to therapists' tBchnique and defini-
tion of the problem: Insight therapy, which defines the 
problem as a lack of self-awareness, and Action therapy, 
which defines the problem as coextensive with the observable 
symptoms. Several four-fold schemes have been proposed. 
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Glad (1959) delineates four approaches to psychotherapy--
the psychoanalytic, the interpersonal-psychiatric, the dy-
namic-relationship, and the phenomenological--each of which 
is guided in its methods and its goals by a distinct set of 
"operational values." Buhler (1962) identifies four basic 
tendencies of life that also constitute distinct therapeu-
tic goals: "need satisfaction," "self-limiting adaptation," 
"expansive creativity," and "upholding of the inner order." 
Lowe (1969) suggests that there are four basic value orien-
tations evident among therapists, based upon the human mo-
tives that each category of therapists considers the most 
highly valued aspect of human experience. He refers to 
these as the humanistic, the naturalistic, the social and 
the existential meanings. (Lowe excludes the disease model 
of mental illness from his scheme, believing that it is no 
longer widely entertained.) Finally, Matson (1976) suggests 
that there are three dominant models of man which determine 
therapists' approaches to their activity: man as animal (as-
sociated with psychoanalysis), man a machine (behaviorism) 
and man as creator (humanistic psychology) . 
Other schemes for categorizing the various psycho-
therapeutic orientations could undoubtedly be added to this 
list. Yet such additions should only lend further support 
to the conclusion already indicated--namely, that thera-
pists have developed (and continue to promote) several mu-
tually incongruous approaches to psychotherapy. These ap-
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preaches are not necessarily incompatible in terms of tech-
nique, as the so-called eclectic approach bears witness. 
Rather, it is with regard to their respective objectives 
(i.e., valued ends) that they are so difficult to reconcile 
(Lowe, 1969). 
Each approach to psychotherapy rests upon some dis-
tinct framework for conceptualizing human nature and its 
constituent features. This conceptual framework actually 
encompasses two dimensions, and it cannot be understood ade-
quately without reference to both. Its descriptive dimen-
sion, comprising a purportedly factual representation of 
various psychological and b.ehavioral conditions and the in-
terrelationships among them, is typically the only one ac-
knowledged. The hidden dimension, so to speak, is the eval-
uative one, defining the relative desirability of those con-
ditions according to their respective positions within the 
more or less systematic structure of that framework. This 
dimension is as indispensable as the first, inasmuch as it 
establishes the direction of therapeutic change. In doing 
so, it fulfills the fundamental purpose of developing such 
a framework, i.e., to inform and to guide all change ef-
forts. Indeed, it is probably impossible to separate en-
tirely the descriptive and evaluative dimensions of any psy-
chotherapeutic approach, for the two are articulated togeth-
er and tend to support one another. 
The aim of our investigation is to discover some jus-
82 
tification for the values intrinsic to the psychotherapeu-
tic enterprise. The finding that the current approaches to 
psychotherapy posit apparently discrepant interpretations 
of human nature and incompatible objectives thus constitutes 
a problem of considerable proportions. Put simply, it is 
hard to imagine how several mutually incongruous ideals 
could be promoted concurrently as the proper goal of thera-
peutic change efforts--or, for that matter, of human striv-
ing in general. 
Moral Neutrality as a Value 
As a matter of fact, therapists of widely differing 
value orientations and technical styles have been able to 
agree upon one basic position as regards their approach to 
values in psychotherapy. This position actually entails 
two complementary concepts, which may be delineated follow-
ing Buhler's (1962) distinction between methodological val-
ues and valued ends. Methodological values are those that 
apply to the therapist's conduct of therapy, while valued 
ends apply to the effect of that therapy upon the client. 
The methodological value entailed in this position has been 
termed "moral neutrality." The valued end has been charac-
terized as "individual moral freedom." The concepts of val-
ue neutrality and individual moral freedom are complementary 
inasmuch as the therapist is supposed to withold all moral 
judgments or guidance while the client is encouraged to for-
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mulate his or her own values unconstrained. 
According to Lowe (1969), this position corresponds 
to what has been termed loosely the "new morality." In his 
understanding, "the new moralists base their values upon 
what they experience as their personal identity, rather than 
conventional standards" (p. 256). Generally speaking, the 
new morality promotes an individual's freedom to choose his 
or her own values--and basically to do as he or she pleases 
--limited only by some general (and often inexplicit) notion 
of social responsibility or obligation to respect the rights 
of others. This position is shared by a broad spectrum of 
modern thinkers, so--altho~gh the concept itself promotes 
pluralism in values--it has become virtually the contempo-
rary moral standard. 
Lowe suggests that despite the many disagreements 
among competing approaches to therapy, almost all therapists 
would agree on the goal of increased moral freedom for indi-
viduals. 
Therapists are still unlikely to agree among themselves 
about the meaning of mental health. They are more 
likely to agree, however, that the so-called good life 
is a highly personal matter, and that one should select 
his values without even those attempts at social sua-
sion which are intended to be helpful. (1969, p. 258) 
Lowe himself is a particularly forthright exponent of this 
pos1tion. He argues that when the aspiring therapist 
adopts the profession of psychotherapy, he has necessarily 
chosen to become an advocate of the individual. According-
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ly, although the therapist need not feel personal approval 
over his client's decisions, he "must stand behind the cli-
ent as he wrestles against the social pressures that would 
force him into an encapsulating mold of moral demands and 
expectations" (p. 277). 
Other therapists may not be as insistent in advocat-
ing the goal of individual moral freedom, but their state-
ments seem generally to support Lowe's impression of a 
broad consensus. Buhler (1962) and Bergin (1980) draw simi-
lar conclusions. Buhler believes that most therapists have 
abandoned "authoritarian and advisory dictates and ... mysti-
cal or philosophical specul~tions" in favor of "freedom of 
choice" (1962, p. 194); nearly 20 years later, Bergin finds 
that most therapists still reject various forms of external 
moral authority, advocating instead some principle of indi-
vidual autonomy. 
This theme appears frequently whenever the matter of 
values is addressed, although the language may differ some-
what from one author to another. Patterson (1959, p. 57) 
argues that "each individual has the right of self-direc-
tion, to choose or select his own values and goals and to 
make his own decisions." Strupp (1980) suggests that the 
"-dual goal of personal freedom and human relatedness" con-
stitutes the humanist's essential values. According to Rog-
ers (1957, p. 296), as we strive for "the good life," we 
should discover that "doing what 'feels right' proves to be 
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a competent and trustworthy guide to behavior which is tru-
ly satisfying." Even behavior therapists' efforts to maxi-
mize their clients' own "reinforcement possibilities" fol-
low from their adherence to "the dictum that what is valued 
is actually valuable, at least to the individual making the 
judgments" (Walker, Ulissi & Thurber, 1980, p. 431). 
This is merely a sampling of the current trend, and 
the number of examples could easily be multiplied several 
times over. Having observed this· broad consensus, Lowe 
concludes that "it seems appropriate ... to seek in personal 
freedom the resolution of the ethical dilemma posed for the 
therapist by competing and contradictory value orientations" 
( 1969' p. 258) • 
There is undoubtedly a certain attraction to this 
position, inasmuch as it suggests a way around the two dif-
ficult problems that beset therapists with respect to val-
ues: first, how to avoid taking a moral stand regarding the 
clients' concerns, and second, how to overcome the profes-
sional factionalism that follows from the proliferation of 
incongruous treatment goals. The concept of moral neutral-
ity provides an apparently innocuous solution to the first 
problem. By adopting a neutral stance, therapists seem to 
avoid imposing any values upon their clients; they merely 
allow each individual to develop his or her own values in a 
nonrepressive, nonjudgmental environment. As regards the 
second problem, the ideal of individual moral freedom sug-
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gests itself as the pre-eminent therapeutic goal, given the 
widespread support it enjoys across the spectrum of thera-
peutic orientations and approaches. If this were acknow-
ledged as the fundamental value implicit in every psycho-
therapeutic endeavor, any discrepancy between particular 
orientations could be interpreted as mainly a technical mat-
ter. 
Upon careful examination, however, these purported 
solutions both prove to be seriously flawed. The solution 
to the first problem is an entirely illusory one, while the 
solution to the second only involves psychotherapists in an 
even more intransigent plight. We will examine these fail-
ures in turn. 
According to London, the term "moral neutrality" is 
a profound misnomer. He argues that the 
so-called moral neutrality in the therapist is as much 
a moral position as any more blatant one. It is, from 
the therapist's side, a libertarian position, regard-
less of how the client sees it. (1964, pp. 13-14) 
London describes the concepts invoked to legitimize and pop-
ularize moral neutrality as those that uphold an individu-
al's freedom to pursue his or her own self-interest, tern-
pered with vague allusions to social responsibility. (We 
may recognize in this description the ideas that essential-
ly characterize the "new morality.") He then goes on to 
question whether therapists should be considered obliged to 
represent themselves to the public as social agents commit-
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ted to a particular moral position. 
In other words, the position of moral neutrality 
(with its complementary commitment to individual moral free-
dom) actually rests upon some very definite value judgments, 
even though ostensibly it promotes no particular values. We 
should credit Lowe with having acknowledged this point, but 
it is doubtful whether other therapists who subscribe to 
that position are as aware of its implications. 
The decision to suspend all (or even select) value 
judgments of an individual's behaviors, aims and interpreta-
tions constitutes a rather potent moral position, and one 
that is definitely not upheld by everyone. When the thera-
pist assumes his own moral neutrality and promotes the no-
tion of individual moral freedom, he commits himself to a 
particular stand regarding the latitude allowed any indivi-
dual vis-a-vis the social and other moral institutions of 
life. To be specific, he affirms the priority of individu-
al self-interest over social or other moral interests. 
That stand has its detractors, of course, and severe 
criticisms have even come from several quarters within psy-
chology. Two of the more recent and articulate challenges 
are particularly instructive. 
The first challenge is from Bergin (1980). He pro-
poses a rather straightforward objection to the current 
trend toward affirming values associated with individual 
freedom. In his opinion, this trend represents an ill-con-
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ceived abandonment of theistically based values, encourag-
ing the virtual exclusion of such considerations from the 
mainstream of contemporary thought in psychology. Bergih 
defines theistically based values as ones "espoused by peo-
ple who believe in God and try to guide their behavior in 
terms of their perception of his will" (p. 99). 
It should be noted that Bergin's criticism is not 
merely that most therapists are indifferent to theistic val-
ues. Such indifference would only be expected if thera-
pists assumed an attitude of moral neutrality. His point 
is rather that there is a fundamental conflict of values at 
issue, between therapists' support for a person's right to 
formulate his or her own values and the moral tradition 
that values issue from divine law. 
Bergin would also dispute Lowe's contention that be-
ing a therapist necessarily commits one to a position con-
gruent with the so-called new morality. He argues instead 
that it should be possible to incorporate theistic values 
into the basic framework of psychotherapy. 
Another sort of challenge is advanced in Yankelo-
vich's (1981) scathing attack upon the same trend in con-
temporary psychology. In his view, psychologists have pro-
moted a "search for self-fulfillment" that encourages a 
preoccupation with individual freedom at the expense of any 
deep commitment to a social ethic. He writes of this mod-
ern, "duty-to-self" ethic that 
it has, to be sure, some benefits to offer the indivi-
dual, but the core idea is a moral and social absurdi-
ty. It gives moral sanction to desires that do not 
contribute to society's well-being. It contains no. 
principle for synchronizing the requirements of the so-
ciety with the goals of the individual. It fails to 
discriminate between socially valuable desires and so-
cially destructive ones, and often works perversely 
against the real goals of both individuals and society. 
( p. 47) 
Yankelovich advances practical as well as ideologi-
cal reasons for objecting to this more or less exclusive 
emphasis upon individual moral freedom. Self-fulfillment 
is a legitimate goal, he concedes, but that goal has been 
badly misconstrued by most psychologists. As a result, 
their programs and pronouncements have fostered unrealistic 
expectations and ineffective long-term strategies. Because 
the model of self-fulfillment through self-interest fails 
to address several crucial complexities of modern life, peo-
ple have been left confused and unprepared to cope with the 
impending demands of the next few decades. 
As might be expected, Yankelovich offers an alterna-
tive notion of self-fulfillment, in the form of an "ethic 
of social commitment." This alternative "demands that peo-
ple form commitments that advance the well-being of the so-
ciety as well as their own" (p. 89). Obviously, if thera-
pists were to adopt such a concept in their effort to help 
their clients achieve self-fulfillment, they could no longer 
remain aloof of social and moral issues. 
Let us pause for a moment to recapitulate: Having 
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wanted to avoid involvement in moral matters, psychothera-
pists adopted the seemingly innocuous position of moral neu-
trality, with its complementary affirmation of individual 
moral freedom. Yet this position commits them in actuality 
to a role as covert agents of a particular ethic, namely, 
one of individual self-interest. The irony of this predica-
ment should be apparent, and it is the reason for my earli-
er statement that moral neutrality constituted an illusory 
solution to the problem of value-involvement. 
Moreover, as again I have already suggested, thera-
pists' professed moral neutrality plunges them into yet an-
other serious predicament. Because this position is actu-
ally partisan as regards moral values, therapists are re-
sponsible for excluding certain categories of values (e.g., 
religious and social values) from their programs, even as 
they promote certain others. Bergin's and Yankelovich's 
criticisms are about precisely this issue. In effect, they 
challenge therapists to defend their judgments on moral 
grounds. 
This challenge finds psychotherapists at a definite 
disadvantage, for they are virtually unprepared to respond 
on the same level as their critics. The decisions that 
led them to embrace or to exclude various kinds of values 
did not originate out of explicitly moral considerations, 
for the most part. Consequently, therapists must either 
invent a suitable rationale after the fact, or else subject 
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those decisions to a critique of their own. 
It might be profitable to consider what the original 
grounds were for excluding certain categories of values 
from psychotherapy. To my mind, these seem to have follow-
ed from therapists' desire to avoid imposing upon their 
clients any values that could not be justified. To this 
scientifically inclined profession, objective justification 
meant validation by empirical test. Therapists sought to 
exclude morals as much as possible, because these could not 
be validated in that manner. Instead, they concentrated up-
on those features of human problems that were susceptible 
to technical treatment. As a result, certain considera-
tions (e.g., needs and desires, individual freedom and self-
interest) began to be emphasized at the expense of others 
(e.g., social commitment, spiritual ideals). 
The adequacy of this approach depends ultimately up-
on whether the assumption is valid that psychological prob-
lems can be resolved without addressing moral issues. It 
is evident from the current form of psychotherapy that, by 
and large, therapists have accepted its validity. What has 
crystallized is a design for living and coping with human 
problems that omits input from--or even reference to--con-
siderations thought by adherents of other ethical systems 
to be equally important in the governance of human conduct. 
In a last ditch effort to salvage the therapists' 
position, one might point out that therapists have no exper-
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tise as arbiters of morality and, more importantly, no way 
of verifying values objectively. From this perspective, 
their decision to exclude values from therapy would be mor-
ally the most responsible one. The rationale may be sum-
marized in a rhetorical form, as follows: Which is better, 
one might ask, to encourage others to observe values that 
may be valid only for oneself, or to refrain from promoting 
values, allowing each person to develop standards that sat-
isfy the dictates of his or her own conscience? 
In the end, however, the attempt to defend the ther-
apists' exclusion of moral concerns proves unsatisfactory. 
It rests upon a false assumption, namely, that values actu-
ally can be eliminated from psychotherapeutic models and 
programs. We have already found it inescapable that psycho-
therapy itself is essentially a vehicle for values of some 
sort. In formulating their approach to the problems of 
living, psychotherapists must make some judgment as to the 
relative importance of various potential considerations. 
Because the conceptual framework that develops as a result 
becomes the basis for future decisions regarding therapeu-
tic ends and means, it clearly constitutes a system of val-
ues. In other words, therapists necessarily commit them-
selves to some moral position, even in their decision to 
disregard the moral dimension of life. 
In short, when therapists elect to introduce some 
considerations and not others into the psychotherapeutic 
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program, they affirm tacitly that certain values figure as 
essential elements in the solution of psychological prob-
lems. In doing so, they imply concurrently that other val-
ues are, if not irrelevant, at least not indispensable to 
the success of that program. 
Contemporary critics of psychotherapy such as Bergin 
and Yankelovich seem to be united on one point, although 
the implications they draw out subsequently may differ. 
All suggest that, in one way or another, the values current-
ly embodied in our models of human nature--as well as in 
the therapeutic programs built upon them--comprise an inade-
quate basis for resolving the psychological problems that 
plague individuals and confront the public at large. In 
other words, we have been trying to cast "psychological man" 
in a mold that is inadequate. 
Practicing therapists are apt to find this point too 
abstract to be taken very seriously, since it does not ad-
dress directly the immediate and practical concerns that oc-
cupy most of their attention. However, although this atti-
tude is understandable, it can hardly be defended. The 
foregoing criticisms constitute a radical indictment of the 
conceptual framework that psychologists have promoted as a 
guide to well-being, so we can no longer go about the busi-
ness of psychology and psychotherapy with the same naivete 
as before. Two options remain: Either we knowingly ignore 
that our current approach may be inadequate in some respect, 
or else we make a concerted effort to ascertain whether 
that is indeed the case. 
As I understand it, a critical inquiry into the val-
ues that underlie our guiding models serves ultimately to 
secure our individual and collective moral freedom. This 
end should not be confused with the so-called moral freedom 
promoted as the complement of value-neutrality. Psycholo-
gists have adopted the interpretation that moral freedom 
means an individual's right to select his or her own values, 
free of any suasion; usually it carries the added implica-
tion that the values that individuals select for themselves 
are indeed right for them. This position is a problematic 
one for psychologists. To begin with, their adherence must 
be rather selective, inasmuch as some values are necessari-
ly encouraged in the process of establishing definitions of 
therapeutic change. Determining what those values are and 
whether they are adequate clearly becomes important if we 
are to entrust ourselves to psychology. Beyond this, the 
position rests upon several questionable assumptions--for 
example, that every individual is actually capable at pres-
ent of deciding what is best for him, or alternatively, that 
his right to select his own values without external input 
or interference takes precedence over whether or not his 
selections are objectively right (supposing an objective 
standard indeed exists). 
We will have reason to discuss these criticisms in 
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more detail in subsequent chapters. For now, I will merely 
suggest that it might be better to conceive of moral free-
dom as the capacity to govern one's conduct in the light of 
values that reflect one's essential nature as an individual 
human being, rather than as license to affirm whichever 
values happen to have been acquired by an individual as ac-
cidents of experience, upbringing and education. From this 
perspective, our moral freedom is limited primarily by our 
own ignorance about values, and not by the pressures or 
persuasions of any external authority (except insofar as 
these figure in perpetuating our ignorance). If there is a 
remedy for this limitation on our individual and collective 
moral freedom, it must entail a deliberate and sustained in-
quiry into human values, those we entertain and those we 
ought to entertain. 
Likewise, if we are to ensure that the psychothera-
peutic enterprise is supportive of our striving for moral 
freedom--or, at the very least, not inconsistent with it--
we must evaluate whether its conceptual framework illumines 
or obscures the moral dimension of life. Psychotherapists 
presume that their approach does nothing to hinder our ef-
forts at moral improvement; indeed, they argue that they 
aim at helping persons to function well enough to select 
values for themselves without neurotic impediment (Buhler, 
1962; Lowe, 1969). Yet--owing to the prevailing identifi-
cation of psychology with empirical science, coupled with 
the popularity of the so-called new morality--therapists 
are reluctant to examine the moral implications of their 
models and programs. This constitutes a potential impedi-
ment in its own right, for critics of the psychotherapeutic 
program seem to agree that its current value-system omits 
reference to aspects of human nature that should figure 
prominently in determining how we ought to govern our lives. 
To summarize: Psychotherapists have come to support 
the ethic of individual self-interest, but largely by de-
fault and not through a critical process of moral reasoning. 
we may draw several conclusions: 
(1) Therapists believe that they have been able to 
remain aloof of the field of competing value-systems, for 
the most part, by reason of their professed value-neutrali-
ty. But their position is hardly a neutral one, and it is 
challenged by other value-systems that claim to be more 
adequate. 
(2) Because therapists have defined their position 
as scientific and not moralistic, they are prohibited from 
either examining their own value presuppositions or evalu-
ating the claims of rival value-systems. Thus they con-
strain themselves from engaging in the moral discourse 
through which reconciliation of those value conflicts might 
be possible. 
(3) As long as therapists fail to confront the na-
ture and extent of their value-involvement, and so fail to 
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examine and emend their values where necessary, their ex-
plicit and implicit claims regarding the adequacy of the 
psychotherapeutic design for living must remain in doubt. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE NEED FOR VALUE-CRITIQUE IN PSYCHOLOGY 
So far we have considered several respects in which 
psychotherapy is enmeshed in matters that once belonged ex-
clusively to ethics and moral tradition. This involvement 
follows from the sorts of concerns addressed by psychothera-
pists and from the character of their response to those 
concerns. 
Nowadays it is virtually taken for granted that many 
of the problems encountered in living are psychological in 
nature, having some cognitive, affectional and/or behavior-
al dysfunction at their root. It is believed that these 
problems can be understood in terms of the psychologists' 
conceptual framework and corrected by means of various psy-
chotherapeutic interventions. However, without disputing 
psychological interpretations of human behavior, we have 
found reason to suggest that psychological problems and mor-
al problems do not constitute mutually exclusive categories. 
Hence, when one category of problems is addressed, the 
other may be implicated as well. 
This is apparent in our observation that problems 
designated as "psychological" typically relate to the ways 
we conduct ourselves, to the ends we seek, and to the kinds 
of meaning we ascribe to our experiences. Such considera-
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tions bear upon moral issues inasmuch as they imply ques-
tions regarding how we ought to act, which ends we ough~ to 
seek, and in what ways the ultimate meaning of human exis-
tence ought to be interpreted. Thus, in their attempts to 
understand the problems of living, therapists and their cli-
ents seek some solution to those moral questions, at least 
implicitly. For this reason, the psychotherapeutic endeav-
or is involved in moral matters. 
Value-involvement in psychotherapy runs even deeper, 
for psychotherapists do not usually limit themselves to a 
dispassionate analysis of the problems of living. Rather, 
in accordance with their understanding, they proceed to 
generate and to implement practical solutions to those prob-
lems. Clearly, the solutions proffered must have moral im-
plications as profound as those of the problems addressed. 
Psychotherapists claim that, when implemented, their 
approach can be effective in helping persons to resolve 
their problems in living. To accomplish that end, they pre-
scribe some definite course of activity for persons to fol-
low. These prescriptions are generally in the form of rules 
of conduct, i.e., behavioral guidelines that the therapy 
client must observe if he or she is to achieve the envision-
ed solution. No psychotherapeutic program can exist without 
such rules of conduct, although their form, number and ex-
plicitness may vary from one program to another. 
The psychotherapists' prescriptions have an import 
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that is moral as well as technical, precisely because their 
purpose is to guide persons along certain lines of conduct 
and toward particular ends. In effect, if not by deliber-
ate design, every psychotherapeutic program constitutes a 
system of values. These values are not merely incidental 
to the psychotherapeutic program. They are inseparable from 
it, being embodied in the character of its conceptual frame-
work and in the aim of its interventions. Consequently, 
the justification of any psychotherapeutic program rests ul-
timately upon whether its implicit value-system can be de-
fended. 
Chapter Three closed with the conclusion that as long 
as therapists failed to submit psychotherapeutic values to 
critique, the moral adequacy of the modes of conduct they 
promoted would remain in doubt. Such an inquiry must pro-
ceed on two fronts: On the one hand, we must identify the 
values implicit in our current programs. On the other, we 
must elucidate further the ideal that we intend to realize 
concretely through psychotherapeutic activity, and that we 
presume is at least approximated in the values we presently 
entertain. As we articulate the psychotherapeutic ideal in 
breadth and in detail, we must modify our provisional values 
and programs accordingly--assuming, of course, that the 
ideal itself can be justified morally. 
Once the need for a self-critical inquiry into psy-
chotherapeutic values has been established, we must ascer-
101 
tain how such a critique should proceed. This is perhaps 
the more difficult question, for as I indicated earlier, 
considerable doubt exists as to whether an objective justi-
fication of values is even possible. So, rather than ad-
dress particular value problems encountered by therapists, 
we will devote our attention to formulating a defensible 
working notion of value-critique. My hope is. that the de-
lineation of an approach acceptable to both moralists and 
broadly scientific-minded psychologists might encourage 
other and more frequent attempts at value-inquiry in psy-
chology. That, in turn, might eventually facilitate some 
resolution of the particular moral dilemmas that are the 
practicing psychologists' immediate concern. 
I am convinced that, in the long run, the incorpora-
tion of an ongoing value-critique would prove to be psy-
chologists' greatest achievement. In one important sense, 
value-critique constitutes our capacity for self-transcend-
ence--i.e., the capacity to overcome the impediments to 
self-realization and self-fulfillment consequent upon inade-
quacies in the structure of human character and its under-
standing of itself. The development of such a capacity is, 
in my opinion, the fundamental purpose of psychology and 
psychotherapy. 
In this chapter, we will highlight further the need 
for a value-critique applied to psychology as a conceptual 
system, and then to psychotherapy as its technical extension. 
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The Individualistic Bias in Psychology 
It would be misleading to imply that no psychologi-
cally oriented process of value-inquiry existed at present. 
we have actually made considerable progress over the last 
century in developing and promoting such a process. We 
call it psychotherapy and apply it mainly to individual per-
sons. Later we will consider why value-inquiry should be 
conceived of as the root of all psychotherapeutic activity, 
irrespective of its theoretical orientation. 
However, the sort of value-inquiry I am proposing at 
this point is one that psychologists would apply, first, to 
their own concepts and activities, and second, to the col-
lective (social-cultural) level of human organization, with-
in which both they and the persons they study are differen-
tiated. Our progress in this regard lags far behind that 
in other dimensions of the psychotherapeutic enterprise. 
Psychologists typically eschew any critique of social 
and normative values, under the assumption that their con-
cerns should not extend beyond the province of individual 
human functioning. But that position itself rests upon cer-
tain value presuppositions, inasmuch as the distinction be-
tween the individual and his social matrix is more a func-
tion of social-cultural definition than a matter of scienti-
fic determination (Hall, 1976). This statement does not 
challenge the psychologists' conviction that their task is 
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primarily to augment individual human functioning. But it 
does suggest that their efforts in that regard are liable 
to be thwarted at some point--owing to inadequacies in 
their conception of human functioning--as long as they fail 
to inquire into the value presuppositions upon which their 
understanding rests. 
Mannheim (1936), for example, argues that the value-
determined bias evident in the psychologists' approach con-
stitutes a definite restriction on their understanding of 
human behavior. That bias, which he terms "the fiction of 
the isolated and self-sufficient individual," has its roots 
in the value of individual autonomy that has dominated West-
ern thought since the Enlightenment and the rise of indivi-
dualistic liberalism. The "fiction" is, in short, that the 
individual is a more or less discrete and self-contained 
entity, possessing from the very first a more or less fixed 
structure and set of capacities; these inherent character-
istics are supposedly released and developed in the course 
of the individual's contacts with a material and social en-
vironment that is, for all practical purposes, fundamental-
ly external to him. 
According to Mannheim, this position is defective be-
cause it overlooks the powerful role of society and the 
processes of group life in the molding of the individual. 
As long as these determinants are masked by uncritically ac-
cepted values, psychologists may ascribe certain traits to 
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"human nature" when in fact these merely reflect particular 
formative influences characteristic of the social matrix 
within which they and their subjects are embedded. Such 
misidentifications may compromise the effectiveness of psy-
chologists' attempts to modify human behavior as well as to 
understand it. 
Although nearly 50 years have elapsed since these 
concerns were put forward, psychologists have apparently ad-
vanced very little in appreciating the relation between the 
individual and the social order. In a recent essay, Sampson 
(1981) has criticized prevailing trends in contemporary psy-
chology along lines substantially the same as those expres-
sed by Mannheim. Sampson isolates two related conceptual 
biases, prominent in Western thought, that have been assumed 
uncritically by psychologists in the cognitivist and psycho-
dynamic traditions. These biases--labeled the subjectivist 
and individualistic reductions--portray the psychological 
structures and processes of the individual person as more 
or less self-contained phenomena, neglecting almost entirely 
the formative influence of material conditions and objective 
social practices in constituting and maintaining those 
mental phenomena. 
Despite the recent trend toward interactionist inter-
pretations of psychological phenomena, the subjectivist/in-
dividualistic bias in psychology has not been surmounted. 
In fact, according to Sampson, the interactionist approach 
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only perpetuates that bias further, inasmuch as it treats 
the psychological subject as the active agent in the "inter-
action," while relegating social reality and its social 
products to the status of relatively passive externalities. 
Again echoing Mannheim, Sampson warns that as long as psy-
chology fails to recognize the social and historical deter-
minants of psychological processes, "it will continue un-
critically to affirm existing social arrangements even while 
it purports simply to be discovering and describing the 
nature of human realities" (p. 739). 
Sarason (1981) adds another kindred voice to this 
small yet incisive chorus of criticism. In his view, Ameri-
can psychology has essentially invented its own subject mat-
ter, in the form of the self-contained individual. Without 
minimizing the substantial contributions that have issued 
from the psychology of the individual, he argues that our 
persistent adherence to that limited perspective only im-
prisons our understanding and constrains our capacity to 
prevent and to correct human problems. He writes: 
A clinical psychology not rooted in a realistic social 
psychology--that is, a social psychology which sees 
itself as a cultural and social-historical product and 
agent, which sees itself by virtue of time, place and 
social and institutional status as both a cultural 
cause and a cultural effect--is a misdirected clinical 
psychology. (p. 835) 
The entire psychological movement must be understood 
ultimately as a product of Western culture. Its conceptual 
biases are, as Mannheim and Sampson suggest, essentially a 
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reflection of our society's highly individualistic value-
system. But the ideological influences that have shaped. 
the current practice of psychotherapy may have operated as 
much through concrete and rather mundane social, political 
and economic conditions as through intellectual prejudices 
in the intellectual arena. 
Sarason (1981) suggests that a combination of such 
factors was responsible for psychologists' ready and unre-
flective adoption of the individualistic approach to thera-
peutic intervention: the expectation that psychologists par-
ticipate in a delivery system that had already been oriented 
to individual treatment before other alternatives were con-
sidered seriously; the financial incentives for such parti-
cipation (originally in terms of governmental funding, later 
from other sources as well); the consequent linkage of clin-
ical psychology to the medical treatment setting; and final-
ly, the complex politics of competing status interests and 
the potential for influencing public policy. 
As psychologists became enmeshed in this burgeoning 
social institution, they began quite naturally to identify 
their interests with its perpetuation. This identification 
was sealed by means of appropriate modifications in their 
theoretical framework, thereby obscuring the social origin 
of the presuppositions and values that underlie our current 
approach to psychotherapeutic intervention. 
Reppucci and Sarason (1979) advance a scathing in-
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dictment of psychologists' failure to pursue the sort of 
inquiry needed to expose the inadequacies of institutional-
ized psychology while opening the universe of alternative 
approaches. In their opinion, this failure verges on 
immorality. 
Thousands of psychologists are in one way or another 
involved with [human service] institutions and very few, 
if any, of them would deny that in general the state of 
these institutions is morally and conceptually bankrupt: 
morally, because these institutions have long been a 
social cancer in our society, and conceptually, because 
their conditions and resistance to change .•• suggest 
that psychologists' way of thinking about these institu-
tions is obviously inadequate. In the realm of human 
affairs, theories and theorists, practice and practi-
tioners are never amoral. As a science and profession, 
psychology is devoted to acquiring new knowledge, ex-
posing myth and ameliorating human misery. However, we 
believe that it is fair~to say that psychologists, to a 
very large degree, buy into and perpetuate the profes-
sionalism and individualism myths. (p. 539) 
The upshot of the foregoing criticisms is clear: 
Psychologists persist in conceiving of the individual as a 
self-contained entity; hence, they continue to assume that 
psychological problems originate primarily in individual 
malfunction. As long as they do so, they are likely to dis-
regard the kinds of change efforts that may be required in 
order to realize significant improvements in the human con-
dition. 
The critics I have just cited assert that the psy-
chological processes--and hence, the psychological problems 
--of individual persons largely reflect the character of the 
Prevailing social order. If their position is correct, it 
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suggests that truly constructive change at the individual 
level must entail some substantive modification of the ~b­
jective social conditions that predispose persons to develop 
those problems in the first place. In this light, the con-
trasting bases for therapeutic intervention, clinical recon-
struction versus prophylaxis or primary prevention, follow 
closely the distinction between the individualistic and the 
social-historical perspectives. 
These alternative routes to reform of the human con-
dition have been characterized succinctly by Dewey (1948), 
himself a staunch critic of the concept of the self-contain-
ed individual. Of the indiyidualistic approach he writes: 
When the self is regarded as something complete within 
itself, then it is readily argued that only internal 
moralistic changes are of importance in general reform. 
Institutional changes are said to be merely external .•.. 
Individuals are led to concentrate in moral introspec-
tion upon their own vices and virtues and to neglect the 
character of the environment. Morals withdraw from ac-
tive concern with detailed economic and political con-
ditions. (p. 194) 
In other words, when we view the individual as a more or 
less self-contained agency, it seems only reasonable to em-
phasize direct intervention into the lives of particular in-
dividuals as the way to correct or to augment individual 
functioning. From this perspective, the material and social 
e~vironment is relatively passive and malleable, mirroring 
the psychological condition of the individuals who occupy 
it. Problems in the social arrangements of life resemble 
symptoms, inasmuch as they are external indications of in-
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ternal psychological problems that need to be corrected. 
rt follows that once the idiosyncratic internal impediments 
to optimal human functioning have been removed, individuals 
should impress their improved character upon their environ-
ment. 
Dewey then goes on to contrast this with the social-
historical perspective: 
The real difficulty with the individualistic approach 
is that the individual is regarded as something given, 
something already there •... But when self-hood is per-
ceived to be an active process it is also seen that so-
cial modifications are the only means of the creation 
of changed personalities. Institutions are viewed in 
their educative effect:--with reference to the types of 
individuals they foster. The interest in individual 
moral improvement and the social interest in objective 
reform of economic and political conditions are identi-
fied. (pp. 194-196) 
An understanding limited to the terms of the individualistic 
approach is inadequate because it neglects the constellation 
of objective social processes that produces specific kinds 
of individuals. From the social-historical perspective, in-
dividual persons mirror the condition of their material and 
social environment as much as that environment mirrors their 
psychological condition. The bounds of their understanding 
and conduct, the manner in which they typically think and 
respond, the kinds of values they entertain, the ways in 
which their lives are arranged--and their approach to re-
solving the problems they experience--are all conditioned by 
the prevailing ideology and social practices, and by the 
material circumstances of life. Reich (1972) takes this a 
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step further, suggesting that the character structures typi-
cal of individuals in a given social system not only mirror 
that system, but also constitute the means by which the so-
cial order is anchored and propagated. 
All in all, change efforts that focus upon the intra-
psychic determinants of human problems, to the neglect of 
the underlying social conditions that foster those problems, 
are liable to be insufficient. The outcome may be more akin 
to symptom reduction than to an actual cure. Sampson, for 
examples, notes that 
by reducing conflicts to individual subjective proces-
ses, we overlook those questions of social structure 
that are necessary to ground both our undertanding and 
our recommendations for~ resolution. When we psycholo-
gize conflicts and their resolution, we fail to test or 
challenge the structures and practices of the larger 
society within which the various subjectivisms have de-
veloped and whose interests they often both veil and 
serve. (Sampson, 1981, p. 737) 
Criticism of the individualistic approach is not 
tantamount to an abandonment of individual concerns in favor 
of social ones. The social-historical perspective offered 
as an alternative merely incorporates those concerns within 
a more comprehensive framework. It denies neither the sig-
nificance of individual psychological problems nor the im-
portance of current strategies aimed at ameliorating those 
problems. To the extent that psychotherapists have demon-
strated an ability to reduce human misery and to improve 
the quality of individuals' lives, their efforts cannot be 
faulted. Yet the broader perspective reveals that such in-
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terventions are primarily reparative and fail to attack hu-
man problems at their root. If therapists restrict them-
selves to patching up the casualties of the prevailing so-
cial order, they may even countenance its pathogenic ar-
rangements, albeit unwittingly. As long as our aim is to 
improve significantly the quality of human life, that ap-
proach must prove inadequate. 
According to the critics I have cited, significant 
improvements in the character of individuals' psychological 
functioning and in the overall quality of human life cannot 
follow from individual-oriented psychotherapeutic interven-
tions alone. Some modification of the social institutions 
of life--moral, political, cultural, economic--must occur 
as well. This was put rather forcefully by Reich (1972), 
who had attempted change efforts on both fronts: 
There are millions of neurotic people, people whose psy-
chic structure and capacity for work and pleasure have 
been seriously impaired; every hour of every day fresh 
thousands of neuroses are produced by family education 
and social conditions •••• From a social point of view, 
the position of individual psychotherapy is a hopeless 
one ..•. The only prophylaxis worthy of serious considera-
tion is one for the practical implementation of which 
the present social system lacks every prerequisite; 
that it is only a thorough turnover of social institu-
tions and ideologies ••• which will create the precondi-
tions for an extensive prophylaxis of neuroses. 
(pp. xx-xxi) 
We will find that much of the controversy surrounding the 
adoption of the social-historical perspective and value-
critique follows from concern that psychologists might be-
come active social critics and advocates of social change. 
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In our adherence to the individualistic perspective, 
we may overlook another important consideration: Our theo-
retical formulations and strategies for intervention are· as 
conditioned by social factors as are the psychological prob-
lems to which these are addressed. Thus we are led once 
more to assert the need for a self-critical value-inquiry 
in psychology and psychotherapy. The individualistic ap-
proach that dominates modern psychology is not only asocial 
and ahistorical--there is a sense in which it is amoral as 
well. Psychologists cannot avoid making value judgments, 
for value judgments are a fundamental feature of the psycho-
therapeutic endeavor. However, their adherence to the indi-
vidualistic approach blinds~ them to the importance of exam-
ining either the values implicit in that approach or the 
values of the prevailing social order within which they 
operate. By contrast, the social-historical approach treats 
psychological inquiry and value-inquiry as complementary as-
pects of a single process. The aim of that process is sim-
ply to augment the capacity of every individual to achieve 
the greatest possible fulfillment for himself or herself. 
One other matter bears mention here. Although it 
has just been argued that we are conditioned by the material 
and social arrangements within which we exist, this does not 
mean that our capacity to think and to act is entirely lim-
ited by those conditions. I believe that our ability to en-
gage in a self-critical inquiry into values enables us to 
113 
comprehend those limits and, in doing so, to formulate a 
more adequate course of action--i.e., one that subordinates 
and exploits existing conditions to further our own well-
being. 
We will explore the ramifications of this perspective 
later. But it does suggest that the activist dedicated to 
truly advancing human interests should set about the task 
of facilitating that process at all levels, individual and 
social. For this reason, as long as psychologists fail to 
incorporate an ongoing value-inquiry as part of their pro-
gram, we may wonder with Smith (1973) whether psychology is 
part of the problem when it would like to be part of the 
solution. 
The Bifurcation of Value-Choices 
The prevailing attitude toward values in psychother-
apy is largely a reflection of the individualistic perspec-
tive that dominates psychotherapists' approach to problem-
solving. Because their attention is focused upon the in-
ternal--and, ostensibly, the internally originating--condi-
tion of the individual person, therapists tend to concen-
trate upon individuals' idiosyncratic values to the exclu-
sion of any other sort. 
As before, by an individual's values I mean the 
grounds for his conduct, the design of his aims, and the 
meaning he ascribes to his experiences; by idiosyncratic 
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values I mean those that are the result of the individual's 
peculiar psychological development. Although therapists 
generally do not label them as such, they routinely evalu-
ate and attempt to modify their clients' idiosyncratic val-
ues. At the same time, however, they typically refrain 
from the critical evaluation of values evident in the ex-
isting social arrangements within which those individuals 
are embedded. The values entertained by any group having 
some legitimate standing in society are similarly exempted. 
Buhler's (1962) approach to values in psychotherapy 
provides a particularly interesting example of this polari-
zation. Her argument is largely a response to those thera-
pists whose only way of handling their clients' value-
conflicts is to interpret these indiscriminately as mani-
festations of some underlying neurotic conflict. Buhler's 
main assertion is that not all value problems experienced 
by a therapy client originate in a neurotic process. She 
distinguishes two kinds of value problems: those that are 
essentially neurotic and those that are basically non-neu-
rotic or "normal." Neurotic value problems have their 
source in some psychological malfunction, and are therefore 
amenable to clinical analysis. So-called normal value 
problems are of an entirely different sort, arising out of 
confusion over two or more rival values, each of which en-
joys the support of at least some segment of society. 
Buhler believes, along with most psychologists, that 
115 
the psychotherapeutic approach can provide no justifiable 
grounds for selecting among rival social-cultural values, 
nor any specific guidance in that regard. The therapist· 
is limited to two types of interventions with respect to 
the client's normal value problems. Primarily, we works to 
eliminate the neurotic conflicts that interfere with the 
client's ability to think, judge and act autonomously and 
without distortion. Here it is presumed that as the client 
grows more realistic and more flexible, he will be able to 
reconcile and to integrate his various conflicting motives 
and preferences. Buhler suggests that, once the client's 
neurotic problems have been corrected, the therapist may 
offer (at his discretion) an impartial clarification of the 
alternative value solutions available to the client, so the 
client may make value-choices that are informed as well as 
free. 
Buhler admits that, in practice, this approach is 
neither simple nor straightforward. Unequivocal criteria 
have not yet been established for discriminating between 
those value problems or value-choices that are of neurotic 
origin and those that are basically normal. Consequently, 
therapists must still often decide for themselves whether 
to take a therapeutic stand regarding particular value-
conflicts or to withold their involvement except for pur-
poses of value-clarification. 
Once one accepts this distinction between normal and 
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neurotic values, this uncertainty is undoubtedly troubling. 
However, in light of our discussion, it is far more signifi-
cant that therapists maintain that such a clear-cut dis~ 
tinction is possible even in principle. In determining 
that certain value problems and value-choices are neurotic 
while others are normal, therapists are unequivocally in-
valved in making value judgments of their own. We must 
question where and upon what grounds these judgments fit 
into their two-category scheme. 
We have already seen that the entire psychotherapeu-
tic change effort rests upon two related kinds of value 
judgments: first, judgments of the relative desirability 
of particular behavioral conditions, which establish the 
direction of therapeutic change, and second, judgments of 
the degree to which individual persons' behaviors deviate 
from those behaviors determined to be favorable, thereby 
identifying the client population. When psychologists 
identify a particular behavior as neurotic {abnormal, mal-
adjusted, etc.), they mean essentially that it falls beyond 
the limits of what--for one reason or another--is consider-
ed normal {healthy, well-adjusted, etc.). As we noted in 
Chapter Three, this is ultimately a matter of moral judg-
ment, regardless of the particular criteria employed in 
making that discrimination. Szasz emphasizes this when he 
writes that 
the statement "X is a mental symptom" involves rendering 
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a judgment that entails a covert comparison between the 
patient's ideas, concepts or beliefs and those of the 
observer and the society in which they live. The notion 
of a mental symptom is therefore inextricably tied to 
the social, and particularly the ethical, context in 
which it is made. (Szasz, 1970, p. 14) 
Therapists have apparently adopted a similar approach 
with regard to an individual's value-choices. Buhler's 
distinction between normal and neurotic value-choices sug-
gests that therapists can identify (or otherwise establish) 
criteria that indicate which value-choices belong to the 
domain of acceptable alternatives and which do not. Again, 
as with the therapists' discrimination between normal and 
deviant behaviors, this discrimination between normal and 
neurotic value-choices is ultimately a matter of moral judg-
ment. 
Consequently, the therapists' explicit position with 
regard to values--that they can offer neither specific guid-
ance nor justifiable grounds in the selection of values--
cannot stand unqualified. Inasmuch as therapists discrimi-
nate between normal and neurotic value-choices, a more ac-
curate statement of their position would be as follows: 
Once those alternatives deemed therapeutically unacceptable 
have been identified and excluded, therapists can direct 
the client no further in selecting from among the competing 
values that remain. 
It is this bifurcation of value-choices into two 
discrete classes that enables therapists to pursue some pro-
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gram of psychotherapeutic change (which nec~ssarily entails 
value judgments) while still promoting the notion of an in-
dividual's freedom to choose his or her own values. Indi-
viduals are indeed permitted to choose their own values, 
but only as long as the values they select lie within the 
ostensible bounds of normality. The value-choices that fall 
outside those limits are presumably of an entirely different 
sort than those that lie within. From this perspective, de-
viant value-choices are indicative of some kind of psychol-
ogical disturbance or distortion, which by definition makes 
them legitimate objects of psychotherapeutic change efforts. 
It should be apparent that serious questions may be 
raised about the practice of classifying value-choices as 
either normal or neurotic, even if we admit that in some 
instances the selection of values is motivated neurotically. 
The issue having received the most attention so far pertains 
to the kinds of values that become categorized as neurotic. 
The main thrust of Szasz's (1970) criticism, for example, 
is that such labels may be employed covertly in order to 
justify measures taken to control individuals whom society 
considers deviant. However, the complementary issue is 
equally deserving of our attention--namely, what kinds of 
value-choices comprise the category of normal or acceptable 
alternatives. 
It is my impression that this bifurcation of value-
choices follows the distinction between the individual and 
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the social order that typifies the individualistic perspec-
tive. Of course, no therapist would maintain that all val-
ues originating with the individual were by definition neu-
rotic. But it does appear that value-choices considered 
neurotic are invariably idiosyncratic in origin, while all 
social and normative values--i.e., value-choices that enjoy 
the support of a significant number of the so-called normal 
members of society--are assigned to the domain of accepta-
ble options. In other words, a therapist may question 
whether an individual's value-choices are in his or her 
best interests, unless those choices pertain to social and 
normative values. As almost every therapist knows, he is 
supposed to remain silent about the latter. 
Therapists are understandably reluctant to disturb 
this arrangement, for doing so might draw their discipline 
into a maelstrom of controversy. Therapists would have to 
surrender their overt stance of value-neutrality, which has 
so far kept them above the confusion and conflict that cur-
rently typifies the arena of social norms and value-systems. 
The advocate of value-neutrality may protest that, being 
thrust into such controversy, therapists could be forced to 
adopt partisan positions regarding the relative merits of 
certain competing social and normative values and value-
systems. 
Although the conclusion is basically sound, that ar-
gument tends to be somewhat misleading. It ignores the 
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fact that the therapists' claim of impartiality is already 
largely a pretense. There appears to be no bias on the 
therapists' part mainly because their laissez-faire approach 
to competing social norms and values fits comfortably well 
with the prevailing bias of society. We saw in Chapter 
Three that the position of value-neutrality itself is clear-
ly a moral position--a libertarian one, highly individual-
istic in its orientation. The so-called new morality upon 
which it rests springs directly from the tradition of indi-
vidualism that is a prominent feature of contemporary West-
ern thought, particularly in America. 
It should be recalled that when therapists elect to 
introduce certain considera~ions into their programs, they 
are affirming in effect that attention to certain values--
i.e., particular grounds for deciding which ends are worth 
pursuing and by which means--is essential to the success of 
the psychotherapeutic endeavor. Because they systematical-
ly exclude other considerations from their programs, they 
imply concurrently that other values are either irrelevant 
or unessential to the task of resolving psychological prob-
lems. Similarly, when therapists define the scope of their 
interests so as to include individual psychological proces-
ses and idiosyncratic value-choices while excluding social 
processes and normative value-choices, they are affirming 
that it is sufficient to attend to defects in the former in 
order to realize the basic aim of psychotherapy. 
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Yet it is precisely this position that critics of 
the individualistic perspective have called into question. 
They contend that particular social values--whether trans-
mitted as ideology or embodied in the material conditions 
of social life--may be as deleterious to individual func-
tioning as any idiosyncratic neurotic process (Sampson, 
1981) and may even be the root cause of neurosis (Reich, 
1972) . 
Buhler (1962) acknowledges that some criteria for 
identifying neurotic involvement is needed in order to dis-
tinguish value problems and value-choices that are neurotic 
in character from those that are not. She suggests that "a 
healthy or a neurotic value development must depend .•. both 
on an individual's ability to integrate his own strivings 
and on his ability to cope with the environmental impacts" 
(p. 131). In neurotic conditions, these activities are 
characterized by severe inflexibility. 
The decisive cause for the neurotic's inflexibility, 
which prevents his freedom of choice, his adequate per-
ception and mastery of reality, his integration, and 
most of all his inner development is ••• faulty and ob-
viously unchangeable interpretation, due to distorted 
symbolic thinking. (pp. 134-135) 
This formulation is basically compatible with the current 
trend toward cognitive-learning theories of human behavior 
(Mahoney, 1977). Such theories maintain that idiosyncratic, 
unrealistic and maladaptive interpretations--or cognitive 
representations--of experience interfere with an individu-
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al's ability to function efficiently. 
This description of the neurotic process constitutes 
immediate grounds for questioning whether it is legitimate 
to exempt social and normative values from the psychothera-
pists' scrutiny. Social and normative values are essenti-
ally interpretative constructs. In some instances, they 
may play as great a role in determining an individual's con-
duct as do the truly idiosyncratic constructs that emerge 
in the course of the individual's unique psychological de-
velopment. It is at least conceivable that particular so-
cial and normative values might also be faulty and inflexi-
ble and liable to interfere with the efficient functioning 
of the individuals who embrace them. Why, then, must thera-
pists be enjoined from taking a stand with regard to these? 
Social and normative values are distinguished from 
the other sort of interpretative construct in that they en-
joy some measure of consensual support and, hence, tend to 
be acquired more or less intact from the social environment. 
For example, Lowe (1969, p. 2) differentiates "psychological 
values," an individual's subjective creations, and "morals," 
the "consensually validated social expectations" produced 
by the culture. A particular value may enjoy consensual 
s:upport either because it is affirmed by the society as a 
whole and embodied in the prevailing social arrangements or 
because it is embraced by some members of society and toler-
ated as a legitimate option by the rest. 
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Although this distinction between idiosyncratic and 
consensually validated interpretative constructs is a valid 
one, it should not be employed to delimit the scope of psy-
chotherapists' critical inquiry. That delimitation risks 
subverting the fundamental aim of the psychotherapeutic en-
deaver, which is to resolve individuals' problems of living 
and to improve both the efficiency of their psychological 
functioning and the overall quality of their lives. Consen-
sual support in and of itself never constitutes adequate 
grounds for assuming that a particular value does not inter-
fere somehow with the efficiency of individuals' function-
ing or (more generally) with their overall best interests. 
When consensus values are exempted from therapists' con-
sideration, factors that contribute significantly to the 
problems therapists address may be ignored. 
Although values that advance human interests often 
receive consensual support while those that impede human in-
terests do not, history is also replete with examples to the 
contrary. The full implications of a particular value are 
not always apparent to the individuals who support it by 
consensus, nor do those individuals always comprehend ade-
quately the alternatives that might exist. Conceptual myo-
pia--i.e., "subjectivity"--is as much a property of indi-
viduals as members of a social group as it is of individuals 
as self-contained entities. Anthropologists have been im-
pressed by the extent to which cultural values blind members 
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of one culture to the values of another (Hall, 1976). But 
this collective subjectivity makes it just as difficult for 
the members of a given society to grasp the nature--and par-
ticularly the shortcomings--of their own values. Hence, 
they may lend their support unwittingly to values that the 
objective observer would recognize as somehow inadequate 
(i.e., partial, biased or distorted) and potentially dele-
terious to human interests. 
In this light, it is a highly questionable practice 
to accept that a particular value-choice is a viable option 
merely on the basis of the consensual support it enjoys. 
Yet this is what therapists do, in effect, when they observe 
the injunction against employing at the level of social and 
normative values the sort of criteria used to evaluate an 
individual's idiosyncratic values. Our discussion suggests 
that particular consensus values, like particular idiosyn-
cratic values, may interfere with individuals' ability to 
integrate their own strivings and to cope with their envi-
ronment. Whether or to what extent this is so can be known 
only through a deliberate program of critical inquiry de-
signed to surmount the conceptual limitations arising out 
of subjectivity--personal or collective--so as to reveal 
any inadequacies in the particular values entertained. 
If the consensual support enjoyed by a particular 
social or normative value is actually warranted, it is only 
because the individuals who comprise that consensus have 
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engaged in the sort of critical inquiry just indicated. In 
thiS event, the consensus reflects the concurrence in their 
judgments that the value in question is indeed adequate and 
worthy of support. If the consensus has no such basis in 
a value-critique, it must remain open to question. Under 
those circumstances, adherence to a consensus value may 
reflect little more than a collective inflexibility. 
In short, consensual support is significant only in-
sofar as it represents the social group's affirmation of a 
particular value based upon their common exercise of criti-
cal judgment. As Frankena (1963) notes, it is the ideal 
consensus (i.e., the conclusion to which all persons who 
engaged in moral reasoning under ideal circumstances would 
come) and not the actual consensus (which may be only a 
distillation of the unreflective prejudices of the majority) 
that is of importance in ethics. 
From this perspective, we should never assume uncri-
tically that the consensual support for a particular value 
is based upon reasoned inquiry and not upon mere prejudice. 
It seems only prudent, therefore, that psychotherapists 
themselves evaluate the consequences upon individuals' 
functioning of particular consensus values, much as they 
do with regard to individuals' idiosyncratic values. 
Once psychotherapists begin to engage in this sort 
of value-critique, either of two outcomes may occur. On 
the one hand, their evaluations might provide a more or less 
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independent confirmation that particular social and norma-
tive values were defensible--i.e., supportive of individu-
als' psychological functioning and congruent with their 
overall best interests. In this case, therapists could 
adopt explicitly and defensibly the consensus position that 
otherwise they were endorsing only covertly or by default 
through their refusal to engage in such critique. On the 
other hand, their evaluations might expose inadequacies in 
those values that had gone undetected (or that had been 
ignored) by others. In that case, therapists would be put 
in the position of challenging the prevailing consensus--
questioning the defensibility of those values and, perhaps, 
suggesting more adequate alternatives. 
CHAPTER V 
OBJECTIONS TO AN INQUIRY INTO VALUES 
I have already suggested that psychotherapists' re-
luctance to engage in a critical inquiry into social and 
normative values stems from their concern that they might 
be drawn into partisan positions on particular moral issues. 
Behind that concern is the fear that they would become more 
prone to subjective bias and distortion as a result. This 
is hardly a valid objection, however, considering that 
their current position--i.e., their so-called value-neutral-
ity--is itself already a partisan position. Indeed, inas-
much as the purpose of value-critique is to identify and to 
correct subjective bias and distortion, it is the injunction 
against engaging in a critical inquiry into values that 
seems peculiar. 
If the consensus that supported particular social 
and normative values were founded upon reasoned judgment, 
the therapists' value-critique would pose no threat, and 
should even be welcomed. On the other hand, one might an-
ticipate resistance to such critical inquiry if those foun-
dations were vulnerable and, hence, when the therapists' 
evaluations were more likely to challenge the prevailing 
consensus than to support it. 
In my opinion, the various objections to therapists 
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engaging in value-critique issue (directly or indirectly) 
from concern that they might abandon their tacit and unre-
flective support for prevailing social and normative values, 
becoming critics of some established social and moral insti-
tutions and advocates of social change instead. In this 
chapter we will examine briefly three of the more serious 
objections lodged against the inclusion into psychology of 
a comprehensive, ongoing value-critique. 
Forms of Covert Resistance 
The first objection to psychologists' involvement in 
value-critique is not so muph an explicit argument as it is 
a pervasive, unverbalized resistance. Several of the crit-
ics whom I quoted earlier have commented on various aspects 
of this resistance. I have already noted Sarason's (1981) 
argument that a combination of social, economic and politi-
cal pressures have contributed significantly to psychology's 
continuing trend toward--and almost exclusive emphasis upon 
--psychotherapeutic interventions oriented at the individu-
al. According to Sampson (1981), psychologists' resistance 
to the notion of a concerted value-critique may be a re-
sponse to the potentially radical implications of stepping 
~eyond the confines of the individualistic approach. In 
his words, 
it would demand a radical break not only with the exist-
ing tradition in psychology but also with psychology's 
relation to society: This step beyond challenges some 
~ .. 
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I of the major value assumptions that have governed West-
ern thought and that continue to serve particular in-
terests and particular social arrangements and prac-
tices. ( p. 733) 
sampson implies that the established institutions of society 
have a powerful interest in maintaining the prevailing so-
cial order as it stands, whether or not it actually supports 
the overall well-being of all its members. As long as psy-
chologists are persuaded, by both ideological and material 
pressures, not to abandon the individualistic perspective, 
the "existing arTangements of power and domination within .•. 
society are served" (p. 735). 
London (1964, pp. v-vi) points out that our society 
sanctions the whole psychotherapeutic enterprise only on 
the tacit assumption that therapists will abide by prevail-
ing social values and that their activities will ultimately 
benefit the existing social order. We may wonder whether 
or to what extent society would withdraw its sanction if 
psychotherapists were to turn social critics. 
In Szasz's (1967) opinion, this ambiguous relation-
ship between psychotherapy and the social order has given 
rise to a hidden tension in the field of mental health. He 
argues that as the psychotherapeutic enterprise acquired 
the support and resources of society, it became gradually 
transformed into a social institution itself. As such, it 
also came to adopt the conservative premise basic to all 
social institutions--namely, that the preservation of exist-
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ing interpersonal and social conditions (i.e., the status 
quo) is the desirable end. Szasz then notes that, in con-
trast, the ideal implicit in the psychotherapeutic endeavor 
is to clarify the nature of human problems and to facili-
tate human growth or development through whatever kind of 
change (individual or social) is necessary. Thus, the so-
cial institution of psychotherapy--the psychotherapeutic 
establishment--now stands more or less opposed to the ideal 
that it was originally meant to embody. 
It is precisely this tension between the psychothera-
peutic establishment and the psychotherapeutic ideal that 
I have tried to expose and to examine in the present study. 
The institutionalization of psychotherapy has given 
rise to practical as well as ideological motives for thera-
pists themselves to resist becoming engaged in value-cri-
tique and in social change efforts. For example, inasmuch 
as therapists are also private citizens, they ordinarily 
desire a reasonably comfortable material lifestyle for them-
selves and their dependents. In this regard, the psycho-
therapeutic establishment serves as a sort of business, of-
fering decent employment to those who observe the tacit 
social and professional guidelines that dictate what thera-
pists should and should not do. At the same time, it pro-
vides little or no support or recognition for activities 
that do not conform to the established pattern. Albee 
(1980), for one, believes that this seductive combination 
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of incentives and disincentives has led a considerable num-
ber of psychologists to lose interest in social reform. 
There are other professional rewards to consider, 
which are less tangible than financial security but no less 
important to many psychologists. I am thinking of two in 
particular: the gratification that comes of personal accom-
plishment and the more subtle sense that the collective en-
deavor in which one is involved is worthwhile and stands 
some chance of success. On both counts, the psychotherapeu-
tic establishment provides psychologists greater opportunity 
for such rewards. The therapists' accomplishments in indi-
vidual psychotherapy and related activities may be minor, 
but they are adequate in most cases to offset frustration. 
Moreover, as long as the "myth of mental illness" persists, 
therapists may seek security in the illusion that the busi-
ness of psychotherapy is currently on the right track. In 
contrast, successes in the area of primary prevention are 
few, and the social order is so refractory t.o change efforts 
that it is difficult to stave off pessimism (Sarason, 1981). 
One of the most pervasive forms of resistance to 
value-critique follows from our society's posture of plural-
ism in regard to social and normative values--i.e., its 
professed toleration of a diversity of value-choices. This 
posture plays an important role in preserving the status 
quo, inasmuch as it affirms the individualistic principle 
upon which the current social order is organized (Dewey & 
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Tufts, 1960). We have already encountered the manifesta-
tion of value-pluralism in mainstream psychology, in the 
form of the therapists' notion of value-neutrality and the 
so-called new morality invoked as its justification. Along 
with the reasons that I suggested earlier were responsible 
for its entrenchment in psychologists' attitude toward val-
ues, we might add that the social order exerts a subtle 
pressure upon the psychotherapeutic establishment to adopt 
this pivotal element of the prevailing ideology. 
However, we cannot discount the possibility that psy-
chologists have also a personal interest in promoting the 
posture of value-pluralism--an interest that goes beyond 
their current involvement in, and reliance upon, the psycho-
therapeutic establishment. Every therapist is likely to 
have committed himself to particular social and normative 
values in the course of his personal life. Hence, if a 
radical value-critique were incorporated into the psycho-
therapeutic enterprise, he might be put in the position of 
having to challenge a consensus value to which he himself 
subscribed. As we will note in the following section, most 
individuals tend to respond defensively to any challenge to 
their personal values. It is reasonable to suspect that 
therapists might do the same. 
In this light, the therapists' position of value-
neutrality serves their own defensive interests as well as 
those of the other members of society. As long as it is 
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maintained that therapy clients should be free to select 
their own values--excepting certain limitations with regard 
to "neurotic" value-choices--it is implied that therapists 
should be granted the same right. Indeed, Principle Three 
of the Ethical Principles of Psychologists affirms outright 
the notion of pluralism in values: 
Psychologists' moral and ethical standards of behavior 
are a personal matter to the same degree as they are 
for any other citizen, except as these may compromise 
the fulfillment of their professional responsibilities 
or reduce the public trust in psychology and psycholo-
gists. Regarding their own behavior, psychologists are 
sensitive to prevailing community standards and to the 
possible implact that conformity to or deviation from 
these standards may have upon the quality of ther per-
formance as psychologists. (APA, 1981, p. 634) · 
However, in view of the issues we have discussed, this prin-
ciple is clearly inadequate. It is actually little more 
than a restatement of the fundamental moral problem that 
psychologists must face--namely, to what extent moral values 
figure in the practice of psychology. Yet its language is 
so equivocal that the issue is made to appear virtually 
unproblematic. 
In Chapter Two we discovered that a therapist's per-
sonal values influence his clients' attitudes and behaviors 
in subtle and unintended ways, and that this influence can-
not be eliminated entirely. Indeed, inasmuch as the thera-
pist's own notion of the ideal person colors his conception 
of mental health and determines his preference for a parti-
cular therapeutic approach (Lowe, 1969), his personal values 
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pervade even the psychotherapeutic value-system he offers 
his clients. With this in mind, I question whether the line 
between psychologists' personal values and those they must 
observe as professionals is as discrete as Principle Three 
suggests. In my opinion, there are no such discrete lines, 
and we only deceive ourselves in thinking that we can com-
partmentalize our values so thoroughly. 
It follows from this that psychologists' personal 
values are no longer entirely a personal matter once they 
attempt to influence others, either with their theories or 
through their clinical interventions. Hence, it is their 
moral and professional responsibility to submit to critical 
examination all values involved in the psychotherapeutic en-
deavor--their personal values as well as their professional 
ones, and the prevailing social and normative values as well 
as their clients' idiosyncratic ones. Although this is 
undoubtedly an arduous task, I see no simpler solution to 
the problem. 
The Attraction of Value-Pluralism 
In contrast to the covert resistance just examined, 
the other objections to psychologists' adoption of any on-
~oing value-critique occur as explicit arguments. They 
challenge, in one way or another, whether it is even legiti-
mate for psychologists to pursue a critical inquiry into 
social and normative values--i.e., into any value that lies 
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outside the domain circumscribed as neurotic. 
I indicated a moment ago that our society embraces 
rather tenaciously the doctrine of pluralism in regard to 
social and normative values. As I understand it, this doc-
trine is designed to avert the possibility that individuals 
might be forced to adopt some arbitrary or self-serving 
ideology. This is certainly creditable insofar as it en-
sures individuals the opportunity to realize their own po-
tentials and fundamental interests free of unwarrantable 
domination. Unfortunately, however, the doctrine of plural-
ism has been promoted at the expense of reasoned value-
critique. As a result, it has unwittingly encouraged the 
proliferation of values that may actually subvert its orig-
inal intent to promote individuals' well-being and funda-
mental interests. 
At its best, I think, the principle of pluralism 
affirms merely that values are not to be imposed upon indi-
viduals by other individuals or by the social order itself. 
As such, it makes no assertion that one individual's value-
choices are as good as another's or that an individual's 
value-choices are necessarily good for him. These notions 
are patently absurd, for not all values support an individ-
ual's well-being, and the mere act of choosing a particular 
value cannot alter its basic character. Value-choices must 
be guided by an understanding of their relation to one's 
best interests or overall well-being. The process of ac-
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quiring that understanding is what I mean by a reasoned 
value-critique. The principle of pluralism, as I have just 
interpreted it, does allow for the rule of reason to sup-
plant the rule of coercion as the means of determining which 
values individuals ought to adopt. 
However, when the principle that one should not im-
pose values upon an individual is taken to an extreme, it 
gives way to quite a different notion: that one should not 
pass judgment upon an individual's value-choices. In ef-
fect, an exaggerated doctrine of value-pluralism leads to 
ethical relativism--the view that what ought to be valued 
by an individual or a society is simply whatever happens to 
be valued by that individual or society. Obviously, this 
position entails the rejection of any objective and univer-
sally binding standard of valuation, and with it the possi-
bility of reasoned value-critique. What is less obvious is 
that it simultaneously undercuts the original aim of plural-
ism, which is to eliminate coercion in the mattter of value-
choices. Because ethical relativism admits of no principle 
by which value conflicts could be argued or arbitrated, such 
disputes could be settled only by use of force (Blanshard, 
1966) . 
The tendency to gravitate from pluralism to relativ-
ism may be attributed to two factors--one psychological, the 
other ideological. The psychological factor that I have in 
mind is our natural propensity to resist any challenge to 
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our own values, irrespective of the merits of that chal-
lenge. This virtually reflexive defensiveness in the face 
of such challenges is explicable in terms of the relation-
shiP between values and personal security. As I have said 
repeatedly, our values reflect our understanding of how we 
ought to act, which ends we ought to seek, and what meaning 
we ought to ascribe to our experiences. A system of values 
provides us the stable sense of order without which we could 
have no confidence that our actions were ever adequate or 
even appropriate. Consequently, the integrity of our value-
system figures prominently in our sense of personal securi-
ty, and any threat to the one threatens the other as well. 
Defensiveness is typically our immediate response whenever 
our personal security is jeopardized. 
From this perspective, the relativistic maxim that 
one should not pass judgment upon an individual's value-
choices formalizes our personal defensive posture that no 
one should challenge our own values. I am not suggesting 
that ethical relativism is actually rooted in psychological 
defensiveness. But the doctrine of relativism does serve, 
first, as a convenient rationalization of that kind of de-
fensiveness and, second, as a way of discouraging the sort 
of value-critique that is experienced as so threatening to 
begin with. 
However, the rejection and abandonment of value-
critique is fundamentally inconsistent with the aim that 
138 
first gave rise to this defensive posture; hence, it is ul-
timately self-defeating. The maneuver is intended origi-
nally to protect one's personal security and, specifically, 
the integrity of one's value-system. But to the extent 
that one thwarts a self-critical inquiry into one's own 
values, there can be no assurance that the values being de-
fended are indeed adequate, nor can there be any way of 
identifying and emending inadequacies that might be present. 
consequently, the abandonment of value-critique would pro-
mote only a false security. In the long run, this could 
hardly be in an individual's best interests. 
On the contrary, we may ensure our personal security 
only through active participation in a self-critical inquiry 
into our own individual and collective values. This implies 
that we must make a deliberate effort to overcome our ini-
tial resistance to value-critique and to accept the possi-
bility that somewhere and to some degree our values may re-
quire emendation. That effort might issue from the aware-
ness that in surrendering our cherished but inadequate val-
ues, we actually reassert the true purpose of having enter-
tained them. 
The ideological factor that contributes to the ten-
dency to gravitate from pluralism to relativism is the wide-
spread assumption that value-choices are entirely subjec-
tive and, hence, that the values an individual selects are 
a personal matter. This rests, in turn, upon the assumption 
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that values can be neither verified by objective test nor 
justified by means of rational argument. Obviously, th~ 
latter assumption renders the process of value-critique as 
subjective as that of value-selection. As we noted in 
Chapter Two, the modern conception of objective verifica-
tion--rooted in the doctrine of empirical science--lends 
credence to these assumptions. Kitchener (1980a, 1980b) 
indicates that a number of prominent behavior therapists 
(e.g., Feldman, 1976; Krasner & Ullmann, 1973; Skinner, 
1971) have adopted this position explicitly and without 
qualification. Tacit support may be widespread among other 
types of therapists as well~ to the extent that their stand 
on value-neutrality implies that persons' so-called normal 
value-choices are a personal matter not subject to critical 
evaluation. 
In the following chapters we will take up in greater 
detail the issue of whether or not values are subject to 
objective verification. For now, I would like to summarize 
the argument for exempting consensually supported values 
from the therapists' critique and to point out the disas-
trous implications for the practice of psychotherapy that 
would follow if we took seriously that rationale. 
The argument begins with the pluralistic proposition 
that the only justification that can be given for social 
and normative values is that they are in fact supported by 
a consensus. In other words, those values supported by the 
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social order or selected by some legitimate (i.e., "normal") 
social group are "right" solely by reason of their support 
or selection only; there is no other criterion of rightness. 
It is pointless for psychologists even to question whether 
particular consensus values are justifiable, inasmuch as 
the only legitimate criterion is consensus--and, in any 
given instance, the presence of a consensus is already a 
patent fact. Psychologists are bound, therefore, to operate 
within the structure of the prevailing social order and to 
refrain from challenging the social and normative values 
adopted by the members of any legitimate social group. 
We have already discussed one problem with the con-
sensus criterion: namely, that consensual support for some 
value gives no assurance in and of itself that the value is 
adequate in terms of individuals' best interests. In answer 
to this, I indicated that consensual support had to be vali-
dated by means of a reasoned value-critique. The argument 
just outlined asserts that consensual support is self-vali-
dating and requires no independent justification before it 
can lay claim to our adherence. Moreover, it asserts that 
no other justification is possible. In this way, it under-
cuts any attempt at an objective value-critique. In doing 
s.o, however, it disregards entirely--and renders insoluble--
the problem that particular consensually validated values 
might be somehow inadequate in terms of individuals' best 
interests. 
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If this radical value-pluralism were adopted, it 
would undermine the fundamental advantage that the psycho-
therapeutic approach to the problems of living holds over 
all others--namely, that its principles, prescriptions and 
procedures are potentially more objective. No such claim 
to objectivity could be defended, inasmuch as value judg-
ments are an intrinsic feature of all psychotherapeutic 
activity. 
I indicated in Chapter Three that the possibility of 
psychotherapeutic intervention is predicated upon the no-
tion that there are deviations in psychological functioning 
that are susceptible to change efforts. Our conception of 
psychological deviation and its amelioration follows from 
our understanding of the nature of normal or healthy psy-
chological functioning. Although the particulars of our 
understanding may include scientific data and empirical 
fact, these are still organized in a way that reflects our 
values (Grunfeld, 1973). Consequently, psychotherapeutic 
judgments are value judgments, at least in part. 
This in itself poses no insuperable problem, as long 
as we are able to evaluate objectively the adequacy of our 
values. However, if we were to affirm the principle of rad-
ical value-pluralism, we would have to abandon the notion 
of an objective value-critique and, along with it, the pos-
sibility of assessing the adequacy of our values. In order 
to understand why, we need only to consider that we would 
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be committed thereby to the position that our value judg-
ments--and, hence, our therapeutic judgments as well--we+e 
inherently and inescapably subjective. 
Actually, it is questionable whether we could engage 
at all in the evaluation of an individual's behavior or 
level of functioning and still remain consistent in our ad-
herence to the principle of value-pluralism. In practice, 
we circumvent this issue merely by postulating two discrete 
categories of behavior, the normal and the neurotic. But 
even if this were legitimate, the only available standard 
of evaluation would be some noncontroversial core of shared 
values. Psychotherapeutic activity would have to be guided 
by these norms, and conformity with the prevailing consen-
sus would constitute the desirable therapeutic outcome. If 
there is an optimum level of human functioning, we would 
have no way of identifying it; hence, we could never know 
whether or not our therapeutic goals even approximated it. 
Indeed, the only meaningful notion of optimal functioning 
from this perspective would refer to a successful adjust-
ment to consensual norms. In short, we could offer no jus-
tification for our judgments (or for our interventions) 
other than an appeal to the consensus criterion. 
These considerations should suffice to illustrate 
the untenable position into which we would be forced by 
our adoption, even in principle, of a radical value-plural-
ism. The popularity that this position still enjoys among 
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psychotherapists--as is evident in their ready acceptance 
of the notion of value-neutrality--may follow from the fact 
that its implications for psychotherapy are seldom made ex-
plicit and seldom taken seriously. If it turns out that 
there is no way to evaluate objectively the values upon 
which we base our judgments, then perhaps value-pluralism 
will be our last resort. But in this light it seems absurd 
that we should elevate it to the position of choice. 
The Psychologists' Qualifications 
The doctrines of value-pluralism and ethical relativ-
ism do not enjoy universal support, of course. But these 
are not the only grounds from which opposition has been 
mounted against an ongoing value-critique in psychology. 
Other opponents--among them some psychologists, their ad-
herence to the concept of value-neutrality notwithstanding--
believe that social and normative values are susceptible to 
some sort of justification besides an appeal to the consen-
sus criterion. Their position is that although a critical 
inquiry into social and normative values is otherwise a 
legitimate enterprise, it is simply not the proper role of 
psychologists and psychotherapists to engage in it. 
Two arguments, mutually supportive of one another, 
figure prominently in this sort of opposition. The argu-
ments pertain, respectively, to the scientific and profes-
sional aspects of the psychologists' self-defined role as 
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~ 144 l "scientist-practitioners." 
The first argument asserts that psychologists ar~ 
not qualified to engage in value-critique, ostensibly be-
cause their area of expertise is the scientific study of 
human behavior and not moral philosophy. Behind this asser-
tion there is also the concern that psychologists should 
engage in no activity that might jeopardize their status as 
scientists. That status is cherished and defended by psy-
chologists because it sets their theories and pronouncements 
apart from those of other parties who share their interest 
in human behavior and the problems of living. It is assumed 
that because psychologists ~re scientists, their investiga-
tions must be restricted to the domain of observable fact. 
This immediately removes from their purview all values ex-
cept those that Lowe (1969) termed "psychological." Psy-
chologists' propositions must be susceptible to validation 
by empirical test in order to qualify as scientific. Be-
cause normative propositions cannot be validated in that 
manner, psychologists are neither permitted nor prepared to 
discuss them evaluatively. In other words, the only method 
of validation available to psychologists (i.e., the empiri-
cal test) is inapplicable to social and normative values, 
and psychologists cannot engage in any other sort of value-
critique and still remain scientific. 
The second argument actually embraces a variety of 
related concerns, all of which pertain to the practitioner 
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aspect of the psychologists' role. Their common theme is 
that any concerted involvement in value-critique would com-
promise the psychologists' ability to perform effectively 
their psychotherapeutic function. (Of course, therapists 
are still encouraged to monitor the therapy situation for 
the possible intrusion of their own personal values, but 
this is considered essentially a technical matter.) 
From this perspective, the therapists' task is the 
treatment of psychological dysfunction, and not the moral 
education of the therapy client. Depending upon a given 
therapist's theoretical orientation, the dysfunction may be 
viewed as one of faulty cognition, faulty conditioning, or 
even faulty biochemistry. But, in any case, it must be 
considered an idiosyncratic problem, susceptible to correc-
tion by means of therapeutic interventions aimed at the 
psychological mechanism or process responsible for the dis-
turbance in functioning. For the most part, the client's 
social and normative value-choices are extrinsic to the 
locus of the problem. When moral conflicts do figure among 
the client's concerns, the problem is still primarily a 
psychological one, inasmuch as he or she is not functioning 
well enough to cope with these effectively (as it is pre-
sumed "normal" persons are able to do). 
Other concerns constellate around this basic posi-
tion. It is considered unquestionably detrimental to the 
therapeutic process that therapists might claim license to 
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challenge their clients' social and normative values. At 
best, that move would distract both therapist and clien~ 
from the real therapeutic issues. At worst, it would sub-
vert the entire therapy. If therapists took a stand on par-
ticular normative and social values, they might alienate a 
number of their clients and possibly entire segments of the 
population of potential clients. On the other hand, they 
might become propagandists, in effect, utilizing their 
status and influence to convert others to their own value-
system. In either case, they could offer no scientific jus-
tification for the values they promoted. Moreover, disa-
greements among therapists as to whether particular values 
could be justified by appeal to some nonscientific criteria 
might only precipitate serious rifts in the profession. 
Finally, if therapists were to take up the analysis of so-
cial problems or to devote their energies to moral specula-
tion, this might occur at the expense of their primary re-
sponsibility to care for the mental health of those indi-
viduals needing treatment. 
Several of the objections that figure in these argu-
ments should be familiar from previous sections. Others 
could undoubtedly be enumerated by opponents of the notion 
of a psychologically-based value-inquiry. But these should 
suffice to indicate the kinds of concerns raised by oppo-
nents who do not argue from the position of radical value-
Pluralism or ethical relativism. 
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What are we to make of these objections? In my opin-
ion, the argument that pertains to the scientific aspect of 
the psychologists' role suffers several serious defects, 
most of which follow from basic misunderstandings about the 
nature of scientific activity. We will be in a better posi-
tion to assess these defects and their significance at the 
end of Chapter Seven, which is devoted to an examination of 
the meaning of scientific inquiry. Here I will merely as-
sert that psychologists' association with science need not 
bar them from engaging in value-critique. Indeed, when we 
understand properly the meaning of science, we may recog-
nize that their commitment ,to that critique is an indispen-
sable aspect of their responsibility as scientists. 
Although obviously I favor the notion of an ongoing 
value-critique as part of the psychotherapeutic enterprise, 
I share several of the concerns raised in the argument re-
garding its potential impact upon the practitioner aspect 
of the psychologists' role. However, the merit of that ar-
gument is limited by its essential neglect of the issue I 
have been raising throughout: namely, that psychologists as 
practitioners are already involved (and unavoidably so) in 
making value judgments and in supporting and promoting cer-
tain values. As I see it, our real concern should be how 
best to incorporate a self-critical inquiry into the values 
involved in psychotherapy. In that context, the objections 
Offered in the second argument serve the useful purpose of 
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alerting us to the hazards involved in attempting that goal. 
No doubt the practicing psychologists' main occuva-
tion for the forseeable future will remain the treatment of 
individual clients--individual persons, for the most part, 
but with increasing attention to individual family-systems 
and small organizations as well. This is, after all, the 
psychologists' area of expertise and it is here that they 
can make an immediate and essentially constructive impact. 
Neither I nor the critics I have cited suggest that psy-
chologists abandon their activity as therapists in favor 
of some other. 
Yet it is apparent that sooner or later the psycho-
therapeutic discipline must establish as its legitimate in-
terest a comprehensive and sustained inquiry into the entire 
spectrum of values that bear upon its fundamental aim--i.e., 
to resolve individuals' problems of living and to improve 
substantially the efficiency of their psychological func-
tioning and the overall quality of their lives. Otherwise, 
psychologists will remain incapable not only of modifying 
the prevailing social order for more effective prophylaxis 
or primary prevention, but even of assessing to what extent 
unidentified biases and inadequacies in their own formula-
tions might be thwarting our collective striving to under-
stand ourselves and to conduct ourselves in ways supportive 
of our well-being. 
At this point it is premature to speculate as to how 
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an ongoing value-critique by psychologists might affect the 
actual practice of therapy. We are only now beginning t~ 
appreciate the extent to which moral values pervade all as-
pects of the psychotherapeutic enterprise. Our first task 
must be to clarify the nature of this involvement. No spe-
cific strategy for further intervention into moral matters 
is warranted until we have clarified and validated the psy-
chotherapeutic values we would promote. In other words, be-
fore presuming the right to challenge others' values, we 
must submit our own to careful scrutiny. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE NATURE OF VALUE-CRITIQUE 
I indicated in Chapter Three (and elsewhere) that 
considerable confusion still surrounds the question of what 
constitutes the essential psychotherapeutic values. On the 
one hand, therapists differ among themselves as to which 
values they should promote. A careful examination of their 
current programs reveals that distinctly different, and 
occasionally incongruous, principles and prescriptions are 
grouped under the general label of psychotherapy (London, 
1964; Lowe, 1969; Weisskopf~Joelson, 1980). On the other 
hand, there is some question as to whether important values 
and related concerns have been excluded from therapists' 
programs altogether. We have examined several of the more 
serious criticisms in the foregoing chapters. 
I suggested earlier that this confusion over values 
in psychotherapy follows from a deeper uncertainty regard-
ing the possibility of an objective value-critique. We 
will devote the remainder of our discussion to elucidating 
a rationale for the critical examination and rectification 
of our values. 
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!re Ambiguous Psychotherapeutic Ideal 
We have already witnessed the ambiguity that current-
ly pervades psychologists' understanding of the relation be-
tween the psychotherapeutic ideal and social and normative 
values. This situation is exemplified in a remark by 
Buhler (1962) regarding the dilemma therapists face when 
they believe that their clients' adherence to some elective 
(social or religious) value-system "might be unfavorable 
for their health." The issue was debated in her study 
group on values, and she reports their major point of agree-
ment as follows: 
The assumption of health being the highest value was 
recognized as not necessarily valid, but as debatable ...• 
This was pointed out by analysts as early as the twen-
ties, and it has been emphasized since then repeatedly. 
(Buhler, 1962, p. 14J) 
Buhler did not elaborate on this, there or elsewhere in her 
essay, other than to observe that incongruities between the 
health value--which, I presume, refers to the psychothera-
peutic ideal--and certain other value-systems were a source 
of value-conflict for therapists and their clients alike. 
Yet this remark has very serious ramifications, especially 
if we infer from it that therapists are promoting principles 
and prescriptions that may be inferior to some others and 
(-by implication) possibly even detrimental to human inter-
ests. 
I find this issue particularly troubling, as I imag-
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ine it would be for any member of the psychotherapeutic 
discipline who dwelt seriously upon it. As a psychologist, 
I subscribe to the general principles of psychology and to 
the task of furthering the psychotherapeutic ideal. Yet, 
being in service to the public, I feel a greater obligation 
to promote only the highest values, or those values that are 
at least supportive of them. It seems to me that if we are 
to pursue the psychotherapeutic endeavor with rectitude as 
well as with conviction, we must not leave unresolved the 
status of its implicit values vis-a-vis the available al-
ternatives. 
Because the passage just quoted from Buhler (1962) 
appears at a juncture in her discussion, it figures in two 
distinct contexts. The meaning we impute to her remark 
actually depends upon the context within which it is inter-
preted. 
That passage follows immediately upon the discussion 
of several case studies. As I understand it, Buhler's point 
here is that some clients should be permitted to suffer the 
frustrations, guilt feelings, et cetera, that are engendered 
by strict adherence to certain beliefs, as long as those be-
liefs maintain the integrity of the clients' personalities 
Qverall. In this context, her reservation over the status 
of the health value could be interpreted as a prudent ad-
monition against an inflexible insistence upon some abstract 
ideal condition. Strictly speaking, the proposed solution--
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i.e., acquiescing to a compromise between the health value 
and some other--does not conflict with our current notion 
of a positive therapeutic outcome, inasmuch as the over-
riding concern is still maintaining the overall integrity 
of an individual's personality. That is, we should consider 
such an outcome favorable, even though it might fall short 
of our abstract conception of what is ideal, because to 
press for a closer approximation would lead instead to an 
overall impairment of functioning, i.e., to a negative out-
come. 
In this situation, an individual's value-choices 
are really never considered rivals of the values promoted 
by psychotherapy. Instead, they are evaluated in conjuction 
with other features of that individual's personality as 
either assets or liabilities, in order to determine how that 
individual might achieve the highest level of functioning 
congruent with his or her potentials. 
Buhler's reservation over the status of the health 
value appears differently in another context, a few para-
graphs later. Here she suggests that the conflict between 
the health value (associated, in part, with a condition con-
sidered free of nonproductive frustrations or guilt feel-
ings) and some other value-system (which, if adhered to 
strictly, might actually engender such frustration or guilt) 
is actually an instance of normal value-conflict. The im-
mediate implication is that the two are legitimate alterna-
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tives, and that the matter of selecting between them should 
be treated as a normal value-choice, outside the province 
of the therapists' judgment. This differs markedly from 
the previous situation, in which the alternative values 
were not of equal status; there the partial affirmation of 
values contrary to the psychotherapeutic ideal actually 
supported that ideal. Here, it seems, we are supposed to 
interpret quite literally the statement that health may not 
be the highest value. 
In light of our earlier observations, this position 
appears to be another way of precluding any challenge to 
social and normative values from the psychotherapeutic cri-
teria. By allowing that there may be other ways of living 
that are as legitimate as the one promoted by psychothera-
pists, that possibility is undercut rather effectively. 
The cost of this maneuver is considerably greater than that 
of the others we have examined, however. Psychotherapists' 
prescriptions lose much of their persuasive force when 
their program for living is portrayed as merely elective. 
Its appeal usually rests upon the vague assumption that it 
represents a basic imperative of human nature. If no jus-
tification could be offered for the superiority of the psy-
chotherapeutic design for living, its status would be re-
duced to that of one among many alternative and partially 
conflicting value-systems. we would no longer have even the 
two-category scheme discussed earlier, with psychotherapeu-
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tic values on the one side and consensus values on the oth-
er. The distinction would collapse, and psychotherapeutic 
values would emerge as a matter of individual preference· 
along with the rest. 
These two interpretations of the notion that health 
(in the psychologists' sense) may not be the highest value 
stand in definite contrast to one another. The first af-
firms the priority of the psychotherapeutic value-system, 
while the second actually undermines the status of psycho-
therapeutic prescriptions. Although neither of these is 
satisfactory, in my opinion, it is instructive to study 
their respective merits and defects. 
The first position has basically two merits: One is 
its overriding concern with the overall well-being of the 
individual, in light of which his or her value-choices must 
be assessed. The other, actually implied in the first, is 
its insistence that the pursuit of some abstract ideal ther-
apeutic outcome must be tempered with an awareness of the 
individual's specific potentials. However, this perspec-
tive seems to establish psychotherapists as the final arbi-
ters of the merits of adherence to a particular value-sys-
tem; it may even imply that such judgments must be made on 
a case-by-case basis. This is clearly problematic in view 
of the serious questions raised earlier regarding the ade-
quacy of our current conception of the psychotherapeutic 
ideal, by which we assess individuals' assets and liabili-
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ties and develop concrete programs for behavior change. 
Here we might consider, for example, Bloch's (1960, p. 120) 
conclusion that therapists' current ideal reflects "the de-
sirable qualities of the rising young executive ... or the 
upwardly mobile middle class citizen," and Hospers' (1959) 
concern that fostering such an ideal might cost us our art-
ists, saints and visionaries. 
The second perspective emphasizes just this issue. 
If we abstract its constructive significance, we may inter-
pret the assertion that health may not be the highest value 
as recognition that our current conception of mental health 
or psychological adjustment-may be inadequate in some re-
spect, and that something intrinsically positive might be 
found in value-systems that seemed somehow antagonistic to 
that conception. I have already alluded to the major draw-
back of this position: Although it allows that rival value-
systems may have their own legitimacy, it makes no provision 
for some means by which these might be reconciled with one 
another. Instead, it merely leaves their differences unre-
solved and, by implication, unresolvable. 
As I indicated before, this last conclusion is hardly 
favorable from the psychologists' standpoint, for it would 
reduce psychotherapeutic values to a matter of individual 
Preference along with all other social and normative values. 
Obviously, this runs counter to the psychologists' belief 
that their prescriptions are somehow sounder because they 
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are grounded in some basic realities of human nature. (I 
believe that there is indeed a kernel of truth to this no-
tion, although it cannot be used as a blanket justification 
of existing psychotherapeutic programs.) Moreover, this 
conclusion is incompatible with the notion that psycholo-
gists should engage in a critical inquiry into social and 
normative values in light of the psychotherapeutic ideal. 
As I argued at length in Chapter Four, that activity is in-
dispensable if we are to ensure that the psychotherapeutic 
program subserves our fundamental interests. 
Still, we must not ignore the many charges that our 
current formulation of the psychotherapeutic ideal--as it 
is reflected in the conceptual schemes and the practices of 
contemporary psychologists--is inadequate in some respects, 
lest we risk promoting a design for living that might actu-
ally compromise those interests. Earlier we examined in 
some detail the inherent partiality of the psychologists' 
current approach, which first lifts the individual out of 
his material and social context, and then divides up the re-
mainder into discrete categories--his psychological func-
tions in one, his moral values and spiritual aspirations in 
another, his politics in yet another. (Unfortunately, this 
atomistic approach to human nature has been institutional-
ized in the departmental organization of our universities, 
thereby tending to legitimate the promulgation of partial 
formulations.) we saw also that the prevailing psychothera-
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peutic program had been reproached for its overall neglect 
of the moral dimension of life, particularly of those con-
siderations that other value-systems believed crucial to 
the governance of human conduct and to the proper resolu-
tion of problems of living. In short, whether it be because 
psychologists have adopted the framework of self-contained 
individualism or because they have embraced the principle 
of value-neutrality, their principles and prescriptions are 
apt to be partial. 
It should be apparent that we face a dilemma here. 
On the one hand, we have the argument that psychotherapists 
should engage in a critical inquiry into prevailing social 
and normative values. As we noted earlier, to the extent 
that those values are defective, they may actually figure 
in the problems of living that psychotherapists seek to cor-
rect. On the other hand, inasmuch as our current formula-
tion of the psychotherapeutic ideal is partial, it does not 
constitute an adequate criterion for evaluating other value-
systems. Indeed, we cannot even assume that the present 
psychotherapeutic design for living specifies adequately how 
we ought to conduct ourselves in order to overcome the prob-
lems of living and, by implication, to function effectively 
and to realize our fundamental interests. 
In a few words, we cannot evaluate social and norma-
tive values against the current psychotherapeutic ideal, be-
cause its formulation is liable to be inadequate, nor can 
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we formulate a psychotherapeutic program on the basis of 
such values, because those also are liable to be defective 
in some respect. 
Unless we can resolve this dilemma somehow, we will 
be forced to accept the ethical skeptic's conclusion (im-
plied in the second position discussed above) that there is 
no way to determine unequivocally to what extent or in which 
respects either the psychotherapeutic value-system or any of 
its rivals is inadequate. In turn, this would preclude the 
sort of value-critique that I had suggested should be part 
of the psychotherapeutic enterprise. 
Alternative Approaches to Value-Critique 
One conclusion we must draw from the foregoing is 
that it is not legitimate to employ any existing value-
system to evaluate its rivals. Such an approach is unaccep-
table because any value-system we might choose to employ 
would be partial and hence unsuitable as an evaluative stan-
dard. However, before abandoning altogether the possibility 
of an objective value-critique, there is another approach 
worth considering. This alternative actually exploits the 
notion that has rendered the other untenable--namely, that 
e_very value-system has both merits and defects. 
It is a patent fact that our value-systems differ, 
often to the point of conflict. We have no reason to assume 
that any one of these is utterly correct and the rest utter-
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lY mistaken. Hence, none can claim without question that 
it is adequate in and of itself, either for all persons or 
even for its own adherents. On the contrary, each is par-
tial in some respect. This description is particularly apt, 
I think, inasmuch as the term "partial" denotes both bias 
and incompleteness. It implies that we may view the imper-
fections peculiar to any value-system as consequent upon its 
omission of considerations that are objectively relevant to 
the proper governance of human conduct. In other words, as 
long as we fail to take all relevant considerations into ac-
count when articulating our values, the resulting formula-
tions are liable to be distorted somehow, relative to a com-
plete or fully adequate understanding of the moral ideal. 
When we characterize some value-system as partial, we imply 
that it is biased to the same extent and in the same re-
spects as it is incomplete. 
We may frame the problem of value-conflict in these 
same terms. It is virtually tautologous that rival value-
systems conflict to the extent that their respective formu-
lations are mutually incongruous, i.e., inconsistent with 
one another. In light of our analysis, we may trace this 
mutual incongruity to the failure at some level of each val-
ue-system to take the other--or considerations deemed rele-
vant by the other--into account. As each elaborates its 
own considerations to the neglect of the other's, their re-
spective formulations display increasingly divergent biases, 
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leading them eventually into conflict. From this perspec-
tive, value-conflicts give evidence of the partiality of our 
value-systems. 
On the other hand, it is difficult (if not impossi-
ble) to imagine a value-system that held no positive signif-
icance whatsoever. Indeed, our assertion that a particular 
value-system is partial implies that its formulations do 
represent some small part of the entire moral scheme--how-
ever incomplete and distorted that part might be. Beneath 
their respective imperfections and aside from their mutual 
incongruities, our value-systems all arise out of a common 
human motive: to formulate as adequately as possible some 
guidelines by which we might realize our essential interests 
and fulfill our potential as human beings. Buhler (1962) 
refers to something akin to this when she observes that the 
common denominator of all value-systems is their "construc-
tive intent." In essence, each one strives to articulate 
those considerations that, from its own perspective, are 
thought relevant to an understanding of how we ought to 
live. Even the biased and distorted formulations peculiar 
to a given value-system are not entirely devoid of positive 
significance, inasmuch as they give concrete (albeit par-
tial) expression to that striving. As I indicated a moment 
ago, it is the unintended omission of objectively relevant 
considerations that skews the process of articulation and 
renders those specific results inadequate. 
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The upshot of all this is that if it were not for 
their respective imperfections--i.e., the omissions and con-
sequent distortions peculiar to each--our value-systems 
would converge upon a common understanding of how we ought 
to act, which ends we ought to seek, and in what way we 
ought to interpret the meaning of human existence. This im-
plies, in turn, that if we could rectify those respective 
omissions and distortions, there would emerge a conception 
of the moral ideal recognized by all as valid and binding. 
(It should be noted parenthetically that this does not con-
note an utter homogeneity as regards the particular values 
entertained by individual persons or groups. It stipulates 
only that all such values be congruous with one another, 
i.e,, mutually consistent within the context of an overarch-
ing system of moral governance.) 
With these preliminary considerations in mind, we are 
in a better position to speculate on how we might go about 
emending our partial (biased and incomplete) understanding 
of the moral ideal. 
First of all, if we are to rectify the omissions and 
distortions in our existing value-systems, we must have some 
notion of what has been omitted and distorted, or at least 
some way of determining where in fact those imperfections 
lie. In order to know in any given instance what exactly 
had been omitted or distorted, it would be necessary for us 
to contrast our current values with an adequate (i.e., com-
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plete and unbiased) conception of the moral ideal. Yet our 
plight is essentially that we have no direct access to the 
moral ideal. Any formulation purported to embody that ideal 
must fall prey to the criticism lodged earlier against em-
ploying one of our rival value-systems as an evaluative 
standard--namely, that it is liable to be partial in some 
respect. Hence, any value-critique that relies upon a cor-
respondence between some fully formed moral paradigm and our 
imperfect values is simply untenable, for our understanding 
is confined exclusively to the latter. 
Because we are unable to obtain direct knowledge of 
what has been omitted from or distorted in our existing 
value-systems, we must reject the popular conception that 
value-critique involves a straightforward comparison to some 
moral exemplar (whether it be our current notion of the psy-
chotherapeutic ideal or some secular or religious moral 
paradigm) . This rejection of the direct correspondence ap-
proach is not tantamount to a complete abandonment of value-
critique, however. It merely forces us to look elsewhere 
for a serviceable means of emending our values. 
The alternative approach to which I alluded earlier 
recommends itself on the grounds that it does not succumb 
to the above limitation. Although it also conceives of 
value-critique as a process of assessment and adjustment, it 
may be differentiated from the correspondence approach along 
several interrelated lines. The following are its most sig-
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nificant characteristics: 
First, this approach turns on the notion that every 
one of our value-systems has both merits and defects. (This 
refers, of course, to the complementary meanings of partial-
ity.) It exploits the possibility that every value-system 
may contribute to our moral understanding in some respect, 
however obscured or distorted that contribution might be at 
present, owing to the inevitable and self-limiting imperfec-
tions in its formulation. 
Second, this approach may be characterized as indi-
rect, inasmuch as it does not presuppose direct and detailed 
knowledge of the moral ideal. It necessitates only that we 
be able to determine approximately where and to what extent 
there are omissions and distortions in our existing value-
systems. 
Finally, it may be characterized as experimental 
(given qualifications to be discussed later), inasmuch as 
it entails inference, test and disciplined observation. In 
this approach, value-critique would proceed by identifying 
some locus of omission and distortion, initiating some cor-
relative adjustment in our values, reassessing the imperfec-
tions in the result and then making further adjustments as 
necessary. The assumption here is that if this were carried 
out with consistency and persistence, we might gradually 
rectify the defects in our value-systems and thereby develop 
a progressively more adequate conception of the moral ideal. 
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The rationale that unites these characteristics into 
a serviceable value-critique will become evident as we con-
sider what remains the principal problem: how to identify 
(in order to correct) the omissions and distortions in our 
value-systems. 
Because we lack a fully-formed standard free of all 
partiality and independent of our imperfect understanding, 
we can only compare our partial formulations to one another. 
Yet we may turn this apparent obstacle to our advantage by 
acknowledging explicitly the partiality of those particular 
formulations. We need only to recall from before that, 
while imperfect, each of these has some merit as well. It 
may be inferred from this, I think, that the comparisons 
among them offer us the opportunity to exploit their re-
spective merits as the means to correcting their respective 
defects. 
Instead of directly employing any one value-system 
or purported moral exemplar to evaluate its rivals, we 
should bring them all to bear upon one another. In this 
light, value-critique emerges as a process of reciprocal 
evaluation and correction, or as the mutual supplementation 
of each one's partiality. 
This is a very elementary description of what is, in 
my opinion, the only viable approach to value-critique 
available to us. Having already sketched out the grounds 
upon which this approach is based, we may now observe how 
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these come together to constitute its underlying rationale. 
To begin with, we should recall three points: First, 
the partiality of each of our value-systems arises essenti-
ally from its omission of some objectively relevant consid-
erations, which leads in turn to corresponding distortions 
in its formulations. Second, although its peculiar omis-
sions and consequent distortions render it inadequate in and 
of itself, every value-system still manifests a fundamental-
ly positive moral striving and potentially harbors some con-
sideration relevant to our understanding of the moral ideal. 
Third, the mutual incongruities that engender conflict among 
our value-systems are only the result of discrepancies in 
regard to the considerations that each one emphasizes and 
omits. 
One conclusion drawn from these furnishes the pivotal 
clue as to how, in the absence of an adequate exemplar, we 
may identify the omissions and distortions in our value-
systems. This is the notion that value-conflict manifests 
the partiality of our formulations. Insofar as the mutual 
incongruities that give rise to conflict among our values 
follow (directly or indirectly) from their failure to take 
one another into account, we may infer that those points of 
conflict indicate respects in which the value-systems in-
volved are each incomplete or inadequately formulated. 
Hence, value-conflict constitutes an index of omission and 
distortion in our value-systems. 
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By observing where and how our values conflict with 
one another, we have a way of identifying imperfections in 
our moral understanding that does not necessitate prior 
direct and detailed knowledge of the moral ideal. Actually, 
it makes only one assumption for which we have no direct 
evidence, but which seems nonetheless plausible: that an 
adequate conception of the moral ideal must be self-consis-
tent, i.e., free of any unremitting conflict or contradic-
tion among its constituent elements. Accordingly, as long 
as there are conflicts and inconsistencies among our formu-
lations, we may infer that these are inadequate in some re-
gard. 
Inasmuch as value-conflict serves to reveal such in-
adequacies, its significance is not entirely negative. In-
deed, it is negative at all only as long as we fail to heed 
its implicit signal that our formulations require some ad-
justment. It is the risk of such failure that I have tried 
to emphasize in my arguments for a vigorous inquiry into 
values and through the criticisms I have leveled against the 
various forms of resistance to it. 
We should recognize that the only real threat to any 
value-system is the one posed by its own partiality, for 
that imposes a constraint upon its intrinsic moral striving, 
i.e., upon the execution of its constructive intent. Al-
though the existing structure of a value-system is temporar-
ily upset by exposing its imperfections, this step is neces-
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sary in order to pursue more adequate formulations and 
thereby a more complete fulfillment of its moral striving--
which is, after all, the motive for forming and holding val-
ues in the first place. Dogmatic adherence to any value or 
system of values in the face of challenge or conflict is 
therefore contrary to the fundamental moral interests of any 
individual or group. When it occurs in the social sciences, 
however, it is nothing short of catastrophic. It fosters 
a reluctance to admit or even to recognize implications and 
interrelationships among the elements of experience that 
should figure in our understanding of human nature and right 
conduct. Open-mindedness and a willingness to submit values 
to critique are crucial to the advance of knowledge. 
In short, every instance of value-conflict should be 
viewed as an opportunity to emend and to extend our under-
standing of the moral ideal in concrete and specific terms. 
We have already noted that value-conflict may draw our at-
tention to aspects of our formulations that are inadequate. 
Of course, without prior knowledge of an adequate exemplar, 
we cannot know exactly the character of the omissions and 
distortions responsible for their partiality. Yet value-
conflict may provide indirect indications in this regard as 
well. 
We noted that the mutual incongruities responsible 
for conflict among our value-systems could be traced to each 
one's indifference to some consideration deemed relevant by 
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another. Therefore, a particular value-conflict indicates 
not only that each of the value-systems involved is partial 
or incomplete, but also that each is partial in a particular 
respect--namely, in that it omits or distorts considerations 
that figure in the formulations with which it conflicts. 
This suggests, first, that every value-system can find in 
its rivals something that it has ignored, excluded or dis-
torted, and second, that by bringing them to bear upon one 
another, these apparent antagonists might actually inform 
one another of their respective omissions. 
This process of mutual supplementation must involve 
more than a simple compounding of rival value-systems. In 
their present form they resist being fitted together like 
the pieces of a puzzle--which is why value-conflicts arise 
to begin with. Likewise, because every value-system tends 
to compensate for its omissions by developing some system-
atic bias or distortion, new (albeit objectively relevant) 
considerations are also likely to be resisted as being in-
congruous with its existing (albeit partial) formulations. 
Consequently, the omissions responsible for the partiality 
of any value-system cannot be rectified without also neces-
sitating concurrent adjustments elsewhere in its structure. 
So the process of mutual supplementation must be one 
of modification and elaboration, and not one of mere accre-
tion or assemblage. Conflicts are indeed likely to ensue 
when rival value-systems--or their respective considerations 
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--are brought to bear upon one another. What becomes impor-
tant at that point is how such conflict is interpreted: that 
is, whether as a threat to be repelled or as an indication 
that some further development of our formulations is in or-
der. As I suggested in Chapter Five and again a moment ago, 
dogmatic defensiveness in response to a challenge to our 
values may be a natural reaction, but it yields no more than 
a false security as regards their adequacy. I imagine we 
must try simply to bear in mind that the aim implicit in 
our values and in those of rival value-systems is essential-
ly one, and that it is our common failure to comprehend ade-
quately our common goal, or each other's perspective on it, 
that manifests in mutual incongruity and conflict. 
If value-conflict were approached with this attitude, 
it might be interpreted not only as an index of the partial-
ity of our formulations, but also as a stimulus to their 
further development. New implications might be educed in 
the light of considerations that had not been taken into ac-
count before. As these implications were articulated, they 
might necessitate selective elaborations and adjustments in 
our formulations, so as to ensure that the latter remained 
both self-consistent and consistent with whatever else had 
come to light in the process. 
Inasmuch as our rival value-systems subserved one 
another as counterpoints in this process of mutual critique 
and relevant adjustment, they might be expected to converge 
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gradually upon a common (and considerably more detailed) 
understanding of the moral ideal. As our value-systems con-
verged, there would be a corresponding attenuation of the 
incongruities and, hence, of the conflicts among their for-
mulations. Moreover, to the extent that the formulations 
that emerged in the course of this mutual supplementation 
were more comprehensive and self-consistent than before, 
this would also mean some mitigation of their partiality. 
value-Critique and Moral Striving 
According to the foregoing characterization, the ex-
pected outcome of mutual supplementation--i.e., of modify-
ing each of our values and value-systems so as to integrate 
the others' considerations with its own--would be a gradual 
convergence upon some common conception of the moral ideal 
that was less partial (and hence more adequate) than prior 
formulations. However, one might argue that this process is 
really no more than a means of achieving social consensus, 
and that the result would be no more than a consensually 
supported system of values. 
I argued in the two previous chapters that consensual 
support does not constitute satisfactory evidence that a 
particular system of values is sound. If we are to accept 
mutual supplementation as an adequate basis for value-cri-
tique, we must distinguish this process from the consensus 
approach to values, to which it admittedly bears a superfi-
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cial resemblance. By doing so, we will gain a clearer un-
derstanding of the character of this alternative and of why 
it is more satisfactory than any other. 
To begin with, we would expect consensual support to 
accompany the convergence upon a common conception of the 
moral ideal. What is really at issue here is the relation-
ship that these bear to one another: that is, whether we 
should interpret the consensus as the collective recognition 
of a more adequate ideal or whether we should interpret the 
convergence as no more than an outgrowth of compromise. 
This distinction is crucial, for if mutual supplementation 
is merely a process of compromise, we cannot claim that it 
would advance our understanding of the moral ideal. The no-
tion of compromise does not imply that the result would be 
more adequate; it implies only that the result would be 
shared. As we witnessed before, the mere fact that some 
formulation is held in common gives no assurance that it is 
any less liable to be partial or subjective (as compared to 
an objective formulation of the moral ideal). 
My point is not to disparage either compromise or 
social consensus, for the attenuation of value-conflict and 
the concomitant promotion of social harmony implied in these 
undoubtedly constitute a desirable goal. However, I doubt 
whether compromise or social consensus, in and of them-
selves, leads ineluctably to that end, at least in any com-
prehensive and enduring way. Moreover, if we treat the at-
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tenuation of social and ideological conflict as our proxi-
mal aim--as I think the consensus approach is apt to encour-
age us to do--we are liable to compromise that very achieve-
ment in the long run. 
The consensus approach alone is not satisfactory from 
the moral point of view, inasmuch as the parties to some 
compromise or consensus might agree unwittingly to pursue 
in unison a course that was actually contrary to fundamental 
human interests--i.e., to moral interests. As long as they 
assumed that the compromise or consensus itself constituted 
sufficient support, inadequacies in their chosen course 
might remain undetected and unanticipated--that is, until 
these were finally made manifest through their deleterious 
consequences. At that point, value-conflict would again be 
in evidence--not among the parties to the compromise or con-
sensus, but between the values held consensually and those 
that, in view of what had transpired, ought to have been 
held. 
we may discern from this the key difference between 
the approach to values that involves an appeal to consensus 
and the approach that involves mutual supplementation: The 
consensus principle affirms those values upon which the 
~arties involved all agree, while the principle of mutual 
supplementation affirms those values upon which all evidence 
converges. This assertion characterizes succinctly both the 
basic defect in the consensus approach and the basic advan-
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tage of the process of mutual supplementation. The latter 
will become clearer once we have fully exposed the former. 
To my mind, the most troubling feature of the consen-
sus approach--and here I would include all forms of dogmatic 
adherence to particular values on the part of some segment 
of society--is that it may lead us to disregard that any 
system of values we entertain is liable to be partial and in 
need of some rectification. Actually, it matters little in 
this regard whether the basis for consensual agreement is a 
collective prejudice or a common appeal within the scope of 
present experience and current understanding. As I indi-
cated a moment ago, a particular system of values may be 
agreed upon at any point in time--thereby satisfying the 
consensus criterion--and still prove inadequate in the face 
of ongoing experience. As long as consensus is taken as 
sufficient grounds for belief, we may rest unwittingly in 
partial formulations. Uncritical adherence to such formula-
tions carries with it the inherent risk that their inade-
quacies may become evident only as they are thrust into our 
attention by the consequences of having disregarded them. 
The basic defect in the consensus approach is, to my mind, 
that it leaves us prey to that risk. 
As long as our understanding of the moral ideal is 
liable to be partial, some rectification of our values will 
be necessary in order to ensure that our conduct is congru-
ent with our fundamental interests. In this light, the 
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principal issue is whether we anticipate necessary adjust-
ments--and thereby forestall any compromise of those inter-
ests--or not. From what we have seen so far, it seems that 
when a value-system is upheld by consensual agreement alone, 
these adjustments are likely to be unanticipated and there-
fore reactive in nature, i.e., forced upon us by conse-
quences that become too severe to disregard or too obvious 
to deny. This is reminiscent of what Heilbroner (1974) 
calls "convulsive change," the kind to which we are compel-
led by external crises, in contrast to the kind to which we 
are led by our own foresight, deliberation and conscious 
choice. 
Perhaps crisis and compulsion are as effective as 
foresight and deliberation in bringing about necessary ad-
justments in our values. However, the value-system that is 
vulnerable to reactive or "convulsive" change (because it 
fails to anticipate those adjustments) is liable to entail 
inadvertent trauma or human suffering as well. Hence, we 
jeopardize our own well-being to the extent that we adhere 
uncritically to a partial understanding of the moral ideal 
and emend it only when compelled by circumstances. It seems 
to me that such conduct is implicitly inimical to our funda-
mental interests and, in principle, violative of the moral 
ideal. 
From this perspective, consensual and dogmatic ap-
Proaches to values actually subvert the climacteric purpose 
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of moral governance even as they purport to promote moral 
conduct. That purpose, as I have indicated before, is to 
sustain and to advance the fulfillment of human interests. 
This suggests that moral striving--which is the foundation 
and the motive of all moral conduct--must be an activity of 
proactive or anticipatory adjustment rather than one of 
scrupulous adherence to some fixed and unexamined system of 
values. Because any existing value-system is liable to be 
partial, its principles and prescriptions are likely at 
some point to provide faulty or inadequate guidance as to 
how we ought to conduct ourselves in order to realize our 
fundamental interests or our potential as human beings. 
Consequently, if our conduct were dictated by such deficient 
formulations, we would undoubtedly fail to advance our in-
terests in some respect and we might even be led into the 
sort of self-limiting conflict and crisis that moral govern-
ance should avert. 
The thrust of this argument is that we give expres-
sion to our moral striving by perfecting our understanding 
of the moral ideal, and not merely by perfecting our adher-
ence to some partial formulation of that ideal. If we 
strive to be moral, we should seek continually to expose and 
to rectify the inadequacies in our value-systems. Obvious-
ly, this orientation is incompatible with the consensual and 
dogmatic approaches to values, for it militates against 
resting in any formulation simply because it is supported by 
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mutual agreement, tradition, an established authority, or 
the like. 
Certainly, being moral means, in part, acting accord-
ing to what is, at the time, our best understanding of how 
we ought to conduct ourselves. But inasmuch as that under-
standing can always be improved, being moral must also mean 
striving to comprehend more fully the nature of our moral 
interests and how to realize them. Otherwise, we acquiesce 
to the imperfections in our conduct. I would argue further 
that these two meanings of being moral are linked inextrica-
bly to one another because our conduct is necessarily deter-
mined by what we actually b~lieve are our interests--which, 
by the way, may not always be what we profess to believe. 
Because our understanding of the moral ideal will al-
ways need some further development, the value-critique 
through which we express our moral striving must be a con-
tinual process of elaboration and rectification. So we must 
treat as provisional any system of values that we construct 
along the way--whether it be one among a number of competing 
alternatives or one that enjoys the support of all persons 
at any point in time. 
We have just observed that this conclusion confutes 
justification by compromise or consensus. But it is also 
at odds with the notion that an adequate system of values 
could result from any one-time reconciliation of rival val-
ue-systems, including reconciliation by reciprocal adjust-
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ment. This implies that by being brought to bear upon one 
another, our existing value-systems may supplement one an-
other's defects only so far. The common conception of the 
moral ideal upon which they converged might be improved, but 
it could not be considered entirely adequate. Because taken 
together our existing value-systems might still omit objec-
tively relevant considerations, they could not provide one 
another all the elements necessary in order to perfect or 
complete our understanding of the moral ideal. 
Clearly, if the process of mutual supplementation is 
to serve as a satisfactory basis for value-critique, it must 
be more than a matter of achieving congruence among our cur-
rent formulations. We may grasp this other dimension by 
first recalling the distinction I drew earlier between con-
sensus and mutual supplementation: that consensus affirms 
those values upon which the parties involved all agree, 
while mutual supplementation affirms those values upon which 
all evidence converges. 
The consensus approach carries the tacit assumption 
that it would not be necessary to inquire further into the 
adequacy of our values once some common understanding of the 
moral ideal had been achieved. Obviously, if we presume 
that the terminus of the supplementation process lies in at-
taining congruence among our existing value-systems, that 
process would indeed be but a variant of the consensus ap-
proach, as was charged earlier. 
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However, rightly considered, the process of mutual 
supplementation seeks congruence not only among those con-
siderations embodied in our current formulations, but among 
all objectively relevant considerations, including those of 
which we are not yet aware. The moral understanding at 
which this process aims lies at the point where all evidence 
converges. Because we do not now comprehend all those con-
siderations relevant to an adequate understanding of the 
moral ideal--nor are we ever likely to--that understanding 
itself remains ideal. Yet it is one that we should continu-
ally strive to approximate better by expanding and integrat-
ing our knowledge of the elements involved in determining 
how we ought to live. Like our moral striving, the process 
of mutual supplementation must be ongoing. 
From this perspective, the reconciliation of existing 
values is only one aspect of rectifying the partiality of 
our moral understanding. We must broaden our conception of 
the kind of conflict indicative of partiality to include in-
congruities other than those among the explicit formulations 
of rival value-systems. Evidence of partiality may be 
found, for example, in conflicts among unelaborated implica-
tions of those value-systems and among such implications and 
the factual circumstances to which they relate. By recal-
ling that values are essentially reasons for directing be-
havior along select lines, we may appreciate the multiplici-
ty of factors involved and the possibility that the omission 
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or distortion of any of these might compromise our attempts 
to formulate adequate modes of conduct. 
So value-critique must involve a continual searching 
out of the hidden incongruities and potential conflicts 
among our values, their mutual implications and their rela-
tion to our manifold experience. Every instance encountered 
is another opportunity to develop our understanding of the 
moral ideal (and thereby to avert the adverse consequences 
of our ignorance). Value-critique would proceed by expand-
ing the range of considerations against which we might test 
the adequacy of our conceptions: bringing them to bear upon 
one another, discriminating interrelationships and identify-
ing inconsistencies, effecting relevant adjustments--all so 
as to augment our insight into the nature of our essential 
interests and how to realize them, and specifically, to ar-
ticulate a system of moral principles and prescriptions har-
moniously adjusted to one another within the fabric of ex-
perience. 
Earlier I noted that our rival value-systems cannot 
be fitted together simply like the pieces of a puzzle, owing 
to their respective omissions and distortions. But the 
analogy is not entirely inappropriate, as long as we bear in 
mind that our present formulations must undergo some modifi-
cation before they can be fitted together congruously. New 
elements may have to be introduced in order to achieve such 
a fit and, in general, bring to completion our design for 
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living. We should also bear in mind that this task of con-
structing an adequate conception of the moral ideal does not 
begin utterly from scratch. Our current conception may be 
imperfect and provisional, but it is upon this that we build 
and improve. Our inquiry is therefore directed as much by 
our understanding of how its constituent elements already 
fit with one another to form a partially congruous design 
for living, as it is by our awareness of the deficiencies 
evident in its formulation. 
The process is guided throughout by the assumption 
that an adequate conception of the moral ideal must be both 
self-consistent and consistent with the evidence of ongoing 
experience. That is, there could be no unremitting conflict 
among its constituent elements, nor could its principles and 
prescriptions be irreconcilable with the facts of reality. 
The import of this assumption becomes clearer when we con-
sider that a system of values is essentially a pattern or 
blueprint for human conduct: First of all, an adequate sys-
tem of values would not bring our activity into conflict 
with itself by specifying mutually incongruous aims. Sec-
ond, it would not lead our activity into conflict with ex-
ternal reality by prescribing a course that failed to take 
into account the structure of the environment in which we 
were embedded. 
In short, a system of values that embodied an ade-
quate reflection of the moral ideal would be one whose con-
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stituent principles and prescriptions were adjusted harmoni-
ously with one another and to the facts of reality. What-
ever the specific content of its constituent elements, a 
value-system must meet that fundamental condition if it is 
not to impede inadvertently the principal aim of moral gov-
ernance--namely, the fulfillment of essential human inter-
ests and the realization of the potentials inherent in human 
nature. 
As long as the values that guide our conduct are not 
adjusted to one another or to the facts of reality, our con-
crete attempts to achieve that moral aim are liable to meet 
resistance, in the form of conflict originating either with-
in the complex structure of our ongoing activity or between 
the design of that activity and the structure of the exter-
nal world. The probable outcome of either encounter would 
be one that was determined largely by the character of the 
resultant conflict, and not the one at which our efforts had 
been aimed. Clearly, such resistance is inimical to the 
concrete realization of the moral ideal, for there is no 
reason to assume that an outcome over which we exerted lit-
tle or no control would be even supportive of our fundamen-
tal interests. 
As I understand it, the aim of our moral striving is 
to govern ourselves according to our moral interests, as 
against being dominated by the consequences of our own moral 
nescience or of external exigency. The perfection of moral 
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self-governance--which is, I believe, the culmination of the 
moral ideal--would entail overcoming all resistance to the 
concrete realization of those interests. We have no way of 
overcoming that resistance except by rectifying the incon-
gruities in our value-systems that lead us into conflict 
with ourselves and with the external world. 
Hence, moral striving must be a continual striving 
for congruence in our understanding of the moral ideal and 
in the conduct that follows from it. So considered, moral 
striving is one with the process of mutual supplementation 
outlined in this chapter. Moral obligation is the obliga-
tion not only to act according to our understanding, but to 
strive continually to better that understanding by engaging 
actively in that process of inquiry and adjustment. By de-
veloping our values in light of one another and in light of 
reality, we might gradually perfect our capacity for moral 
self-governance, articulating concurrently a concrete design 
for living through which we might realize our essential in-
terests in concert with one another and in harmony with our 
environment. 
This moral striving--the working-out of a comprehen-
sive and mutually congruous system of values--is a temporal 
process. Its origin lies somewhere in our collective past, 
when we first began to direct our own behavior according to 
some nascent sense of good. We may approach its ideal ter-
minus only asymptotically, inasmuch as ongoing experience 
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will always demand some elaboration of particular values. 
Consequently, we can never know in every concrete detail the 
terms of a fully adequate design for living. 
Yet our medial position vis-a-vis that ideal terminus 
does not leave us bereft of an absolute or objective stan-
dard for assessing the adequacy of our provisional values 
and value-systems. Indeed, without access to such a stan-
dard there could be no real progress toward that ideal. So 
it seems to me that the standard must be implicit in the 
very activity of moral striving, as well as in the final re-
sult. Inasmuch as the design for living realized concretely 
through moral striving must take the form of specific, in-
ternally and ecologically congruous patterns of conduct, the 
activity of moral striving must be the ongoing organization 
of behavior according to some principle of mutual congruous-
ness or harmonious reconciliation. Being in this sense the 
essence of the moral ideal--i.e., the rule of order govern-
ing its pattern or design--this principle constitutes an ab-
solute or objective standard for assessing our values and 
value-systems. 
From this perspective, we assess the adequacy of a 
system of values according to the degree to which its con-
stituent elements are congruous with one another and to the 
degree to which the system as a whole is congruous with the 
facts of reality. Specific values are adequate to the de-
gree to which they can be fitted harmoniously into such a 
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structure. In short, to the extent that a particular value-
system is organized according to this principle of mutual 
congruousness, it constitutes a concrete approximation of 
our abstract moral ideal, and the activity it engenders 
should support or augment our capacity for self-governance. 
It is difficult to imagine how we could even have 
survived and maintained our integrity as living and striving 
beings if our values and the actions that followed from them 
had not been organized (however imperfectly) along these 
lines prior to a self-conscious, concerted value-critique. 
It is for this reason that I identify the principle of mutu-
al congruousness--along with the activity of moral striving 
--as the manifestation of a natural principle and the exten-
sion of a natural process at the level of human psychologi-
cal and social organization. That is, I find it more illu-
minating to set the value-formative process in a broad con-
text, and to conceive of values as the implicit grounds for 
all discriminative activity at every level of human organi-
zation--from the neurophysiological to the societal--at 
which such activity occurs. 
Ultimately, I would identify this principle as the 
manifestation, at the human levels of organization, of what 
the biologist Weiss (1969) refers to as the "systems prin-
ciple" governing all living systems--i.e., the natural ten-
dency of any living system to coordinate its constituent 
elements so as to maintain or augment its overall design, as 
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reflected in the intrinsic order or pattern implicit in its 
ongoing activity. Harris (1965) refers to the same organic 
principle when he describes a living system as "one which 
maintains itself in being ... by automatic adjustive modifica-
tion of its internal processes and structure .•. subject to a 
recognizable principle of organization" (p. 230). Further 
on, he describes the process of adaptation as the "harmoni-
ous coordination and integration of functions within the or-
ganism with reference to its environment ... [which] is at 
once internal coherence and adjustment to external condi-
tions" (p. 250). Clearly, this bears a striking resemblance 
to the process of proactive or anticipatory adjustment, 
which we noted earlier was the main characteristic of moral 
striving. 
From this perspective, the value-formative process is 
rooted in a natural order. Yet it is questionable whether 
the values we generate will lead us unfailingly along a 
proper course--i.e., one supportive of our fundamental in-
terests--if they remain unexamined. The conscious and de-
liberate activity of moral striving is not merely the exten-
sion of a natural process. It is, more importantly, ana-
tural imperative that arises once we begin consciously to 
select our own ends, thereby superceding the automatic and 
instinctually conditioned patterns of behavior that display 
their own systematic order and possess their own specific 
principles of governance. 
187 
In other words, at some point we must participate 
actively in the value-formative process. Values assume an 
explicitly moral significance once we begin to ask ourselves 
whether the values we hold are formulated adequately and re-
present the best possible way for us to conduct ourselves. 
We are moral beings essentially because we are capable of 
such deliberate self-inquiry. Furthermore, we actualize 
our nature as moral beings in and through our individual 
and collective striving to formulate and to resolve such 
questions in concrete terms. It is in the course of this 
striving that we have developed whatever notions of right 
and wrong that we entertain, as well as the corresponding 
guidelines that we try to abide by. 
The value disputes that are current in our society 
make it quite apparent that we have not achieved final and 
immutable solutions to all moral problems. I have already 
suggested that such solutions can never be contained in any 
finite set of specific moral injunctions. As Peters (1974) 
indicates, these must still be interpreted when applied to 
particular concrete circumstances, thereby demanding of us 
something beyond rote memorization and robotic adherence to 
whatever we may have been taught about right and wrong. 
Every new situation constitutes another choice-point, so to 
speak, both because the circumstances are in some way unique 
and because our understanding is changed somehow as the re-
sult of prior experience. So the question must be posed 
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again and again, in specific terms, as to which course of 
action is best. Every instance becomes another opportunity 
to assert our moral character: to develop in concrete detail 
our understanding of the abstraction "good," and to give it 
concrete form in and through our actual conduct and the ar-
rangement of our affairs. 
I have come to conclude that in our practical ap-
proach to values, as well as in our conception of them, we 
ought to assert the priority of this striving to actualize 
our moral nature, over any specific formulation or particu-
lar value that might be generated in its course. As I indi-
cated before, moral striving is first and foremost the at-
tempt continually to better our understanding of how we 
ought to live, and thereby to organize our conduct along 
more adequate lines. It is formalized in the process of mu-
tual supplementation, which was characterized as an activity 
of reasoned self-inquiry and correlative self-adjustment. 
In light of our discussion, this process is essentially one 
of organizing human affairs in accord with our only absolute 
moral standard, the principle of mutual congruousness. 
This argument is the basis of my persistent emphasis 
upon our responsibility to develop a vigorous and unremit-
ting value-critique, as well as of my proposal as regards a 
defensible criterion for assessing the adequacy of our val-
ues. Here also are implied the grounds for justifying psy-
chologists' attempts to formulate and to promote a system 
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of values in the form of the psychotherapeutic design for 
living. 
However, before turning to this last point, we should 
summarize the terms of the value-critique elaborated in this 
chapter. The following is obviously a descriptive charac-
terization rather than a procedural formula--largely because 
by its very nature the process cannot be reduced to a series 
of simple steps. 
The indirect approach to value-critique that we have 
termed mutual supplementation is essentially a process of 
reciprocal evaluation and correction. It is predicated upon 
the notion that by bringing our rival value-systems to bear 
upon one another, they might illuminate one another's de-
fects and provide one another some of the elements with 
which their respective omissions (and attendant distortions) 
could be corrected. Our task would be to draw out the mutu-
al implications of our values and then to adjust or develop 
them further in light of those implications. The process 
would be guided throughout by the principle of mutual con-
gruousness--i.e., the principle that a system of values that 
reflects adequately the moral ideal must be both self-con-
sistent and consistent with external reality. By articu-
lating our values according to this principle, we would si-
multaneously emend their respective imperfections ·and ex-
plicate their implicit congruity. 
This activity is fundamentally experimental, inasmuch 
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as it would proceed by developing, testing and modifying 
hypotheses in accord with the principle of congruousness, 
rather than by effecting a point-by-point correspondence 
with some fully-formed moral paradigm. These hypotheses--
essentially provisional values--would have to undergo con-
tinual elaboration and adjustment in response not only to 
the logical implications of the values brought to bear upon 
one another, but also to the factual considerations that 
emerged as those implications were sought out and developed. 
In short, this value-critique would display empirical as 
well as deductive features. 
As these provisional values were explicated, inter-
related and adjusted, the overall result would be the arti-
culation of a progressively more comprehensive and self-
consistent value-system. Moreover, inasmuch as the respec-
tive imperfections in our formulations were emended in the 
process, the result would comprise the ongoing realization, 
in concrete and specific terms, of the moral ideal implicit 
in (and common to) our partial and apparently conflicting 
value-systems. Through the assiduous exercise of this form 
of value-critique, we should develop a progressively more 
adequate and more concretely detailed approximation of the 
ideal presumed to lie at the terminus of all moral striving. 
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Psychotherapy as Value-Inquiry 
Now, in light of the foregoing discussion of value-
critique, we are in a position to resolve some of the diffi-
cult questions we have raised regarding value-involvement 
in psychotherapy. 
We noted at the outset of this chapter that consider-
able confusion still surrounded our understanding of the 
nature of the psychotherapeutic ideal, particularly vis-a-
vis other social and normative value-systems. It was appar-
ent from the preceding chapters that the design for living 
promoted by psychotherapists was essentially a system of 
moral values, even though 'its prescriptions were not framed 
in the traditional language of ethics. The psychotherapeu-
tic design for living specified some set of normative prin-
ciples by which we ought to conduct ourselves in order to 
overcome the problems of living--and, by implication, to be 
able to fulfill our fundamental interests and our potential 
as human beings. In short, its principles and prescriptions 
aimed implicitly at realizing the moral ideal in human be-
havior. 
However, we discovered not only that there were con-
flicts between our current formulation of the psychothera-
peutic ideal and other value-systems entertained by members 
of society, but also that every one of these--including the 
psychotherapeutic design for living--was liable to be par-
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tial (i.e., incomplete and distorted) in some respect. 
Thus we were faced with the dilemma that we could neither 
evaluate social and normative values (and the conduct fol-
lowing from them) against the current psychotherapeutic 
ideal, because its formulation was liable to be inadequate, 
nor develop a psychotherapeutic program on the basis of such 
values, because those also were liable to be inadequate. 
It seemed that we might be unable to determine whether or 
to what extent the design for living promoted through psy-
chotherapy was morally adequate, thereby precluding the pos-
sibility of either justifying or emending the psychothera-
peutic system of values. 
It was this problem that led us to inquire further 
into the nature of value-critique and into the possibility 
of entertaining a defensible evaluative standard. As a re-
sult, we articulated in general terms a form of value-cri-
tique which we termed mutual supplementation: an ongoing 
process of elaboration and adjustment--essentially the for-
malization of moral striving itself--through which we might 
develop a progressively more adequate and more concretely 
detailed approximation of the otherwise abstract moral 
ideal. 
To ~ mind, the ideal implicit in the psychotherapeu-
tic enterprise must be one with the aim of all moral striv-
ing; the psychotherapeutic design for living must be an at-
tempt to concretize the moral ideal. Because a fully ade-
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quate formulation of the psychotherapeutic ideal lies only 
at the terminus of the process through which it is real~zed, 
we must treat our current formulations as partial and pro-
visional. But it is this ideal that we should continually 
try to approximate more adequately in our models of man and 
in the principles and prescriptions for life conduct that 
follow from them. 
From what we have seen so far, it seems unlikely that 
we could formulate a morally adequate design for living by 
means of research and speculation limited strictly to the 
terms of the prevailing psychological perspective, unmindful 
of the partiality of its underlying assumptions and value-
presuppositions. As long as we remain bound by the limits 
of our provisional formulations instead of emending and de-
veloping them further, we fail in our mission to improve 
our understanding of ourselves and of how we ought to con-
duct our lives. In order to identify and to rectify the 
inadequacies in our principles and prescriptions, we must go 
beyond the confines of our current approach. This can be 
done only by seeking out other perspectives and considera-
tions with which we might compare, contrast and eventually 
supplement our own. In short, we can formulate a morally 
adequate design for living only by engaging in the sort of 
ongoing value-critique outlined above. 
We have discredited the approach to value-critique 
that would evaluate social and normative value-systems 
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against our current conception of the psychotherapeutic 
ideal, or vice versa, and along with it the approach that 
would evaluate any of these against some fully-formed moral 
paradigm. In their stead, we have recognized that the psy-
chotherapeutic value-system and other value-systems share a 
common aim--the aim implicit in the moral striving that gave 
rise to them all--and that each embodies some contribution 
to our understanding of the moral ideal, limited only by the 
peculiar omissions and consequent distortions in its formu-
lation. Value-critique should proceed by a process of reci-
procal evaluation and mutual supplementation, through which 
we would remedy their respective omissions, explicate their 
implicit congruities and (by emending their self-limiting 
defects) reveal new avenues for further inquiry and new con-
siderations to be integrated into our understanding. 
Consequently, this value-critique would be character-
ized by a certain mutuality, as psychotherapists sought si-
multaneously to perfect their own value-conditioned formula-
tions in light of other prevailing value-systems and to en-
courage the same constructive development on the part of 
their rivals. Undoubtedly, this has occurred all along to 
some extent, although rarely explicitly. However, it is im-
portant that we begin more deliberately to develop our psy-
chological models and psychotherapeutic programs along such 
lines. 
This point was anticipated some years ago by Strupp 
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and Hadley (1977), in an insightful article on the problem 
of evaluating positive and negative therapeutic outcomes. 
Noting that any outcome assessment assumes some valued end 
as its criterion, the authors indicate that currently there 
are at least three "vantage points," or value-determined 
perspectives, from which the success of a treatment outcome 
might be judged: namely, that of the individual client, that 
of society, and that of the therapist. It is clear from 
their analysis that to the extent that the values of any one 
of these parties differ from those of the others, a particu-
lar treatment outcome might be judged as positive and as 
negative simultaneously. 
Strupp and Hadley conclude that a truly adequate, 
comprehensive definition of mental health and therapeutic 
outcomes must take into account and integrate all relevant 
vantage points. In the context of our discussion, this in-
tegration can only mean a reconciliation of the correspond-
ing partial and relatively incongruous value-systems within 
one that is more comprehensive and that fulfill the intrin-
sic aim exemplified in each. In other words, it would have 
to be the result of the sort of value-critique I have sug-
gested. 
At the end of their article, Strupp and Hadley note 
that empirical research into psychotherapy cannot answer 
the question of how the evaluations from the various vantage 
points are to be integrated into an overall assessment of 
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any given outcome. As they put it, "in the final analysis, 
this is an issue of human values and public policy, not of 
empirical research" (p. 196). The conclusion is undoubtedly 
sound, as far as it goes. But it leaves unresolved the 
principal question we must answer sooner or later--namely, 
how and by whom this issue of human values and public policy 
is to be resolved. 
Ideally, of course, the responsibility for elucidat-
ing a morally adequate design for living should be assumed 
by all persons, inasmuch as all are party to the matter. 
Yet historically this task seems to have fallen inevitably 
upon the moralists of the age, who were deliberative enough 
to advance provisional solutions that at least partly recon-
ciled conflicting interests. As we saw in the first several 
chapters, our present age has thrust psychotherapists, wil-
lingly or unwillingly, into the position of moralists. It 
seems to me that as the problem of values in psychotherapy 
becomes more apparent--due in part to a growing awareness of 
such practical ramifications as Strupp and Hadley have indi-
cated--psychotherapists will have to take an increasingly 
active role in developing defensible guidelines by which to 
evaluate (and, by implication at least, to govern) human 
conduct. It is not clear that a comprehensive and fully 
adequate system of values would be forthcoming without the 
active involvement of the therapsits themselves, in whose 
models and programs it must be reflected, nor that thera-
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pists would not be morally remiss if they failed to address 
that task. 
The point I would like to suggest here is that psy-
chologists and psychotherapists are uniquely equipped by the 
nature of the psychotherapeutic enterprise--as well as mor-
ally compelled by it--to contribute to the formulation of a 
more adequate design for living. 
Our earlier conclusion that moral regulation is an 
ongoing process and not a fixed adherence implies that the 
particular moral principles and prescriptions we entertain 
must undergo development as our experience unfolds and as 
our understanding of the nature of our experience develops. 
If our prescriptive formulations lag behind our articulated 
understanding, they no longer constitute the best possible 
approximation of the moral ideal, and instead assume the 
character of self-limiting dogma. Hence, an ongoing inquiry 
into--and interplay between--our understanding of the nature 
of things and our understanding of how we ought to conduct 
ourselves is essential to the concrete resolution of a com-
prehensive and morally adequate design for living. 
Unlike the consensual and dogmatic approaches dis-
cussed earlier, the psychotherapeutic enterprise is grounded 
in a deliberate and ongoing investigation into human nature. 
That is, it embodies in its own movement an activity of 
self-critical inquiry into its understanding of human nature 
and human interests, aimed at extending and articulating in 
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concrete detail our organized awareness of ourselves--of the 
structure of our being, the nature and the consequences of 
our activity, and our relation to ourselves, to one another 
and to the world. The work of psychological investigation 
is the active pursuit of new knowledge on each of these 
fronts, both by searching out additional data and by inte-
grating these with data already organized, all toward devel-
oping a comprehensive and self-consistent body of knowledge. 
In principle--if not always in practice--this effort is 
self-correcting, inasmuch as it never rests in provisional 
formulations, but seeks continually to improve its under-
standing through further investigation and theory-building. 
So considered, psychological investigation is essen-
tially an embodiment of the process of value-inquiry--i.e., 
the self-critical activity of elaborating the implications 
of the elements of our current understanding, testing them 
against one another and against newly apprehended considera-
tions, and modifying them accordingly. Moreover, to the ex-
tent that the therapeutic programs and the overall design 
for living developed and promoted by psychotherapists are 
generated by means of such self-critical inquiry, they are 
essentially facilitating {directly or indirectly) the organ-
ization or systematization of human behavior in accordance 
with the principle of mutual congruousness or harmonious ad-
justment, which we identified as our fundamental moral stan-
dard. 
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The conclusion to which this points, I believe, is 
that the psychotherapeutic enterprise itself is a formali-
zation of our collective moral striving. That is, it car-
ries forward the process of developing an adequate concep-
tion of human nature and human interests, upon which we 
could base decisions regarding our conduct. This suggests, 
in turn, that the psychotherapeutic design for living is a 
concrete approximation of the moral ideal, the pattern of 
activity through which we might realize our capacity for 
self-governance or self-determination. Inasmuch as the pro-
cess of psychotherapeutic inquiry and program design is on-
going, it constitutes a living and developing system of 
values. 
When, at the outset, we confronted the problem of 
value-involvement in psychotherapy, I indicated that thera-
pists faced a twofold challenge: first, to offer some justi-
fication for their formulation and promotion of a system of 
moral values, and second, to find some way of justifying the 
particular values they promoted. We may now offer a re-
sponse to that challenge. 
I have just suggested that the psychotherapeutic en-
terprise is, at least implicitly, a formal embodiment of 
our collective moral striving. That is to say, the psycho-
therapeutic enterprise is by its very nature an expression 
and an extension of the value-formative process. As such, 
it necessarily entails the formulation and promotion of mor-
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al values. In practice, then, the psychotherapists• efforts 
to formulate and to promote a moral design for living are 
justifiable to the extent that they follow the lines of the 
process of value-inquiry that we have discussed. 
Similarly, the particular principles and prescrip-
tions promoted by psychotherapists are justifiable to the 
extent that they are in accordance with the most comprehen-
sive articulated understanding of human nature and human in-
terests available at that point in time, as measured against 
the principle of mutual congruousness. Of course, as with 
any particular value, each of these must be considered pro-
visional and subject to modification in the light of new ex-
perience and further developments in our understanding. 
Ultimately, the only absolute rule of conduct pro-
moted in and through the psychotherapeutic enterprise is the 
imperative of our moral striving: to pursue assiduously the 
activity of self-critical inquiry and self-adjustment. As 
I see it, every program of psychotherapy--including even the 
circumscribed and highly focused behavior therapies--insists 
upon some form of self-inquiry or self-reflection as its 
fundamental rule of conduct. Whatever form it takes, this 
activity is intended to facilitate some sort of self-adjust-
ment--among the individual's desires, impulses, cognitions 
and behaviors, or between the individual and his or her 
material and social environment. Although different terms 
are used to describe the desired therapeutic end--e.g., per-
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sonality integration, self-actualization, authenticity, con-
flict resolution--the principle governing the pattern of 
that outcome is in each case the principle of mutual congru-
ousness or harmonious adjustment. 
The strength of the foregoing justification depends, 
of course, upon whether or to what extent psychologists and 
psychotherapists do indeed strive to fulfill the ideal in-
tent of the psychotherapeutic enterprise, by engaging in a 
deliberate value-critique. Otherwise, there can be no as-
surance that the values generated in and through the actual 
program of psychotherapy are adequate. It is precisely for 
this reason that I have argued so firmly for the adoption 
of an explicit and ongoing inquiry into values as part of 
psychology. 
Once psychologists deny that their activity is rooted 
in the value-formative process, and instead impose narrow 
and artificial limits upon their field of inquiry and method 
of investigation, they impede the implicit movement of the 
psychotherapeutic approach toward a more adequate design for 
living. To the extent that this has occurred, the main rea-
son is undoubtedly the link that has been forged between 
psychology and empirical science, as the latter is presently 
conceived. We have already noted that psychologists and 
psychotherapists still cling to the notion that it is im-
proper--i.e., unscientific--for them to enter into moral 
discourse, despite the fact that they do entertain and pro-
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mote particular values. That notion, as well as the common 
belief that no objective justification can be provided for 
value propositions, is inherited from the prevailing doc-
trine of science. 
I am not particularly sanguine about the likelihood 
of overcoming the various forms of resistance to including 
an explicit value-critique in psychology. The covert per-
sonal, political and economic forms of resistance seem to be 
especially intransigent. Regarding these, we may be able to 
do little more than appeal to psychologists' sense of moral 
responsibility and to their implicit commitment to the psy-
chotherapeutic ideal. Yet we may render ineffectual at 
least one major obstacle by demonstrating that, far from 
being irreconcilable, the process of scientific inquiry and 
that of value-inquiry are intrinsically related to one 
another. 
CHAPTER VII 
OBJECTIVITY AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 
Although the breach between science and moral philo-
sophy spans five centuries, the two were perhaps at their 
farthest point apart when modern psychology rose to promi-
nence. This coincidence left an indelible mark upon the 
course of that discipline. Prior to that, the study of psy-
chological subject matter had been characterized as the 
"moral science." But as psychologists sought to establish 
their discipline among the highly respected empirical sci-
ences, that appellation fell into disfavor--perhaps because 
its constituent terms were incompatible according to the 
prevailing doctrine of empirical science. 
In my opinion, the abandonment of that characteriza-
tion constituted the greatest single error in the history 
of the psychological movement. It set psychology on a 
course that has culminated in the complex problem of values 
we have examined. I believe that psychology is indeed a 
moral science, in the most literal sense of that compound 
term. That is, psychology is inseparably a scientific acti-
vity and a moral one. 
So far we have found that the psychotherapeutic en-
terprise is implicitly a value-formative process, i.e., a 
formalization of our moral striving. What remains to be 
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demonstrated is that this activity of formulating and jus-
tifying what is in effect a system of moral governance is 
actually a continuation of the scientific process and not a 
departure from it. It is to this that we must now turn our 
attention. The solution entails rethinking our understand-
ing of the meaning of objectivity and of the nature of ob-
jective scientific inquiry and validation. 
Having identified themselves as scientists, psycholo-
gists assume that their investigations must be restricted to 
the domain of observable fact and that their propositions 
must be susceptible to validation by empirical test. Be-
cause the traditional procedures of empirical science cannot 
be used to validate normative propositions, psychologists 
conclude that they cannot engage in value-critique without 
going beyond the bounds of their science and surrendering 
the credibility and authority they enjoy as scientists. 
One might imagine that the process of value-critique 
would be rendered more acceptable to the scientist if it 
were characterized as being fundamentally experimental in 
nature. However, it is not enough merely to assert that 
value-critique involves experiment. What remains is the 
matter of establishing some criterion for validating its re-
sults and of demonstrating that those results (as well as 
the criterion itself) can be considered objective. That is 
the problem. The only criteria acceptable to empiricists 
would limit the role of an experimental ethic in moral gov-
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ernance, while other criteria entertained by moralists are 
objectionable to empiricists. 
In order to be considered legitimately scientific 
from the empiricist's point of view, an experimental ethic 
would have to be bound by the methodological constraints of 
traditional science. Within that framework, the sole func-
tion of deduction is to derive empirically testable hypo-
theses from a theory. Moreover, no knowledge of what ought 
to be can be derived by inductive inference from what is ob-
served in fact. Without invoking some principle external to 
science, no empirically testable hypothesis could carry nor-
mative force, regardless of the factual evidence marshalled 
in its support. Hence, and experimental ethic would have to 
confine itself to descriptive propositions and to abstain 
from framing any normative prescriptions. Clearly, this 
would constitute an unsatisfactory basis for developing a 
sound system of moral governance. 
The alternative is an experimental approach to values 
that would indeed involve observation and test, but that 
could also draw normative conclusions from the evidence ex-
amined by means of some objective standard of validation not 
acknowledged in empiricist doctrine. However, any such ap-
proach would be rejected out of hand by the empiricist, on 
the assumption that unless it proceeded according to the es-
tablished principles of empirical validation, its proposi-
tions could not carry the stamp of scientific objectivity. 
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At best, it would be considered imitation science, claiming 
the designation "scientific" only by reason of a superficial 
resemblance between its procedures and the methods of trtie 
science. 
As long as we accept the empiricist doctrine of know-
ledge on its face, it is doubtful whether we could ever re-
concile its model of objective scientific investigation with 
our notion of value-inquiry through reciprocal evaluation 
and mutual supplementation. In Chapter Six we concluded 
that a fully adequate design for living would be one that 
articulated into a comprehensive and self-consistent system 
of values all considerations that were objectively relevant 
to the realization of human interests. We found that we 
could compare our values only to one another, inasmuch as we 
had no access to a fully-formed moral paradigm external to 
and independent of our own understanding. For this reason 
we were led to affirm as our absolute standard of valuation 
the principle of mutual congruousness or harmonious recon-
ciliation. We concluded that value-critique had to proceed 
as an ongoing activity of elaborating, comparing and render-
ing self-consistent all of our formulations (including both 
particular values and related facts) in accordance with that 
principle. An objective system of values would be one that 
was not partial (i.e., incomplete, biased or distorted) in 
any respect, upon which all persons (past, present and fu-
ture) would agree if fully informed, and that fulfilled all 
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essential human interests (those of which we were not pres-
ently aware as well as those that we had already comprehend-
ed). In our approach to value-critique, a system of values 
would be considered objective to the extent that it fulfil-
led the principle of mutual congruousness. 
Undoubtedly, to anyone raised in the tradition of 
modern empiricism, this must seem a very eccentric criterion 
for assessing objectivity, as compared to that employed by 
science. However, I believe that the fault lies not with 
our conception of value-inquiry, but with the peculiar mean-
ing that the term "objective" has acquired with the rise of 
empiricism. The modern emp~ricist virtually equates what 
is objective with that which is publically observable by 
means of sense perception, or by extension, with statements 
about such perceptual events. Hence, we have learned to as-
sociate the term "objective" with that which is "out there," 
so to speak, as opposed to that which is constructed by the 
activity of the intellect. Consequently, any reference to 
a moral truth as being objective is apt to conjure up the 
notion that it too is somehow "out there." Generally speak-
ing, the empiricist recognizes that this notion is ludicrous 
and he interprets this application of the term as merely an 
analogy to scientific objectivity, based upon the subjective 
feeling of certainty that may accompany particular value-
formulations. On the other hand, some literal-minded per-
sons may simply accept that moral truths do indeed exist 
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somewhere "out there," as fully-formed and independent of 
man as any element of the material world. 
We have already discussed the problems inherent in 
the notion that moral truths are "out there," in terms of 
the indefensibility of any value-critique based upon a cor-
respondence to some fully-formed moral paradigm. But in my 
opinion there are equally severe difficulties with the em-
piricists' notion of objectivity, as well as with their 
claim that objectivity in ethics is no more than a subjec-
tive feeling of certainty is therefore inferior to scienti-
fic objectivity. We will cover two points in the present 
chapter: first, that the process of objective validation in 
science is essentially the same as the one we have embraced 
in our approach to value-critique, and second, that when the 
activity of science reaches the level of psychological in-
quiry, it can and must involve the process of value-critique. 
The Meanings of Subjectivity 
It is generally thought that as long as the scientist 
is scrupulous in his adherence to the methodological canons 
of empiricism, his formulations will be conditioned primari-
ly by the "facts," and to that extent should represent the 
objective reality of experience. This notion is the basis 
for the peculiar bifurcation of fact and value that figures 
prominently in modern discussions of the relation between 
science and ethics, including those in the psychological 
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literature. This bifurcation of fact and value corresponds 
to the one drawn between objectivity and subjectivity. That 
is, subjectivity or subjective bias is believed to be char-
acteristic of value-formulations, along with all other for-
mulations considered fundamentally interpretative in nature 
(e.g., beliefs, opinions, feelings, some kinds of theory, 
and--unless the procedure is conceived of as purely tauto-
logical--the results of deductive inference). Objectivity 
is believed to be characteristic of empirical statements 
(i.e., systematic descriptions of publically observable 
events), once these have been stripped of all subjective 
contaminants. 
However, there is by now incontrovertible evidence--
provided by scientists, especially psychologists, as well as 
by philosophers--that perception and observation are essen-
tially interpretative in nature (Harris, 1970a). That is to 
say, the particular elements of experience appear to us as 
they do in accordance with the manner in which they are fit-
ted into the more or less systematic structure of meanings 
that we have constructed over time. It is this structure of 
meanings that renders our experience intelligible overall. 
This does not entirely controvert the notion that our ex-
perience of those particulars manifests something of the 
character of the "things in themselves" that we imagine must 
lie in the so-called real world. It only belies the naive 
assumption of common-sense experience that we peer directly 
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onto the world through a sort of window in our heads. 
Indeed, perceptual data and observational "fact" are 
particularly liable to be partial (i.e., incomplete, biased 
or distorted) as compared to the organized contents of 
awareness. According to Harris (1970a), the ambiguity in-
herent in perceptual data and in particular observations is 
resolved only by virtue of their being integrated into the 
interpretative context that structures and imparts meaning 
to the particulars of experience. Furthermore, as we noted 
in Chapter One, judgments as to what constitutes a fact, 
which ones are to be admitted as relevant, and how they are 
significant are all conditioned by the theoretical context 
within which observation occurs (Grunfeld, 1973). 
In short, what the empiricist doctrine designates as 
"facts"--i.e., observational data that constitute the possi-
ble objects of rigorous scientific analysis--are themselves 
interpretations. It is to this that philosophers of science 
refer when they speak of the theory-ladenness of scientific 
observation. The implication is that the empirical method 
of observation by itself carries no assurance that its re-
sults will constitute an adequate representation of reality. 
The recent crisis in the theory of empirical scientific in-
vestigation has its roots partly in this conclusion. 
Inasmuch as scientific fact has been relegated to the 
status of interpretation along with value-formulations, we 
have already succeeded in narrowing the conceptual gap be-
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tween them. However, if we were to curtail our discussion 
at this point, that narrowing would have been achieved en-
tirely at the expense of scientific inquiry. That is, one 
might conclude that by exposing scientific observation and 
scientific fact as matters of interpretation, we had render-
ed the process of scientific inquiry inescapably prone to 
subjectivity. Obviously, this conclusion is hardly suppor-
tive of the psychotherapist's attempts to defend the objec-
tivity of his formulations, either in his role as scientist 
or as moralist. 
Yet if we carry our analysis a step further, we will 
find that we can retrieve both science and ethics from unre-
mitting subjectivity. To begin with, we should identify two 
distinct, although related conditions to which the term 
"subjectivity" refers. 
In its first sense, subjectivity refers to the funda-
mental characteristic of human awareness and of every con-
tent of awareness (sensations, feelings, percepts, concepts, 
theories, values): namely, that in order to be at all, these 
must be experienced by a human subject. 
This notion is the basis for the assertion that our 
understanding of experience must be interpretative in na-
ture. All understanding is limited to the contents of 
awareness, for nothing can be known that is not experienced. 
Consequently, there is no possibility of directly comparing 
a particular content--whether it be a simple percept or a 
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sophisticated theoretical construct--to the real world that 
it is supposed to represent, in order to determine its veri-
dicality or its meaning (Harris, 1954). We may recognize 
this as the general case of the point discussed in Chapter 
Six, that there can be no possibility of direct comparison 
between any value held in awareness and some external moral 
absolute. The particular contents of awareness can be com-
pared only to one another, and it is of such relations that 
our understanding must be constructed. Hence, we may infer 
that what imparts meaning to a particular content of aware-
ness is the pattern of interrelationships articulated be-
tween it and the already existing structure of systematical-
ly interrelated elements that constitutes intelligible ex-
perience. 
When employed in this first sense, the term subjec-
tivity is neither positive nor negative in itself; it refers 
simply to the natural and inescapable condition of human 
awareness. But the second sense in which we employ the term 
--probably its more familiar usage--typically carries a pe-
jorative connotation. When we describe the condition of 
awareness as subjective in this other sense, we mean that in 
some respect it is an inadequate representation of reality, 
and that the inadequacy is traceable to and characteristic 
of the subject's mental make-up. In other words, subjec-
tivity refers here to the partiality (i.e., the incomplete-
ness, bias or distortion) liable to be evident in human 
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awareness--especially in particular contents of awareness--
consequent upon the finitude of the subject's experience, 
the idiosyncratic structure of his interpretative framework, 
or the subject's need to have experience conform to his own 
preconceptions about himself and the world. 
It should be evident that subjectivity in the second 
sense follows from the first--i.e., that the partiality of 
human awareness and understanding is a consequence of its 
interpretative character. That is not remarkable, because--
owing to the finite and serial character of human experience 
--the articulated psychic structure that constitutes the ma-
trix of awareness and the context for all interpretation is 
always bound to contain some flaws, inconsistencies and la-
cunae. (This should hold true not only of the individual 
subject, but in analogous fashion, of any social group that 
develops a shared context for interpreting experience.) 
I would emphasize, however, that the two notions of 
subjectivity ~ distinct and ought not to be collapsed into 
one. That is to say, while all awareness and its contents 
are subjective in the first sense (i.e., interpretative), 
it does not follow that all are equally subjective in the 
second sense (i.e., equally partial). As long as we make 
any claim to knowledge whatsoever, we are committed to the 
position that there is a distinction between truth and fal-
sity, and that on occasion we can discriminate between the 
two. Hence, we must accept that our interpretations are 
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susceptible to degrees of adequacy, or (in other words) to 
degrees of objectivity. 
Thus, although objectivity and partiality are anti-
thetical terms, objectivity and interpretation are not. Ob-
jectivity must be thought of as a characteristic that we 
ascribe to certain kinds of interpretations. If subjectiv-
ity in the sense of interpretativeness were to be eliminated 
from our awareness and its contents, we would not be left 
with objective awareness or objective knowledge. We would 
be left with nothing. From this perspective, the bias and 
distortion evident in our understanding--whether it be in 
terms of fact or of value--are not the result of an intru-
sion of subjectivity into awareness. Rather, they are the 
consequence of inadequacies (e.g., the omission of relevant 
considerations) in the course of the interpretative process 
that constitutes awareness in the first place. 
What, then, is the criterion by which we determine 
whether or to what degree our interpretations are objective? 
We have already considered that as regards values it must be 
the principle of mutual congruousness or harmonious recon-
ciliation. Now we find that as regards our knowledge of the 
external world, the realm of so-called fact, the criterion 
of objectivity is fundamentally the same. As Harris sug-
gests, "the only reliable criterion we have of the 'objec-
tivity' of things is their stability and coherence in our ex-
perience and the persistent interconnexions which they dis-
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play" (1970a, pp. 372-373). In other words, a particular 
element in awareness is objective to the extent that it is 
proved to be coherent on the basis of repeated and consis-
tent experience. Essentially, this means that the particu-
lar element coheres (i.e., fits consistently) with the other 
elements of experience in a comprehensive and self-support-
ing system of interpretations. Coherence and mutual congru-
ousness emerge as two expressions of the fundamental princi-
ple of order governing our objective understanding of ex-
perience. 
From this perspective, it is the interpretative sys-
tem as a whole, and not particular observational data, that 
comprises the most objective representation of the world. 
The particulars of experience are to be treated as objective 
to the extent that they can be fitted into that interpreta-
tive system, while the system itself is objective to the ex-
tent that it organizes the particulars of ongoing experience 
in a consistent and mutually corroborative whole. The or-
derly structure of this interpretative framework is consid-
ered an approximate reflection of the order inherent in the 
world that common sense tells us exists independent of our 
minds. 
So we may conceive of the activity of science as the 
deliberate activity of constructing in subjective awareness 
an objective structure of interpretations through discrimi-
nating, relating and integrating into a coherent conceptual 
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system the elements of common-sense experience. Given this 
conception of science, human subjectivity (in either sense 
of the term) is no unremitting impediment to the possibili-
ty of objective scientific knowledge. Because the interpre-
tative activity of science occurs entirely within the con-
fines of awareness and needs never go beyond it, it does not 
matter that we have no access to the world except through 
(subjective) experience. Undoubtedly, the contents of 
awareness--whether as particulars of observational experi-
ence or as conceptual constructs built through further in-
terpretation--may be subjective in the sense that they are 
liable to some degree of partiality. But subjectivity in 
this sense should become evident at some point in the fail-
ure of experience to cohere, i.e., in our failure to arrive 
at a "mutual fit" among our particular interpretations of 
experience or among the results of technical manipulations 
based upon them. When apprehended, such subjective error 
may be corrected by elucidating in greater detail the order 
implicit in experience, deducing probable relations from the 
mutual implications of the background structure of interpre-
tations, and seeking confirmation of these in further ex-
perience. 
In short, once we begin to look more closely at the 
process of scientific investigation and its only defensible 
criterion for objective validation, we find that it is in-
deed not so different from the process of value-inquiry and 
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its corresponding criterion. As we look further, we will 
find other links between the two. 
The Nature of Scientific Inquiry 
In its pure and simplest form, the method of empiri-
cal science is supposed to proceed by inductive reasoning 
from particular observational data to general conclusions. 
Yet more than two centuries before the recent onslaught of 
criticism against the notion of empirical science, Hume had 
already exposed the fundamental problem of induction: namely, 
that no number of observations of constant conjunction of 
empirical data can guarantee that there are necessary con-
nections among them. Some non-empirical principle must be 
invoked in order to justify inductive inference. But the 
empiricist scheme admits of no such principle, inasmuch as 
it maintains that knowledge is derivable only from experi-
ence. As long as this premise is accepted, one must con-
clude that scientific investigation can provide us no know-
ledge beyond that of immediate and ephemeral experience. 
Obviously, this conclusion flies in the face of com-
mon sense. Empiricists after Hume have sought to reclaim 
induction, not by questioning the premise that observation 
is the only source of knowledge, but by substituting proba-
bility for certainty. In other words, it is believed that 
a sufficient number of observations will yield knowledge of 
the probable outcome of all observations. Psychologists and 
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other scientists will recognize this immediately as a funda-
mental canon of research. But it is an utterly specious 
solution to the problem of induction, for the notion of 
probability itself presupposes the necessary connection that 
induction is unable to establish. 
Popper (1959) tried to overcome the problem of induc-
tion by substituting a principle of falsification for that 
of verification. That is, although no number of observa-
tions can establish the truth of a hypothesis, the hypothe-
sis can be rejected on the basis of disconfirming evidence. 
This principle has been incorporated into the prevailing 
conception of how scientific investigation proceeds, known 
generally as the hypothetico-deductive method. According 
to this method, empirically testable consequences are infer-
red from some theory by deduction, after which observations 
are collected in order to determine whether the data will 
falsify (i.e., contradict) the inferred consequences. 
This conception of science falls prey to serious cri-
ticisms. Here it must suffice to note the two that are the 
most damaging. First, although empiricists assume that the 
falsification procedure avoids the problem that besets veri-
fication by induction, its success is actually only appar-
ent. When all falsified hypotheses are eliminated, there 
is still no guarantee that the unfalsified hypotheses will 
remain unfalsified (Harris, 1970a). The empiricist scheme 
can provide no grounds whatsoever for assuming that the lat-
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ter are any more likely to be true, so it should relinquish 
falsification as a valid discriminative test. To believe 
otherwise is to make the same empirically unwarranted as-
sumption as was involved in the principle of verification by 
simple induction. 
I have already alluded to the other, and perhaps the 
more radical, challenge leveled against empirical science: 
namely, that inasmuch as all experience (beginning with per-
ception) is essentially interpretative, all scientific ob-
servation is inescapably theory-laden. This poses an in-
tractable problem for the empiricist. Even if the procedure 
of inductive generalization could be justified within the 
empiricist's scheme of things, this apparent contamination 
of observational data by the prejudices of subjective aware-
ness would render those data untrustworthy as a source of 
knowledge. As long as the empiricist maintains that know-
ledge can be tested only through observation--which now can-
not be trusted--he has no way of determining whether his 
conclusions are congruent with objective reality or whether 
they are only a projection of his own subjective theories, 
beliefs and biases. 
In Chapter One we noted several other untoward con-
clusions about science that had been drawn from this impasse 
in the empiricist theory of knowledge. At that point I in-
dicated that we would have to either abandon altogether the 
possibility of objective science, or else reformulate our 
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basic understanding of the nature of scientific activity. 
Now, in light of our discussion of objectivity, I would sug-
gest that it is not necessary to give up the notion of ob-
jective science. What we must abandon instead are certain 
preconceptions about scientific activity inherited from the 
empiricist tradition, particularly the principle that objec-
tive knowledge is obtained solely through observation. As 
we have just witnessed, it is the empiricist's adherence to 
this principle that thwarts any attempt to overturn the 
challenges to scientific objectivity. 
It is easy to appreciate historically the signifi-
cance of the emphasis upon direct observation in science. 
When Francis Bacon was attempting to systematize scientific 
procedures, man's understanding of the natural world was 
still dominated by an amalgam of religious dogma and ancient 
Greek speculations. According to Russell (1945), that un-
derstanding had failed to advance because it relied too ex-
clusively upon deductive reasoning from purportedly indubi-
table general principles. The tremendous advances in early 
science followed a suspension of traditional beliefs and a 
reliance instead upon patient and detailed observation. 
Such results seemed only to confirm the superiority of the 
inductive method over deductive inference. The eventual bi-
furcation of the two laid the foundation for the empiri-
cist's claim that observation was the only source of scien-
tific knowledge, while deduction could yield no new know-
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ledge and should be reserved for elucidating testable hypo-
theses to be submitted for empirical confirmation. 
The alternative conception of scientific activity· 
that I began to describe at the end of the last section is 
impervious to the criticisms that have proved so deadly for 
modern empiricism--precisely because it rejects the doctrin-
al bifurcation of induction and deduction, or the utter 
separation of the processes of observation and interpreta-
tion. It acknowledges readily what empiricist theory tries 
unsuccessfully to avoid--that observation and interpretation 
interpenetrate throughout the scientific process. As Harris 
puts it: 
Theory and observation are not two separate and indepen-
dent factors by one of which we may check or test the 
other. A scientific theory is a more or less organized 
and coherent interpretation of what is observed, with-
out which the observed factors lose their character and 
their significance ..•• The endeavor of science is con-
stantly to improve the system so that it becomes more 
comprehensive and self-consistent. Verification, there-
fore, always consists in the assembling of mutually cor-
roborative evidence, the interconnections of which make 
the denial of the theory impossible without the break-
down of the entire conceptual scheme. (Harris, 1970b, 
p. 201) 
In other words, both activities--observation and interpreta-
tion--are inseparable aspects of the ongoing constructive 
process of scientific investigation. Without some prior 
interpretative context to confer meaning upon particular 
data, there could be no relevant observation. Conversely, 
without observational data--or, more generally, without ex-
perience--there would be nothing to interpret and hence no 
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subject matter for science. 
If we go back for a moment to the criticisms that led 
us to distrust scientific activity, it should be apparent 
that the problems encountered there are surmountable. In-
duction is never merely the summation of repeated instances 
of constant conjunction. Rather, it is the search for evi-
dence of a pattern already believed to exist, in light of 
the mutual implications of elements in the interpretative 
structure articulated so far. (It is, after all, on the 
basis of such suppositions that we are guided in making par-
ticular observations.) So we infer that an observed rela-
tion among empirical data is probably valid on the strength 
of its consistency with the entire body of systematized 
(i.e., interpreted) experience, and not simply on the basis 
of the frequency with which it is observed. 
Certainly, the theory-ladenness of all observation 
poses a problem for the scientist. Yet the problem seems 
insuperable only as long as we adhere to the empiricist's 
notion that objective knowledge can be derived solely from 
the deliverances of the senses. (As we have already seen, 
the subjective "contamination" of observational data sub-
verts altogether the possibility of scientific investigation 
along the lines of strict empiricism.) If we recognize in-
stead that the pursuit of objective knowledge involves an 
ongoing systematization of experience, we may appreciate 
that subjective distortion and lacunae should become evident 
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sooner or later in the failure of some aspect of the devel-
oping interpretative structure to cohere. 
Admittedly, the history of science teaches us that 
theories can be stretched to a remarkable degree in order to 
accomodate discrepant data, before finally capitulating to 
their successors. But the great "scientific revolutions" to 
which Kuhn (1970), Hanson (1972) and others refer also de-
monstrate that the movement of science is indeed progressive 
--i.e., that each successive interpretative system displays 
a greater degree of coherence and comprehensiveness than did 
its predecessor (Harris, 1970a). 
I do not wish to imply here that the movement of 
science is automatic and effortless. On the contrary, it 
is guaranteed only to the extent that we remain vigilant of 
flaws in our entire interpretative scheme of things and re-
fuse to rest in the partiality of our understanding. It is 
this dedication to self-critical awareness--itself an inter-
pretative activity--and not a dogmatic commitment to empiri-
cist doctrine that is the scientist's cardinal virtue. 
It is worth inquiring into the source of this obliga-
tion to think self-critically that the scientist imposes 
upon himself. Bronowski, for one, suggests that scientists 
are committed to "truth as an end in itself" (1959, p. 56). 
Yet it seems improper that we should make of "truth" an idol 
at whose altar the scientist serves. To my mind, it is 
truth that serves man, so to speak, and not man who serves 
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truth. In other words, we pursue objectivity in our inter-
pretation of experience because doing so is in our interests 
while resting in our own subjectivity is not. So-called 
"pure" science--i.e., scientific investigation meant to ex-
tend in breadth and in detail our knowledge of the world 
without regard for its practical applicability--is the ex-
ception rather than the rule. But even the understanding 
that issues from such science implicitly serves our inter-
ests, for every bit of knowledge has its place in completing 
the comprehensive and fully coherent system of interpreta-
tions that constitutes our intellectual mastery of experi-
ence, and that enables our practical mastery over it. 
In short, knowledge is always and only for the sake 
of the knower. Furthermore, inasmuch as our fundamental in-
terests are moral interests, the aim of scientific activity 
must be ultimately to further the concrete realization of 
our moral interests. Actually, this should come as little 
surprise if we recall from the last chapter that our value-
formulations must be adjusted not only to one another, but 
also to the structure of the environment within which our 
value-directed activities occur. An adequate adjustment in 
this latter respect is possible only so far as we entertain 
an objective understanding of the world within which we must 
act. We might also infer from this that our moral obliga-
tion continually to develop our understanding extends over 
the activity of scientific inquiry as well. 
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Science emerges in the present light as an expression 
of our collective moral striving, albeit at a level less ex-
plicit than that of value-critique. Obviously, this differs 
sharply from the usual characterization of science as an 
amoral activity. Moreover, the procedural principles of 
science (i.e., its methodology) are revealed as a rudimen-
tary ethic. That is, they constitute a system of self-im-
posed constraints upon human activity--in this case, upon 
the activity of interpretation--the purpose of which is to 
direct that activity according to some rule of order, toward 
the realization of our moral interests. I have already sug-
gested that at the level of scientific interpretation this 
rule of order is the principle of coherent organization, and 
that this principle is to science what the principle of mu-
tual congruousness is to ethics. 
The methodologist's concern over the possible intru-
sion of values into the process of scientific investigation 
is consonant with this conception of science. His concern 
is essentially that dogmatic adherence to particular values 
(which are liable to be partial) might constrain or other-
wise subvert the activity of self-critical inquiry that is 
the route to objectivity and the hallmark of scientific 
reasoning. But inasmuch as the ideal intent of science and 
the ideal intent of all particular values are one and the 
same--namely, the realizat~on of our moral interests--there 
is no conflict between them except that which arises out of 
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the partiality of our formulations. 
The Scientific Process in Psychology 
The stifling effect of dogmatism upon objective un-
derstanding was illustrated vividly in the struggle for in-
tellectual freedom waged by the early proponents of modern 
science. But this struggle must be an ongoing one, for 
every age has its own ideological scotoma that impede objec-
tive understanding. Moreover, we cannot assume that the 
scientific establishment will necessarily play the role of 
protagonist in this struggle, for the radicals of one age 
often prove to be the conservatives of the next. This may 
be witnessed, in one of its aspects, in the succession of 
scientific paradigms overturned by "revolution." But we 
must be particularly wary in our present age, for the cur-
rent scientific establishment itself has enshrined a self-
limiting dogma, in the form of modern empiricism. 
As I tried to indicate in the preceding section, 
science does not and cannot proceed in the manner outlined 
in empiricist doctrine. For the most part, that version has 
been employed only in descriptions of what it is supposedly 
that scientists do. This dichotomous approach to science 
has had very little impact upon the physical sciences, which 
are both well-established and rather far removed from value-
related issues. Until recently, the biological sciences had 
suffered somewhat more, owing to the empiricist's rejection 
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of the concept of internal relations and the consequent bias 
toward reductionistic analyses of biological phenomena. 
The real victims of dogmatic empiricism have been the 
social sciences, especially psychology. These were formal-
ized as sciences lately enough to have been influenced as 
much by the empiricist's notion of how science was supposed 
to proceed, as by an appreciation of the true nature of sci-
entific inquiry and how it should be applied to the objec-
tive understanding of human nature and human interests. 
Koch has this in mind when he writes: 
At the time of its inception, psychology was unique in 
the extent to which its institutionalization preceded 
its content and its methods preceded its problems ••.. 
From the earliest days of the experimental pioneers, 
man's stipulation that psychology be adequate to science 
outweighed his commitment that it be adequate to man. 
From the beginning, some pooled schematic image of the 
form of science was dominant. (Koch, 1974, pp. 15-16) 
In his opinion, this unquestioning adherence to an inappro-
priate model of scientific inquiry has led psychology down 
a barren trail, the occasional germane fact or spark of in-
sight being overwhelmingly counterbalanced by what he calls 
"pseudo-knowledge"--i.e., "'findings' which, however, meti-
culously produced, tell us nothing intrinsically illuminat-
ing" (p. 20). This, he states, is evident in "a congeries 
of alternate--and exceedingly simple--'images [of man],' 
around each of which one finds a dense scholastic cluster 
of supportive research, 'theorizing,' and methodological 
rhetoric" (p. 7). 
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Yet psychologists are still being taught that the 
hypothetico-deductive method is the only legitimate way to 
engage in scientific inquiry, as if the terminal flaws in 
its underlying doctrine were irrelevant outside of philo-
sophical discussions. (For an example, see Grano & Brewer, 
197J.) The deftness with which empiricists circumvent any 
critique of their basic premises follows from their unwaver-
ing conviction that the methodology is "scientific," and 
hence beyond reproach, while philosophical arguments are not 
"scientific," and hence at least somewhat suspect. 
According to Hogan and Schroeder (1981), this frame 
of mind has pervaded our entire approach to graduate educa-
tion in psychology, encouraging as a result the unreflective 
proliferation of the kinds of findings that Koch termed 
"pseudo-knowledge." They conclude: 
Education properly conceived and conducted would include 
making students aware of their values and theoretical 
presuppositions. But in America we do graduate train-
ing, not education; graduate school is more like barber 
college than like Plato's Symposium. Students are 
taught how to do research (in the approved manner); the 
focus is almost exclusively on professional training 
rather than on a careful examination of theoretical 
premises. Biases persist because they are unexamined. 
( p. 14) 
Admittedly, a number of psychologists have recognized 
that important concerns are barred from modern psychology 
only because these cannot be made to conform to the condi-
tions of empirical inquiry. But, by and large, the solu-
tions they propose are an inadvertent demonstration of how 
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firmly the empiricist doctrine grips our conception of sci-
ence. Robinson (1976), for example, reiterates verbatim the 
empiricist canons of science, and then concludes that psy-
chology must relinquish its status as science if it is to 
reclaim its proper subject matter. Other psychologists, 
feeling disenfranchised, have abandoned empirical science 
altogether in favor of other approaches, sometimes described 
as "holistic" or "humanistic." But, in Koch's words, "often 
the net difference is that instead of getting 'rigorous' 
imitation science we get fuzzy imitation science" (1974, p. 
29). Unfortunately, this only polarizes further our under-
standing of the nature of objective inquiry in science. 
It seems to me that as long as we accept such mis-
guided solutions, we will continue to stifle further pro-
gress in psychology. A more satisfactory alternative fol-
lows from the characterization of scientific inquiry out-
lined in this chapter. From this perspective, psychology is 
indeed scientific--in principle, if not consistently so in 
practice--but for reasons other than those laid down by em-
piricism. 
Psychologists have aspired, understandably, to a po-
sition from which they could claim that their formulations 
were objective. However, having been taught that objectiv-
ity is a function of adherence to empirical method·ology, 
psychologists have assumed simply that they must restrict 
themselves as far as possible to statements of observable 
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"fact." As regards values, therefore, they are permitted 
to discuss only what happens to be valued by persons in 
fact. They must reject the possibility that any proposition 
regarding what is actually valuable could be objective (at 
least in a scientific sense), inasmuch as it would have to 
go beyond the observed facts. 
Obviously, as long as psychologists adhere to this 
conception of scientific activity, it is virtually impossi-
ble for them to reconcile psychological inquiry and value-
critique. Yet this route leads inevitably to the morally 
unsatisfactory position summarized at the end of Chapter 
Three: To the extent that psychologists restrict themselves 
from engaging in value-inquiry, they fail to acknowledge, to 
examine and (where necessary) to emend their own value pre-
suppositions, as well as to evaluate the claims of rival 
value-systems. As a result, they are unable to provide any 
assurance that their design for living is morally adequate. 
We may begin to appreciate the true nature of psy-
chological inquiry only after recognizing that objectivity 
is the result of the systematic interpretation of experience 
and, hence, that it is more likely to be characteristic of 
our entire conceptual framework than of particular observa-
tional data. In this light, theoretical reasoning about 
psychological concepts--e.g., about their presuppositions, 
their mutual implications and their relation to concepts 
outside the psychological scheme of things--is not a depar-
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ture from strictly objective science. To the contrary, it 
is an integral and absolutely essential feature of the ongo-
ing process of objective inquiry, without which psychology 
would eventually collapse into conceptual incoherence. 
The most serious risk to scientific objectivity in 
psychology actually stems from a dogmatic adherence to em-
pirical procedures, for that in turn fosters an uncritical 
acceptance of observational data and the inferences drawn 
from them. The notion that observation alone can provide 
objective guidance was exposed as myth when we noted that 
our empirical investigations were conditioned by our theo-
retical and value presuppositions. Yet the myth persists, 
and the complacency bred of that myth stands opposed to the 
self-critical awareness that is the hallmark of true scien-
tific inquiry. 
Having said this, I should add that we ought not to 
deprecate the role of experimental investigation in psychol-
ogy--nor even of the traditional empirical methodology, as 
long as it subserves objective inquiry rather than dictating 
its subject matter. The method is a kind of discipline, and 
disciplined observation is as vital to psychological inquiry 
as its explicitly interpretative aspect. As we noted earli-
er, observation and interpretation are inseparable in sci-
ence. Moreover, what distinguishes psychology from other 
approaches to the understanding of human nature--and what, 
in my opinion, is its ultimate advantage over them, both as 
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an intellectual system and as a moral one--is its unwavering 
insistence upon reasoning from evidence. But this is really 
no more than another way of saying that psychology is scien-
tific. 
However, we must understand the proper role of the 
experimental procedures generally employed in psychological 
research. As I see it, the experimental method in itself is 
really no more than a sophisticated intellectual prosthesis 
which, when handled correctly, can augment our capacity to 
observe systematically. In this sense, it is analogous to 
the computer, which is fundamentally only a device for car-
rying out numerical manipulations that are not done easily 
in our heads. There is another respect, equally instruc-
tive, in which the two are similar. Persons who do not un-
derstand the function of one or the other are apt to ascribe 
to its use a nearly magical potency. But computer techni-
cians have a saying that may be applied equally well to the 
experimental method: "Garbage in, garbage out." 
Obviously, then, there must be more to the process of 
objective psychological inquiry than is embodied in its gen-
erally accepted empirical methodology. Attempts to secure 
psychological knowledge through methodologically rigorous 
observation and experiment are only as sound as the presup-
positions and supporting hypotheses upon which those at-
tempts rest, for that context determines to a large extent 
how the results will be interpreted. 
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We subvert the scientific intent of observation when 
we persist unreflectively in observing only what our preju-
dices dictate about the nature of our subject matter. The 
effect of such prejudices in canalizing our understanding in 
psychology is by no means insignificant. As we witnessed in 
Chapter Four, our entire approach to psychological inquiry 
and intervention has been conditioned by certain value-de-
termined assumptions as to the nature of the individual vis-
a-vis his material and social environment. So if we are 
truly to advance our understanding of human nature and hu-
man interests, we must go beyond the confines of business-
as-usual research and free ourselves of the self-limiting 
constructs we entertain. 
The upshot of our argument is this: In order to en-
sure the objectivity of our formulations, we must turn the 
light of self-critical inquiry upon the presuppositions and 
prejudices that underlie our understanding of psychological 
inquiry itself, as well as upon those that underlie our ap-
proach to particular questions about human nature and to the 
psychological problems of living. Several considerations 
follow: 
(1) This turn is as much a part of the movement of 
science as are the empirical procedures with which it is 
usually identified, for without it there can be no guarantee 
that our investigations are objective and therefore truly 
scientific. 
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(2) This turn is not only a scientific imperative, 
so to speak, but a moral imperative as well. If our psy-
chological investigations are not objective, they cannot 
constitute an adequate basis for developing the prescriptive 
formulations that we have found to be an intrinsic element 
of the psychotherapeutic program. 
(3) Inasmuch as many (if not all) of the presupposi-
tions that underlie our understanding are value-determined, 
this self-critical inquiry must follow the lines of the val-
ue-critique discussed in the last chapter. 
In short, at the level of psychology and the social 
sciences, value-critique constitutes a necessary phase of 
scientific activity--an extension of objective inquiry and 
not a departure from it. 
We have already characterized the pursuit of objec-
tive knowledge as the ongoing systematization of experience 
--i.e., as the attempt to construct in subjective awareness 
an objective structure of interpretations by discriminating, 
interrelating, and integrating into a coherent conceptual 
system the various elements of experience. Because objec-
tivity in awareness is the result of the systematic inter-
pretation of experience, it is more properly characteristic 
of our entire conceptual framework than of the particular 
data of experience. 
Consequently, the objective understanding that is the 
goal of psychological science cannot be identified with the 
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plethora of relatively disconnected empirical facts that 
crowd our current textbooks, nor could it ever arise auto-
matically (as empiricism presumes) out of the simple accu-
mulation or aggregation of such data. Objective understand-
ing in psychology must be a comprehensive and coherently ar-
ticulated conception of human nature and human interests. 
This can be achieved only through the systematic elaboration 
and integration of the multiplicity of factors that bear 
upon human life and human experience. 
Once our articulated understanding of human nature 
begins to grow so intricate and all-inclusive, we necessar-
ily verge into the realm of moral values. As Matson (1976) 
suggests, the model of man that one entertains determines 
inevitably how one seeks to organize one's life conduct. 
Shall we consider man an intelligent animal, a complex ma-
chine, an individualistic self-actualizer, a spiritual be-
ing? It does make a difference which one we settle upon. 
Of course, man may be all of these, and our problem is how 
to relate these perspectives within a comprehensive and 
self-consistent interpretative system. In any case, this is 
as much a matter for moral speculation as for science--and 
not merely a matter for one or the other. I believe that 
when our psychological constructs reach a certain level of 
complexity and comprehensiveness, they acquire a moral va-
lence along with their factual one. 
Over the years, critics have repeatedly charged that 
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psychology is a substandard science as compared to physics 
or chemistry--if indeed it can be considered a true science 
at all. From the standpoint of modern empiricism, a plausi-
ble argument can be made along such lines. However, given 
the flaws we have exposed in that doctrine, we should recon-
sider whether the charge itself still carries any weight. 
In my opinion, it does not. In fact, I would argue that 
psychology is the apex of the process of scientific inquiry. 
That is to say, the true nature of scientific inquiry is 
still largely incipient in the activity of natural science 
and becomes explicit only as we reach the level of psychol-
ogical science. 
This conclusion follows from the notion of science 
developed in this chapter. In simplest terms, when we en-
gage in scientific inquiry, we are establishing objectivity 
in our awareness by taking into account our own subjectivi-
ty, essentially through the mental activity of identifying 
and implementing correlative adjustments in our interpreta-
tive framework. At the level of natural science, this pro-
cess proceeds more or less unself-consciously. The kinds of 
observation and interpretation involved are largely exten-
sions and refinements of those of common-sense awareness--
hence the empiricist's untroubled emphasis upon sense-data. 
The sources of partiality that figure prominently in natural 
science research originate primarily in the spatia-temporal 
finitude of the human investigator--characteristics that are 
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more or less identical among all persons--rather than in the 
more complex idiosyncratic dimensions of human subjectivity, 
such as psychological and value structures. For the most 
part, the mental operations necessary in order to correct 
for one's subjectivity at this level are crystallized in the 
natural scientific method. 
However, as I indicated earlier, the kinds of bias 
and distortion evident in our interpretations at the level 
of psychological investigation are largely value-determined. 
The natural scientific method was simply not designed to 
correct for those aspects of human subjectivity. Conse-
quently, any attempt to achieve objectivity in our psychol-
ogical understanding solely by means of the traditional pro-
cedures of empirical science will inevitably fail to take 
into account the partiality that arises out of unexamined 
and unemended value presuppositions. As a result, psychol-
ogists are liable to generate and perpetuate inadequate and 
self-limiting formulations, even as they assume they are be-
ing supremely objective. 
If psychologists are to fulfill the scientific intent 
of psychological inquiry--i.e., to establish objectivity in 
their interpretations--they must make explicit the scientif-
ic process of taking into account their own subjectivity. 
In other words, they must strive continually to be more 
aware of the peculiar character of their own awareness--
which includes their personal, professional and social-cul-
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tural value-structures, along with other presuppositions 
about themselves and the world. This ongoing self-awareness 
is the first essential step in organizing and developing ·the 
elements of psychological understanding into a single, com-
prehensive and self-consistent conceptual structure--i.e., 
into an objective interpretative system. 
I have already indicated that an objective conceptual 
structure or interpretative system can be constructed only 
through the continuous and consistent application of some 
principle of order. We have discussed such a principle un-
der two aspects: as the coherence principle in science, with 
which we establish objectivity in our subjective understand-
ing of the factual dimension of experience, and as the prin-
ciple of mutual congruousness in ethics, with which we do 
the same with respect to the dimension of values. 
One might wonder in which of its aspects this prin-
ciple of order figures as regards the activity of critical 
self-awareness in psychology. However, when this principle 
is applied in psychology, it is no longer exclusively one 
or the other. Rather, it partakes of the character of both. 
At the level of psychological understanding, the process of 
scientific inquiry and value-critique emerge as one. 
This last point may be understood in the following 
way: In our striving for scientific objectivity in psychol-
ogical inquiry, we must become aware of our value presuppo-
sitions in order to make adjustments that account for the 
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partiality of our understanding. We have noted repeatedly 
that values are an intrinsic feature of our psychological 
models and programs. Values cannot be eliminated from ap-
plied psychology or psychotherapy without annihilating the 
entire enterprise. So the proper reason for becoming aware 
of our underlying values is not to eliminate them, but to 
rectify them. Thus, the process of scientific inquiry car-
ried to the level of psychology begins to emerge as value-
critique as well, and the moral striving implicit in science 
becomes explicit in the psychotherapeutic enterprise as the 
ongoing attempt to perfect an objective design for living 
and to organize human conduct along its lines. 
Through psychological inquiry we have become aware of 
some of the many complex determinants that to a large extent 
govern our behavior. Armed with this self-knowledge, we 
have begun the task of finding ways to adjust ourselves so 
as to take these determinants into account--figuring them 
into the equation, so to speak, by which we decide how to 
conduct ourselves in order to achieve more effectively our 
fundamental aims. Through such deliberate self-adjustment 
we are able to reduce the single greatest resistance to our 
moral striving over which we can gain control--namely, that 
which originates from incongruities within the structure of 
our own ongoing activity. In doing so, we augment our ca-
pacity for moral self-governance and thereby realize, in the 
form of our conduct, the moral ideal after which we strive. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE SYNTHESIS OF SCIENCE AND ETHICS 
In the last two chapters I have tried to outline some 
solution to the troubling issues exposed by our examination 
of value-involvement in psychology and psychotherapy. I 
have suggested that psychologists and psychotherapists are 
implicitly justified in their involvement with values be-
cause their activity is, by its very nature, a formalization 
of our collective moral striving. We have discussed an ap-
proach to value-critique and a moral standard of valuation 
which, if adopted as an explicit part of psychological in-
quiry, might ensure that the psychologists' system of prin-
ciples and prescriptions would constitute a progressively 
better reflection of the moral ideal. Finally, I have sug-
gested that the scientific and moral dimensions of the psy-
chotherapeutic enterprise are reconcilable when treated as 
aspects of that process of self-critical inquiry. 
Obviously, we have not touched upon every facet of 
value-involvement in psychotherapy. The practicing thera-
pist is forced to confront many difficult moral problems--
if not on a daily basis, at least often enough to warrant 
serious consideration. Nothing has been said of these spe-
cific problems, first, because they lay beyond the scope of 
our inquiry, but more importantly, because I do not purport 
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to have satisfactory answers to any of them. I hope that 
this has not been a disappointment to the reader, for I be-
lieve that we have demonstrated something at least as impor-
tant: that value problems can be approached and evaluated by 
psychologists with a degree of objectivity commensurate with 
that of science. Armed with the understanding that value-
critique is the natural and necessary continuation of objec-
tive scientific inquiry, psychologists may be encouraged to 
investigate solutions to those specific moral problems as 
part of developing a design for living that is more adequate 
overall. 
Having said this, I should add that the actual imple-
mentation of this approach to value-critique does not lie 
somewhere off in the future. It is no mere abstraction, far 
removed from current attempts to come to terms with the 
problem of values. In exploring the matter of value-involve-
ment in psychotherapy, its implications and possible ways of 
responding to it, we have already been engaged in the sort 
of value-critique proposed. So have the several critics 
whose investigations share that objective. It has simply 
been difficult before now to define the nature of these in-
quiries, as well as to defend their legitimacy. 
I have been convinced that if both scientific-minded 
psychologists and traditional moralists are willing to forgo 
dogmatism in their respective attitudes toward values, some 
notion along the lines developed here could serve as a com-
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mon ground from which a better integrated model of human na-
ture and human conduct might emerge. I have tried to indi-
cate that this position is consonant with the scientific· 
perspective, not only because there exists an intrinsic con-
nection between scientific inquiry and value-critique, but 
also because our moral striving itself may be viewed as a 
natural process and integrated into our scientific under-
standing of man as a natural being. Yet inasmuch as it en-
tails no reductive materialism, this "naturalism" should not 
render our approach unacceptable to traditional moralists, 
including those with a theological orientation. If any-
thing, it suggests that in human nature there is an indwell-
ing principle of development that is both natural and moral 
in the same moment, and that aims human activity (however 
falteringly) toward the concrete realization of the good. 
It is highly presumptuous to think that we already 
possess an adequate grasp of human nature, so there remains 
a great deal of room for developing an understanding accept-
able to all. Indeed, it would be troubling if these two 
powerful movements--science and moral tradition--were unable 
to establish some common ground for understanding human na-
ture and human interests. As Harris (1959) points out, each 
one seeks to reveal a truth that penetrates every detail of 
our lives, that claims our total allegience, and that must 
be ultimately all-inclusive. 
Although there has always been a tension between sci-
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ence and moral tradition, it is particularly evident in our 
age, as is the need for a reconciliation of the two. We 
have already examined that need on the side of social sci-
ence, in terms of the covert moral implications of the psy-
chologists' models of man. But it is evident on the other 
side as well, as was thrust dramatically into attention by 
the creationists' renewed assault upon scientific authority. 
In each case, we are challenged to examine how our most 
deeply held convictions about the moral character of man and 
the scientific conception of man actually bear upon one 
another. Up to now we have managed to hold them apart and 
in parallel, but that may no longer be possible. 
It is important to recognize that this need for re-
conciliation is a practical exigency as much as an intellec-
tual or philosophical one. Each has claimed for itself the 
right to dictate the lines of our conduct and to determine 
the arrangement of human affairs. We accept that this is so 
of moral traditions, but it is no less so of science. Here 
we have addressed the part played by psychologists in di-
recting human conduct. Other authors have pointed out the 
more subtle yet even farther reaching impact of technology 
upon the arrangement of our lives. 
The world-view advanced by modern science and the one 
promoted by moral tradition conflict in several respects. 
That cannot be denied. Yet it cannot be taken as evidence 
that science and ethics themselves are fundamentally antago-
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nistic to one another. I have tried to suggest that such 
conflict is indicative only of inadequacies in our under-
standing of the nature of each and of their relation to one 
another. Hence, the ostensibly contrary pulls exerted upon 
the psychotherapeutic discipline because of its simultaneous 
involvement in the realms of fact and of value need not 
eventually render it asunder--that is, as long as we strive 
to rectify those inadequacies and to integrate the two into 
a more comprehensive interpretative framework. 
A few psychologists have argued, along one line or 
another, that it is indeed possible to reconcile moral and 
spiritual values within the psychotherapeutic framework pro-
vided by psychological science. Although I am substantially 
in agreement with that aim, I believe that it is also neces-
sary to caution that a true reconciliation of science and 
moral tradition cannot be achieved merely by incorporating 
one into the other. That might only make of psychotherapy 
little more than a vehicle for promulgating uncritically 
accepted values--whether they be the values of traditional 
religion or the values of contemporary materialism. [As I 
have indicated before, this reconciliation must be a matter 
of drawing out the mutual implications of the scientific and 
the moral approaches to human experience, which might then 
be articulated as two aspects of a single complex process~ 
Initially I characterized the psychotherapists' posi-
tion as one of straddling the domains of science and ethics. 
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Since then, however, we have considered that the gulf that 
divides the two is largely our own creation, the result of 
our failure to comprehend adequately the nature of each and 
their essential relatedness. With this in mind, I would 
suggest a different image: that psychotherapists stand at 
the confluence of science and ethics. The main thrust of 
the present argument is, in short, that the psychotherapeu-
tic enterprise constitutes an incipient concrete synthesis 
of the scientific and moral perspectives. 
I realize that this position may seem somewhat pre-
sumptuous, even if taken to represent an ideal still scarce-
ly realized in actual practice. Yet I believe that it is 
implicit in the task that psychotherapists have set for 
themselves. They strive to be both scientists and moralists 
in their approach to understanding and directing human be-
havior. 
However, the currently held conception of science and 
the prevailing systems of moral governance cannot be fitted 
with one another without some modification and adjustment 
of each. The former has its doctrinal roots in empiricism, 
while the latter are grounded in and justified by reference 
to tradition or consensus; we have found reason to question 
the adequacy of either one. If psychotherapists are to de-
velop a design for living that is consistently both scienti-
fic and moral, their approach must fulfill the essential 
conditions of scientific inquiry in such a way that it si-
246 
multaneously fulfills the essential aim of our moral striv-
ing. If the psychotherapeutic enterprise actually met that 
criterion, it would indeed constitute a concrete synthesis 
of science and ethics. 
SUMMARY 
Moral values and value judgments are involved in· 
every aspect of the psychotherapeutic enterprise. The de-
sign for living promoted by psychotherapists is implicitly 
a system of moral governance, inasmuch as its principles and 
prescriptions constitute directives as to how persons ought 
to interpret their experiences and conduct their lives. 
Psychotherapists have been reluctant to address their in-
volvement in values, first, because they assume that as sci-
entists they must restrict their investigations to the do-
main of observable fact, and second, because they share the 
common belief that moral values are a personal and subjec-
tive matter, not susceptible to objective validation. Other 
covert factors contribute further to their reluctance. Yet 
psychotherapists cannot escape their role as moral agents 
without abandoning their role as change agents. They have a 
responsibility to examine self-critically the values that 
they promote, for the psychotherapeutic design for living is 
morally justified only so far as its implicit values are 
adequate. Inasmuch as no existing value-system, including 
the current psychotherapeutic ideal, can be employed to 
evaluate its rivals, some other standard of moral valuation 
is required. An approach to value-critique involving the 
reciprocal evaluation and mutual supplementation and adjust-
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ment of values does not suffer the inadequacies of other ap-
proaches; a principle of mutual congruousness or harmonious 
reconciliation emerges as the only objective standard of 
valuation. Within this framework, the psychotherapeutic en-
terprise is viewed as a formalization of man's collective 
moral striving, and psychological inquiry is an extension of 
the process of value-inquiry. Although science and ethics 
are commonly believed to be utterly discrete, the activity 
of formulating and justifying a system of moral governance 
is actually a continuation of the scientific process and not 
a departure from it. When the process of scientific inquiry 
is carried to the level of psychology, it begins to emerge 
as value-critique as well, and the moral striving implicit 
in science becomes explicit in psychology as the ongoing at-
tempt to perfect an objective design for living and to or-
ganize human conduct along its lines. Thus, the psychother-
apeutic enterprise constitutes an incipient concrete synthe-
sis of science and ethics. 
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